From f7affbf1a640fd547398284cdae4b8e197f446ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com> Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 12:10:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "ion: ensure CMO target is valid" This reverts commit 88e7e589568488ff983950c083d456bc072ca393. Bug: 72957321 Bug: 79219092 Change-Id: I8894188f90682c00f9b2fec0b5f6b74cf4a8562c Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com> --- drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c | 5 ----- drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c index 5973e5b76146..c283701a5887 100755 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/ion.c @@ -1480,11 +1480,6 @@ static int ion_sync_for_device(struct ion_client *client, int fd) } buffer = dmabuf->priv; - if (buffer->flags & ION_FLAG_SECURE) { - pr_err("%s: cannot sync a secure dmabuf\n", __func__); - dma_buf_put(dmabuf); - return -EINVAL; - } dma_sync_sg_for_device(NULL, buffer->sg_table->sgl, buffer->sg_table->nents, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); dma_buf_put(dmabuf); diff --git a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c index 828826254657..8e10e0cddd74 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c +++ b/drivers/staging/android/ion/msm/msm_ion.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014,2016,2018 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. +/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 and @@ -722,11 +722,11 @@ long msm_ion_custom_ioctl(struct ion_client *client, down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - start = (unsigned long)data.flush_data.vaddr + - data.flush_data.offset; - end = start + data.flush_data.length; + start = (unsigned long) data.flush_data.vaddr; + end = (unsigned long) data.flush_data.vaddr + + data.flush_data.length; - if (check_vaddr_bounds(start, end)) { + if (start && check_vaddr_bounds(start, end)) { pr_err("%s: virtual address %p is out of bounds\n", __func__, data.flush_data.vaddr); ret = -EINVAL; -- GitLab