From 55c7750482e20029ba05918ea95249f2d0cd7fcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 14:32:21 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Update sepolicy 26.0 prebuilts again, again.
Bug: 37896931
Test: none, just prebuilt update.
Change-Id: I55b5179f98703026699a59cce4b2e1afb166fd1d
---
prebuilts/api/26.0/private/app_neverallows.te | 61 ++++++++++++++++---
prebuilts/api/26.0/public/attributes | 9 +++
prebuilts/api/26.0/public/hal_neverallows.te | 5 +-
prebuilts/api/26.0/public/runas.te | 1 +
4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/26.0/private/app_neverallows.te b/prebuilts/api/26.0/private/app_neverallows.te
index 09177240e..3c159d5f1 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/26.0/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/26.0/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -132,20 +132,63 @@ neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;
# incidence rate of security issues than system/core components and have
# access to lower layes of the stack (all the way down to hardware) thus
# increasing opportunities for bypassing the Android security model.
+#
+# Safe services include:
+# - same process services: because they by definition run in the process
+# of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
+# the process runs
+# - coredomain_hwservice: are considered safe because they do not pose risks
+# associated with reason #2 above.
+# - hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs: becuase it has specifically been
+# designed for use by any domain.
+# - hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice: because these operations are also offered
+# by surfaceflinger Binder service, which apps are permitted to access
+# - hal_omx_hwservice: because this is a HwBinder version of the mediacodec
+# Binder service which apps were permitted to access.
neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
hwservice_manager_type
- # Same process services are safe because they by definition run in the process
- # of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
- # the process runs
-same_process_hwservice
- -coredomain_hwservice # neverallows for coredomain HwBinder services are below
- -hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs # Designed for use by any domain
- # These operations are also offered by surfaceflinger Binder service which
- # apps are permitted to access
+ -coredomain_hwservice
+ -hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs
-hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice
- # HwBinder version of mediacodec Binder service which apps were permitted to
- # access
-hal_omx_hwservice
+ -untrusted_app_visible_hwservice
+}:hwservice_manager find;
+neverallow untrusted_app_visible_hwservice unlabeled:service_manager list; #TODO: b/62658302
+# Make sure that the following services are never accessible by untrusted_apps
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+ default_android_hwservice
+ hal_audio_hwservice
+ hal_bluetooth_hwservice
+ hal_bootctl_hwservice
+ hal_camera_hwservice
+ hal_contexthub_hwservice
+ hal_drm_hwservice
+ hal_dumpstate_hwservice
+ hal_fingerprint_hwservice
+ hal_gatekeeper_hwservice
+ hal_gnss_hwservice
+ hal_graphics_composer_hwservice
+ hal_health_hwservice
+ hal_ir_hwservice
+ hal_keymaster_hwservice
+ hal_light_hwservice
+ hal_memtrack_hwservice
+ hal_nfc_hwservice
+ hal_oemlock_hwservice
+ hal_power_hwservice
+ hal_sensors_hwservice
+ hal_telephony_hwservice
+ hal_thermal_hwservice
+ hal_tv_cec_hwservice
+ hal_tv_input_hwservice
+ hal_usb_hwservice
+ hal_vibrator_hwservice
+ hal_vr_hwservice
+ hal_weaver_hwservice
+ hal_wifi_hwservice
+ hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice
+ hidl_base_hwservice
}:hwservice_manager find;
# HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor components)
# are considered somewhat safer due to point #2 above.
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/attributes b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/attributes
index 90740d456..cde55da19 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/attributes
+++ b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/attributes
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ attribute socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
# TODO(b/36463595)
attribute vendor_executes_system_violators;
+# hwservices that are accessible from untrusted applications
+# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless
+# absolutely necessary. It is a temporary allowance to aid the
+# transition to treble and will be removed in a future platform
+# version, requiring all hwservices that are labeled with this
+# attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain their
+# app-visibility.
+attribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice;
+
# PDX services
attribute pdx_endpoint_dir_type;
attribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/hal_neverallows.te b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/hal_neverallows.te
index feadcdadb..036e1d2dc 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/hal_neverallows.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/hal_neverallows.te
@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@ neverallow {
-rild
} self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
-# Unless a HAL's job is to manage network hardware, it should not be
-# using network sockets.
+# Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
+# hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
neverallow {
halserverdomain
+ -hal_tetheroffload_server
-hal_wifi_server
-hal_wifi_supplicant_server
-rild
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/runas.te b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/runas.te
index cda02efab..7a7febfc0 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/runas.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/26.0/public/runas.te
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ type runas, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type runas_exec, exec_type, file_type;
allow runas adbd:process sigchld;
+allow runas adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
allow runas shell:fd use;
allow runas shell:fifo_file { read write };
allow runas shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
--
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