diff --git a/app.te b/app.te
index 097224472b0cf1efaff506c82ed203861aece76d..902200181e43ddac5933a2a1853b413270d85ce6 100644
--- a/app.te
+++ b/app.te
@@ -222,8 +222,7 @@ neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
 
 # Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
 neverallow appdomain
-    self:{
-        netlink_socket
+    domain:{
         netlink_firewall_socket
         netlink_tcpdiag_socket
         netlink_nflog_socket
@@ -236,7 +235,7 @@ neverallow appdomain
 # These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
 # Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
 # of rooting vulns in the past.
-neverallow appdomain self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
+neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
 
 # Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
 neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
diff --git a/untrusted_app.te b/untrusted_app.te
index efa0520f0b40e1b740d5bdd6d8f62b2d53bf7bc8..77dafea1830c791358d047c0d8b2d7f47025f117 100644
--- a/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/untrusted_app.te
@@ -124,7 +124,10 @@ auditallow untrusted_app {
 ###
 
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
-neverallow untrusted_app self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_socket *;
 
 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.