diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 4628314f3c2a557687a6619b3c949504f59df0d1..8d9ccd6720730fe93db722c492c48505ddc2d4a7 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -93,9 +93,7 @@ neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_fil
# application un-installation.
neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
fs_type
- -fuse # sdcard
- -sdcardfs # sdcard
- -vfat
+ -sdcard_type
file_type
-app_data_file # The apps sandbox itself
-media_rw_data_file # Internal storage. Known that apps can
diff --git a/private/bug_map b/private/bug_map
index 127a7e6716623116749c0546d3d729a57963ad20..5e945944a134e3f8d8270423283dfb86d54efd2e 100644
--- a/private/bug_map
+++ b/private/bug_map
@@ -1,8 +1,43 @@
+dexoptanalyzer apk_data_file file 77853712
+dexoptanalyzer app_data_file file 77853712
+dexoptanalyzer app_data_file lnk_file 77853712
+dexoptanalyzer system_data_file lnk_file 77853712
+dnsmasq netd fifo_file 77868789
+dnsmasq netd unix_stream_socket 77868789
+init app_data_file file 77873135
+init cache_file blk_file 77873135
+init logpersist file 77873135
+init nativetest_data_file dir 77873135
+init pstorefs dir 77873135
+init shell_data_file dir 77873135
+init shell_data_file file 77873135
+init shell_data_file lnk_file 77873135
+init shell_data_file sock_file 77873135
+init system_data_file chr_file 77873135
+mediaextractor app_data_file file 77923736
+mediaextractor radio_data_file file 77923736
+mediaprovider cache_file blk_file 77925342
+mediaprovider mnt_media_rw_file dir 77925342
+mediaprovider shell_data_file dir 77925342
+netd priv_app unix_stream_socket 77870037
+netd untrusted_app unix_stream_socket 77870037
+netd untrusted_app_25 unix_stream_socket 77870037
+netd untrusted_app_27 unix_stream_socket 77870037
platform_app nfc_data_file dir 74331887
+postinstall postinstall capability 77958490
+postinstall_dexopt postinstall_dexopt capability 77958490
+postinstall_dexopt user_profile_data_file file 77958490
priv_app system_data_file dir 72811052
+profman apk_data_file dir 77922323
+statsd hal_health_default binder 77919007
storaged storaged capability 77634061
+surfaceflinger mediacodec binder 77924251
system_server crash_dump process 73128755
+system_server logd_socket sock_file 64734187
+system_server sdcardfs file 77856826
+system_server zygote process 77856826
untrusted_app_25 system_data_file dir 72550646
untrusted_app_27 system_data_file dir 72550646
usbd usbd capability 72472544
system_server sysfs file 77816522
+zygote untrusted_app_25 process 77925912
diff --git a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
index 71c7a007445f8a5bb97ebf474085f6b7572c9c96..d45596ab982b97674faf2f33653adcb19731982e 100644
--- a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
crossprofileapps_service
e2fs
e2fs_exec
+ exfat
exported_bluetooth_prop
exported_config_prop
exported_dalvik_prop
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@
lowpan_service
mediaextractor_update_service
mediaprovider_tmpfs
+ mnt_vendor_file
netd_stable_secret_prop
network_watchlist_data_file
network_watchlist_service
@@ -86,6 +88,8 @@
statsd
statsd_exec
statsd_tmpfs
+ statsdw
+ statsdw_socket
statscompanion_service
storaged_data_file
sysfs_fs_ext4_features
diff --git a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
index 94c81d0cb8332f2a6915bdbe12a583a1a3dfbeda..aa322418f657488fc55424ee7383de5a5ca9cdd0 100644
--- a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
bpfloader_exec
cgroup_bpf
crossprofileapps_service
+ exfat
exported2_config_prop
exported2_default_prop
exported2_radio_prop
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@
lowpan_prop
lowpan_service
mediaextractor_update_service
+ mnt_vendor_file
network_watchlist_data_file
network_watchlist_service
perfetto
@@ -74,6 +76,8 @@
statsd
statsd_exec
statsd_tmpfs
+ statsdw
+ statsdw_socket
storaged_data_file
system_boot_reason_prop
system_update_service
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index fda972b48f11e374048e78ade629a76df82db556..58ee0def82540ac88fbc049c5eef678f32235a95 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ type config_gz, fs_type, proc_type;
# /data/misc/stats-data, /data/misc/stats-service
type stats_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type statsdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+
# /data/misc/storaged
type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index c5169ff60060848755275c267bbd59770e3c1027..71bff736572776b534a04644f3d4959f28cc128b 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
/dev/socket/logd u:object_r:logd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/logdr u:object_r:logdr_socket:s0
/dev/socket/logdw u:object_r:logdw_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/statsdw u:object_r:statsdw_socket:s0
/dev/socket/mdns u:object_r:mdns_socket:s0
/dev/socket/mdnsd u:object_r:mdnsd_socket:s0
/dev/socket/mtpd u:object_r:mtpd_socket:s0
@@ -526,3 +527,7 @@
/mnt/user(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0
/mnt/runtime(/.*)? u:object_r:storage_file:s0
/storage(/.*)? u:object_r:storage_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# mount point for read-write vendor partitions
+/mnt/vendor(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_vendor_file:s0
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index c261afa9e8ad369e94184f52a0e316bcf7ea36cc..ce26d73a69efedc4663de19afb358d5d7d2b2444 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/lowmemorykiller/
genfscon inotifyfs / u:object_r:inotify:s0
genfscon vfat / u:object_r:vfat:s0
+genfscon exfat / u:object_r:exfat:s0
genfscon debugfs / u:object_r:debugfs:s0
genfscon fuse / u:object_r:fuse:s0
genfscon configfs / u:object_r:configfs:s0
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 80b20e1454e0cb8cd5efba77de2c2ad9e3c2796c..f60597a7ef59918bbe2d4405781b6777b8e0bd82 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ allow platform_app cache_file:file create_file_perms;
# Direct access to vold-mounted storage under /mnt/media_rw
# This is a performance optimization that allows platform apps to bypass the FUSE layer
allow platform_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow platform_app vfat:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow platform_app vfat:file create_file_perms;
+allow platform_app sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow platform_app sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
# com.android.systemui
allow platform_app rootfs:dir getattr;
diff --git a/private/statsd.te b/private/statsd.te
index fec10a4b69aa8d35f7085fb59657da9341d56add..7305464ba370c6f6c8479ddedb30e254bfb796e6 100644
--- a/private/statsd.te
+++ b/private/statsd.te
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-type statsd, domain;
+type statsd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
typeattribute statsd coredomain;
init_daemon_domain(statsd)
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ binder_call(statsd, stats)
# Allow access to with hardware layer and process stats.
allow statsd proc_uid_cputime_showstat:file { getattr open read };
+hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_health)
hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_power)
hal_client_domain(statsd, hal_thermal)
@@ -81,6 +82,12 @@ allow statsd adbd:fd use;
allow statsd adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
allow statsd shell:fifo_file { getattr read };
+unix_socket_send(bluetooth, statsdw, statsd)
+unix_socket_send(bootstat, statsdw, statsd)
+unix_socket_send(platform_app, statsdw, statsd)
+unix_socket_send(statsd, statsdw, statsd)
+unix_socket_send(system_server, statsdw, statsd)
+
###
### neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 9830bd6a93ea1f62545f4bfe558d59a3d4e9a432..5c2335e7f1cc74be71ab0440825b278cea2ddfb7 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
+allow system_server mediacodec:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_camera:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaserver:process { getsched setsched };
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ allow system_server bootanim:process { getsched setsched };
# Allow system_server to write to /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns
allow system_server appdomain:file w_file_perms;
allow system_server audioserver:file w_file_perms;
+allow system_server mediacodec:file w_file_perms;
allow system_server cameraserver:file w_file_perms;
allow system_server hal_audio_server:file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index 93d6c115b152d0bb2582d0300d3d3e4f599bb879..ab1825824998ce4412a94910a926209ae2b65c45 100644
--- a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ allow vold_prepare_subdirs self:process setfscreate;
allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
system_data_file
vendor_data_file
-}:dir { open read write add_name remove_name relabelfrom };
-allow vold_prepare_subdirs system_data_file:file getattr;
+}:dir { open read write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
+allow vold_prepare_subdirs system_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
allow vold_prepare_subdirs vold_data_file:dir { create open read write search getattr setattr remove_name rmdir relabelto };
allow vold_prepare_subdirs vold_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
allow vold_prepare_subdirs storaged_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
diff --git a/public/app.te b/public/app.te
index 5df558e398eea4ef9f7dce2c4acb7d0c9aa2fba6..ac11a3a108eeb4f449a1c21304752a2bdf5c07c1 100644
--- a/public/app.te
+++ b/public/app.te
@@ -260,19 +260,12 @@ allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Read/write visible storage
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } fuse:file create_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcardfs:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { media_rw_data_file vfat }:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
-# File write access allowed for FDs returned through Storage Access Framework
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } vfat:file rw_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 1b7bbd4abf30f44bd89fd48c49205344feabc822..cccc651597a2359e6225bce171c7f38eec710bb8 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -363,6 +363,14 @@ neverallow {
-system_server
-ueventd
} hw_random_device:chr_file *;
+# b/78174219 b/64114943
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -shell # stat of /dev, getattr only
+ -vendor_init
+ -ueventd
+} keychord_device:chr_file *;
# Ensure that all entrypoint executables are in exec_type or postinstall_file.
neverallow * { file_type -exec_type -postinstall_file }:file entrypoint;
@@ -560,7 +568,7 @@ neverallow {
} serialno_prop:file r_file_perms;
# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
-neverallow { domain -init -system_server } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;
neverallow {
domain
@@ -600,6 +608,7 @@ neverallow {
-init
-uncrypt
-update_engine
+ -vendor_init
-vold
-recovery
-ueventd
@@ -834,13 +843,25 @@ full_treble_only(`
-appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
-coredomain
-data_between_core_and_vendor_violators # TODO(b/34980020) Remove once all violators have been cleaned up
+ -vendor_init
} {
core_data_file_type
# libc includes functions like mktime and localtime which attempt to access
# files in /data/misc/zoneinfo/tzdata file. These functions are considered
# vndk-stable and thus must be allowed for all processes.
-zoneinfo_data_file
- }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+ }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+ neverallow {
+ vendor_init
+ -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+ } {
+ core_data_file_type
+ -unencrypted_data_file
+ -zoneinfo_data_file
+ }:file_class_set ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
+ # vendor init needs to be able to read unencrypted_data_file to create directories with FBE.
+ # The vendor init binary lives on the system partition so there is not a concern with stability.
+ neverallow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:file ~r_file_perms;
')
full_treble_only(`
# vendor domains may only access dirs in /data/vendor, never core_data_file_types
@@ -849,12 +870,26 @@ full_treble_only(`
-appdomain # TODO(b/34980020) remove exemption for appdomain
-coredomain
-data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
- } {
- core_data_file_type
- -system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below...
- -vendor_data_file
- -zoneinfo_data_file
- }:dir *;
+ -vendor_init
+ } {
+ core_data_file_type
+ -system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below...
+ -vendor_data_file
+ -zoneinfo_data_file
+ }:dir *;
+ neverallow {
+ vendor_init
+ -data_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+ } {
+ core_data_file_type
+ -unencrypted_data_file
+ -system_data_file
+ -vendor_data_file
+ -zoneinfo_data_file
+ }:dir *;
+ # vendor init needs to be able to read unencrypted_data_file to create directories with FBE.
+ # The vendor init binary lives on the system partition so there is not a concern with stability.
+ neverallow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:dir ~search;
')
full_treble_only(`
# vendor domains may only access dirs in /data/vendor, never core_data_file_types
@@ -1121,6 +1156,7 @@ neverallow {
-system_app
-init
-installd # for relabelfrom and unlink, check for this in explicit neverallow
+ -vold_prepare_subdirs # For unlink
with_asan(`-asan_extract')
} system_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
# do not grant anything greater than r_file_perms and relabelfrom unlink
@@ -1355,3 +1391,9 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
dontaudit domain proc_type:file create;
dontaudit domain sysfs_type:file create;
')
+
+# Platform must not have access to /mnt/vendor.
+neverallow {
+ coredomain
+ -init
+} mnt_vendor_file:dir *;
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 8906f5dcf4c8431ec3aacc0a8fc502519fb29a85..596f33247a9d3e9bda7e29da0beb931f32ed1a6f 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ allow dumpstate cache_recovery_file:file r_file_perms;
allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+#Access /data/misc/update_engine_log
+allow dumpstate update_engine_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate update_engine_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
# Access /data/misc/profiles/{cur,ref}/
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow dumpstate user_profile_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -233,16 +237,8 @@ set_prop(dumpstate, exported_dumpstate_prop)
# dumpstate_options_prop is used to pass extra command-line args.
set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_options_prop)
-# Read device's serial number from system properties
-get_prop(dumpstate, serialno_prop)
-
-# Read state of logging-related properties
-get_prop(dumpstate, device_logging_prop)
-
-# Read state of boot reason properties
-get_prop(dumpstate, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
-get_prop(dumpstate, last_boot_reason_prop)
-get_prop(dumpstate, system_boot_reason_prop)
+# Read any system properties
+get_prop(dumpstate, property_type)
# Access to /data/media.
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 156fce141519249a0ef180f6f7870de867ed0f4a..1451dc4501bfb8f4d6f2a9ef26f8cef9bb3f6529 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ type mqueue, fs_type;
type fuse, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
type sdcardfs, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
type vfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type exfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
type debugfs, fs_type, debugfs_type;
type debugfs_mmc, fs_type, debugfs_type;
type debugfs_trace_marker, fs_type, debugfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
@@ -224,6 +225,9 @@ type storage_file, file_type;
type mnt_media_rw_stub_file, file_type;
type storage_stub_file, file_type;
+# Mount location for read-write vendor partitions.
+type mnt_vendor_file, file_type;
+
# /postinstall: Mount point used by update_engine to run postinstall.
type postinstall_mnt_dir, file_type;
# Files inside the /postinstall mountpoint are all labeled as postinstall_file.
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index d5f2ef6fe440e7e8342ebd0703032b8efc4cc688..c8051e142f8f8e17439cc638ca7bc6f54b5107d1 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -49,7 +49,14 @@ neverallow hal_configstore_server {
}:{ file fifo_file sock_file } *;
# Should never need sdcard access
-neverallow hal_configstore_server { fuse sdcardfs vfat }:file *;
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+ sdcard_type
+ fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat # manual expansion for completeness
+}:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow hal_configstore_server {
+ sdcard_type
+ fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat # manual expansion for completeness
+}:file *;
# Do not permit access to service_manager and vndservice_manager
neverallow hal_configstore_server *:service_manager *;
diff --git a/public/hal_telephony.te b/public/hal_telephony.te
index 31859aa5179608b03c9d7687faf3b675a09e2a3f..5f8cc41ca10a3b1cba2db638ffce849b014a0933 100644
--- a/public/hal_telephony.te
+++ b/public/hal_telephony.te
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ allow hal_telephony_server efs_file:file create_file_perms;
allow hal_telephony_server vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow hal_telephony_server bluetooth_efs_file:file r_file_perms;
allow hal_telephony_server bluetooth_efs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow hal_telephony_server sdcard_type:dir r_dir_perms;
# property service
set_prop(hal_telephony_server, radio_prop)
diff --git a/public/lmkd.te b/public/lmkd.te
index 5b6a7084bfa9839aa9f5a59b49d45feb88b74270..472946ece09291baa6b87e8afc086308a5e97e18 100644
--- a/public/lmkd.te
+++ b/public/lmkd.te
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ allow lmkd domain:file { open read };
# reboot because orderly shutdown may not be possible.
allow lmkd proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
+# Read /proc/meminfo
+allow lmkd proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
### neverallow rules
# never honor LD_PRELOAD
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index 0e9e08ca7f0772f62d97d17a0a87b9e8d7ecb082..18113e75662d686d79a4982211a5853b4288f70d 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ neverallow netd { appdomain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call;
# persist.netd.stable_secret contains RFC 7217 secret key which should never be
# leaked to other processes. Make sure it never leaks.
-neverallow { domain -netd -init } netd_stable_secret_prop:file r_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -netd -init -dumpstate } netd_stable_secret_prop:file r_file_perms;
# We want to ensure that no other process ever tries tampering with persist.netd.stable_secret,
# the RFC 7217 secret key managed by netd. Doing so could compromise user privacy.
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index f757936d7b669c1cbfb5546f9a948fa1e34cb9b6..0e298098885945e466c5130a7a3977d20b4a6059 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -154,7 +154,6 @@ compatible_property_only(`
-coredomain
-appdomain
-hal_nfc_server
- -vendor_init
} {
nfc_prop
}:property_service set;
@@ -167,11 +166,57 @@ compatible_property_only(`
-vendor_init
} {
exported_radio_prop
- exported2_radio_prop
exported3_radio_prop
+ }:property_service set;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -appdomain
+ -hal_telephony_server
+ } {
+ exported2_radio_prop
radio_prop
}:property_service set;
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -bluetooth
+ -hal_bluetooth
+ } {
+ bluetooth_prop
+ }:property_service set;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -bluetooth
+ -hal_bluetooth
+ -vendor_init
+ } {
+ exported_bluetooth_prop
+ }:property_service set;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -hal_wifi
+ -wificond
+ } {
+ wifi_prop
+ }:property_service set;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -hal_wifi
+ -wificond
+ -vendor_init
+ } {
+ exported_wifi_prop
+ }:property_service set;
+
# Prevent properties from being read
neverallow {
domain
@@ -200,7 +245,6 @@ compatible_property_only(`
-coredomain
-appdomain
-hal_nfc_server
- -vendor_init
} {
nfc_prop
}:file no_rw_file_perms;
@@ -210,8 +254,25 @@ compatible_property_only(`
-coredomain
-appdomain
-hal_telephony_server
- -vendor_init
} {
radio_prop
}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -bluetooth
+ -hal_bluetooth
+ } {
+ bluetooth_prop
+ }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+ neverallow {
+ domain
+ -coredomain
+ -hal_wifi
+ -wificond
+ } {
+ wifi_prop
+ }:file no_rw_file_perms;
')
diff --git a/public/property_contexts b/public/property_contexts
index 0156a47bb02d6a2ed4677eb597150fd882185461..0907a27f16d0580d5e3857c243315db4efd7186f 100644
--- a/public/property_contexts
+++ b/public/property_contexts
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ drm.service.enabled u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
keyguard.no_require_sim u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
media.recorder.show_manufacturer_and_model u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
-persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.config.calibration_fac u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact string
persist.dbg.volte_avail_ovr u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact int
persist.dbg.vt_avail_ovr u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ persist.radio.multisim.config u:object_r:exported3_radio_prop:s0 exact string
persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2 u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact string
persist.sys.sf.color_saturation u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact string
persist.sys.sf.native_mode u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
pm.dexopt.ab-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.first-boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.install u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
ro.audio.monitorRotation u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.supported u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
ro.boot.vendor.overlay.theme u:object_r:exported_overlay_prop:s0 exact string
ro.boot.wificountrycode u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact string
ro.bt.bdaddr_path u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact string
diff --git a/public/tombstoned.te b/public/tombstoned.te
index cf3ddcba9b8dda8e37449f98793f097efb48d516..1dfcf504f081cf2e14587a3197f71ba9bd5d55b4 100644
--- a/public/tombstoned.te
+++ b/public/tombstoned.te
@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ auditallow tombstoned anr_data_file:file { append write };
# Changes for the new stack dumping mechanism. Each trace goes into a
# separate file, and these files are managed by tombstoned.
allow tombstoned anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow tombstoned anr_data_file:file { getattr open create };
+allow tombstoned anr_data_file:file { create getattr open unlink };
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index 0237861a949ce133d04013280a9963e9c0df11ee..b025fc88a97384830b9d2d20652a4d4a30c9f07d 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
# we just allow all file types except /system files here.
allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid };
+# mkdir with FBE requires reading /data/unencrypted/{ref,mode}.
+allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:dir search;
+allow vendor_init unencrypted_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow vendor_init system_data_file:dir getattr;
+
allow vendor_init {
file_type
-core_data_file_type
@@ -146,6 +152,9 @@ allow vendor_init serialno_prop:file { getattr open read };
# Vendor init can perform operations on trusted and security Extended Attributes
allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+# Raw writes to misc block device
+allow vendor_init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
not_compatible_property(`
set_prop(vendor_init, {
property_type
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index ba3c705e22279d0e23e60325743b7da325da5fd8..17a12d9136fffd364e2f74ce98604c05d5ecbe58 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.omx@1\.0-service u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio\.config@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_radio_config_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-radio-service u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-sap-service u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_radio_default.te b/vendor/hal_radio_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..82fd40e948895f4200e79c0a5b1ce20b3ebadb28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_radio_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+type hal_radio_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_radio_default, hal_telephony)
+
+type hal_radio_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_radio_default)
+