From f7affbf1a640fd547398284cdae4b8e197f446ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 12:10:16 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "ion: ensure CMO target is valid"

This reverts commit 88e7e589568488ff983950c083d456bc072ca393.

Bug: 72957321
Bug: 79219092
Change-Id: I8894188f90682c00f9b2fec0b5f6b74cf4a8562c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
---
 drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c         |  5 -----
 drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c
index 5973e5b76146..c283701a5887 100755
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c
@@ -1480,11 +1480,6 @@ static int ion_sync_for_device(struct ion_client *client, int fd)
 	}
 	buffer = dmabuf->priv;
 
-	if (buffer->flags & ION_FLAG_SECURE) {
-		pr_err("%s: cannot sync a secure dmabuf\n", __func__);
-		dma_buf_put(dmabuf);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 	dma_sync_sg_for_device(NULL, buffer->sg_table->sgl,
 			       buffer->sg_table->nents, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
 	dma_buf_put(dmabuf);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c
index 828826254657..8e10e0cddd74 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014,2016,2018 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and
@@ -722,11 +722,11 @@ long msm_ion_custom_ioctl(struct ion_client *client,
 
 		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 
-		start = (unsigned long)data.flush_data.vaddr +
-			data.flush_data.offset;
-		end = start + data.flush_data.length;
+		start = (unsigned long) data.flush_data.vaddr;
+		end = (unsigned long) data.flush_data.vaddr
+			+ data.flush_data.length;
 
-		if (check_vaddr_bounds(start, end)) {
+		if (start && check_vaddr_bounds(start, end)) {
 			pr_err("%s: virtual address %p is out of bounds\n",
 				__func__, data.flush_data.vaddr);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
-- 
GitLab