From 4abd409af0e7d7fb908e5f04fa1ed946e2996dce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 08:28:26 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Relax neverallow rule for loading an updated SELinux policy.

Revert the neverallow change portion of
356df32778732aa576e15071bf2736fbbd778b77, in case others need to
do dynamic policy updates.

(cherrypicked from commit e827a8ab27020be0f266a5a6083b11308fe1a349)

Bug: 22885422
Bug: 8949824
Change-Id: If0745e7f83523377fd19082cfc6b33ef47ca0647
---
 domain.te | 5 +++--
 init.te   | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/domain.te b/domain.te
index 2af36e811..e7e0d7d67 100644
--- a/domain.te
+++ b/domain.te
@@ -209,10 +209,11 @@ neverallow domain self:capability2 mac_override;
 # Only recovery needs mac_admin to set contexts not defined in current policy.
 neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin;
 
-# Nobody should be able to load a new SELinux policy.
+# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.
 # The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain,
 # but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet.
-neverallow domain kernel:security load_policy;
+# Policy reload requires allowing this to the init domain.
+neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security load_policy;
 
 # Only init and the system_server can set selinux.reload_policy 1
 # to trigger a policy reload.
diff --git a/init.te b/init.te
index 4bf40f53b..6b5709835 100644
--- a/init.te
+++ b/init.te
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ allow init unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
 allow init security_file:dir { create setattr };
 
 # Reload policy upon setprop selinux.reload_policy 1.
+# Note: this requires the following allow rule
+#   allow init kernel:security load_policy;
+# which can be configured on a device-by-device basis if needed.
 r_dir_file(init, security_file)
 
 # Any operation that can modify the kernel ring buffer, e.g. clear
-- 
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