diff --git a/app.te b/app.te
index 21fdc8ad5b816cac18b8ec7ed0c0c7ea8522a470..5215633a90f8e358ae61a89ea220f765beffe836 100644
--- a/app.te
+++ b/app.te
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
 allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
 
 # Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
+allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
 allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
 allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
@@ -137,6 +138,8 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
 
 # Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
 allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
+# read /proc/net/xt_qtguid/stats
+r_dir_file(appdomain, proc_net)
 # Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
 # So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
 allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
@@ -164,7 +167,8 @@ allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
 allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
 allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
 # Backup ability using 'adb backup'
-allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
+allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read };
 
 # Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
 allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
@@ -231,6 +235,8 @@ allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
   ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
 
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# TODO is write really necessary ?
+auditallow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file { write append };
 
 # TODO: switch to meminfo service
 allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/bluetooth.te b/bluetooth.te
index 4b20a5828cf8fe27d6f722c03201759746976880..2723df22e8694d2eb4899281803065ecfd1febbf 100644
--- a/bluetooth.te
+++ b/bluetooth.te
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ r_dir_file(bluetooth, bluetooth_efs_file)
 allow bluetooth { uhid_device hci_attach_dev }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # sysfs access.
+r_dir_file(bluetooth, sysfs_type)
 allow bluetooth sysfs_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
 allow bluetooth self:capability net_admin;
 allow bluetooth self:capability2 wake_alarm;
diff --git a/clatd.te b/clatd.te
index 3cda6a2a3be3b1452b9aca85fe30649ff766803b..fd6be00c90ebaf9838304b1a16e46983c117d971 100644
--- a/clatd.te
+++ b/clatd.te
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ type clatd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
 net_domain(clatd)
 
+r_dir_file(clatd, proc_net)
+
 # Access objects inherited from netd.
 allow clatd netd:fd use;
 allow clatd netd:fifo_file { read write };
diff --git a/debuggerd.te b/debuggerd.te
index 2b8d229f5f2f44aaeede5c6b29d88a314d12e831..1e84e8d3111ff38be989bd16da3f645dd29b755a 100644
--- a/debuggerd.te
+++ b/debuggerd.te
@@ -58,3 +58,7 @@ read_logd(debuggerd)
 
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(debuggerd)
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow debuggerd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow debuggerd dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/dex2oat.te b/dex2oat.te
index 48daac3fe3ba7e6512df2f04b41eef74a3c53c42..c18f496b5ee35c27ed18e07acefcf6f5cb7c4889 100644
--- a/dex2oat.te
+++ b/dex2oat.te
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
 type dex2oat, domain, domain_deprecated;
 type dex2oat_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, apk_data_file)
+
+allow dex2oat tmpfs:file { read getattr };
+
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, dalvikcache_data_file)
 allow dex2oat dalvikcache_data_file:file write;
 # Read symlinks in /data/dalvik-cache. This is required for PIC mode boot images, where
 # the oat file is symlinked to the original file in /system.
diff --git a/domain_deprecated.te b/domain_deprecated.te
index 22bac861867adfcd9a1a37923479c5d1c28c1077..b0a6addd64e6adbe2ec784906f4f6f45474cab75 100644
--- a/domain_deprecated.te
+++ b/domain_deprecated.te
@@ -4,52 +4,82 @@
 allow domain_deprecated kernel:fd use;
 allow domain_deprecated tmpfs:file { read getattr };
 allow domain_deprecated tmpfs:lnk_file { read getattr };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -init } kernel:fd use;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -dex2oat } tmpfs:file { read getattr };
+auditallow domain_deprecated tmpfs:lnk_file { read getattr };
 
 # Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
 allow domain_deprecated tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -sdcardd -surfaceflinger -system_server -vold -zygote } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Inherit or receive open files from others.
 allow domain_deprecated system_server:fd use;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -mediaextractor -mediaserver -netd -surfaceflinger } system_server:fd use;
 
 # Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
 # This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
 allow domain_deprecated adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 allow domain_deprecated adbd:fd use;
 allow domain_deprecated adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -system_server } adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -system_server } adbd:fd use;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -system_server } adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
 
 # Root fs.
 allow domain_deprecated rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated rootfs:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -healthd -init -installd -kernel -priv_app -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -uncrypt -vold -zygote } rootfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -healthd -init -installd -kernel -priv_app -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -uncrypt -vold -zygote } rootfs:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -healthd -init -installd -kernel -priv_app -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -uncrypt -vold -zygote } rootfs:lnk_file { getattr open ioctl lock }; # read granted in domain
 
 # Device accesses.
 allow domain_deprecated device:file read;
+auditallow domain_deprecated device:file read;
 
 # System file accesses.
 allow domain_deprecated system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated system_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -drmserver -init -rild -surfaceflinger -system_server -zygote } system_file:dir { open read ioctl lock }; # search getattr in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -drmserver -init -rild -surfaceflinger -system_server -zygote } system_file:file { ioctl lock }; # read open getattr in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -drmserver -init -rild -surfaceflinger -system_server -zygote } system_file:lnk_file { getattr open ioctl lock }; # read in domain
 
 # Read files already opened under /data.
 allow domain_deprecated system_data_file:file { getattr read };
 allow domain_deprecated system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -logd -sdcardd -system_server -tee } system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -logd -system_server -tee } system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read apk files under /data/app.
 allow domain_deprecated apk_data_file:dir { getattr search };
 allow domain_deprecated apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated apk_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -dex2oat -init -installd -system_server } apk_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -dex2oat -installd -system_server } apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -dex2oat -installd -system_server } apk_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read /data/dalvik-cache.
 allow domain_deprecated dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
 allow domain_deprecated dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -dex2oat -init -installd -system_server -zygote } dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -dex2oat -installd -system_server -zygote } dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read already opened /cache files.
 allow domain_deprecated cache_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated cache_file:file { getattr read };
 allow domain_deprecated cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -init -priv_app -system_server -vold } cache_file:dir { open read search ioctl lock };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -priv_app -system_server -vold } cache_file:dir getattr;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -init -priv_app -system_server -vold } cache_file:file { getattr read };
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -init -system_server -vold } cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 #Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow domain_deprecated ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# split this auditallow into read and write perms since most domains seem to
+# only require read
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -fingerprintd -gatekeeperd -keystore -mediaserver -surfaceflinger -system_server -tee -vold -zygote } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+auditallow domain_deprecated ion_device:chr_file { write append };
 
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(domain_deprecated, proc)
@@ -58,11 +88,28 @@ r_dir_file(domain_deprecated, inotify)
 r_dir_file(domain_deprecated, cgroup)
 allow domain_deprecated proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 r_dir_file(domain_deprecated, proc_net)
+#auditallow domain_deprecated proc:dir r_dir_perms; # r_dir_perms granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -fsck -fsck_untrusted -init -kernel -logd -priv_app -rild -system_server -vold } proc:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -fsck -fsck_untrusted -init -kernel -logd -priv_app -rild -system_server -vold } proc:lnk_file { open ioctl lock }; # getattr read granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -bluetooth -fingerprintd -healthd -init -netd -priv_app -rild -system_app -surfaceflinger -system_server -tee -ueventd -vold -wpa } sysfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -bluetooth -fingerprintd -healthd -init -netd -priv_app -rild -system_app -surfaceflinger -system_server -tee -ueventd -vold -wpa } sysfs:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -bluetooth -fingerprintd -healthd -init -netd -priv_app -rild -system_app -surfaceflinger -system_server -tee -ueventd -vold -wpa } sysfs:lnk_file { getattr open ioctl lock }; # read granted in domain
+auditallow domain_deprecated inotify:dir r_dir_perms;
+auditallow domain_deprecated inotify:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -drmserver -fingerprintd -gatekeeperd -healthd -init -inputflinger -installd -keystore -logd -mediaextractor -mediaserver -netd -rild -surfaceflinger -system_server -zygote } cgroup:dir r_dir_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -drmserver -fingerprintd -gatekeeperd -healthd -init -inputflinger -installd -keystore -logd -mediaextractor -mediaserver -netd -rild -surfaceflinger -system_server -zygote } cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -logd -mediaextractor -priv_app -surfaceflinger -system_server -vold } proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -clatd -init -logd -netd -system_server -vold -wpa -zygote } proc_net:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -clatd -init -logd -netd -system_server -vold -wpa -zygote } proc_net:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 
 # Get SELinux enforcing status.
 allow domain_deprecated selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -drmserver -init -installd -kernel -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -drmserver -init -installd -kernel -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:file { open read ioctl lock }; # getattr granted in domain
 
 # World readable asec image contents
 allow domain_deprecated asec_public_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated { asec_public_file asec_apk_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+auditallow domain_deprecated asec_public_file:file r_file_perms;
+auditallow domain_deprecated { asec_public_file asec_apk_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/drmserver.te b/drmserver.te
index 9a9cfc0981dbd828c8ed07206fc21f30c3f14cdb..b385e490d88f8efcccbe32d263d69513d7bc4e02 100644
--- a/drmserver.te
+++ b/drmserver.te
@@ -53,3 +53,6 @@ allow drmserver drmserver_service:service_manager { add find };
 allow drmserver permission_service:service_manager find;
 
 selinux_check_access(drmserver)
+
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, system_file)
diff --git a/fingerprintd.te b/fingerprintd.te
index 1c0ab1c9e8fd0fcdd6c6ce4bd19edb82df7d5d34..09d39b187d179d04620420b6bbc98e3a20f02032 100644
--- a/fingerprintd.te
+++ b/fingerprintd.te
@@ -21,3 +21,7 @@ allow fingerprintd keystore:keystore_key { add_auth };
 # For permissions checking
 binder_call(fingerprintd, system_server);
 allow fingerprintd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+r_dir_file(fingerprintd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(fingerprintd, sysfs_type)
+allow fingerprintd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/fsck.te b/fsck.te
index d5a6db11b2b65fc4aac67bb36cfef9d7285334d8..9f372ce257170b0828498bf75be1ae1c0b9340e8 100644
--- a/fsck.te
+++ b/fsck.te
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
 # swap device before setting the EXT2_MF_SWAP mount flag.
 allow fsck swap_block_device:blk_file getattr;
 
+r_dir_file(fsck, proc)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/fsck_untrusted.te b/fsck_untrusted.te
index 00faa205a54c9dfa8e507b72ba0db7485bd733c6..98806dd1fb9450eb00c56a0be6b0d2a6cbc7018b 100644
--- a/fsck_untrusted.te
+++ b/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
 allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
 allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(fsck_untrusted, proc)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/gatekeeperd.te b/gatekeeperd.te
index e394af332d82961293009f2bdd977f929e7394aa..3d9b60cd1f6d3375735302a926484423beb7f406 100644
--- a/gatekeeperd.te
+++ b/gatekeeperd.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(gatekeeperd)
 binder_service(gatekeeperd)
 binder_use(gatekeeperd)
 allow gatekeeperd tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gatekeeperd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
 # need to find KeyStore and add self
 allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_service:service_manager { add find };
@@ -27,4 +28,6 @@ allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 # For hardware properties retrieval
 allow gatekeeperd hardware_properties_service:service_manager find;
 
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup)
+
 neverallow { domain -gatekeeperd } gatekeeper_service:service_manager add;
diff --git a/healthd.te b/healthd.te
index 2658ef84c2ae3e3a0447628469b1bcec847959c7..0c310916895c177061ca69c2f69e623032549000 100644
--- a/healthd.te
+++ b/healthd.te
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ type healthd, domain, domain_deprecated;
 allow healthd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
-r_dir_file(healthd, sysfs)
+r_dir_file(healthd, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(healthd, rootfs)
 
 allow healthd self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config };
 wakelock_use(healthd)
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@ allow healthd sysfs_usb:file write;
 
 allow healthd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(healthd, sysfs_type)
+
 ###
 ### healthd: charger mode
 ###
diff --git a/init.te b/init.te
index eb15d288ddc7ee1cc4b337aee4dafe9886464a32..e2f30a06189efd316b8f4f54317d18937c184c70 100644
--- a/init.te
+++ b/init.te
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ allow init tmpfs:{ chr_file blk_file } relabelfrom;
 allow init tmpfs:blk_file getattr;
 allow init block_device:{ dir blk_file } relabelto;
 allow init dm_device:{ chr_file blk_file } relabelto;
+allow init kernel:fd use;
 
 # setrlimit
 allow init self:capability sys_resource;
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ allow init sysfs:dir mounton;
 allow init tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow init tmpfs:dir mounton;
 allow init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+r_dir_file(init, cgroup)
 allow init cpuctl_device:dir { create mounton };
 
 # /config
@@ -200,9 +202,11 @@ allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
 allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Write to /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops.
+r_dir_file(init, proc)
 allow init proc:file w_file_perms;
 
 # Write to /proc/sys/net/ping_group_range and other /proc/sys/net files.
+r_dir_file(init, proc_net)
 allow init proc_net:file w_file_perms;
 allow init self:capability net_admin;
 
@@ -218,10 +222,7 @@ allow init self:capability sys_boot;
 # Write to sysfs nodes.
 allow init sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow init sysfs_type:lnk_file read;
-allow init sysfs_type:file w_file_perms;
-
-# disksize
-allow init sysfs_zram:file getattr;
+allow init sysfs_type:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
 domain_trans(init, rootfs, adbd)
@@ -350,6 +351,15 @@ unix_socket_connect(init, vold, vold)
 # Raw writes to misc block device
 allow init misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
 
+allow init apk_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow init dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+r_dir_file(init, system_file)
+allow init proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow init system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow init system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/inputflinger.te b/inputflinger.te
index 324f3f6cfdc87c26cc0720a79b58a7054c6cc0f4..b6a5f0b2173560e8684c734731be36f016ac45fc 100644
--- a/inputflinger.te
+++ b/inputflinger.te
@@ -13,3 +13,5 @@ wakelock_use(inputflinger)
 allow inputflinger inputflinger_service:service_manager { add find };
 allow inputflinger input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow inputflinger input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup)
diff --git a/installd.te b/installd.te
index e832e9238bf4a5539bf747ae91d9c443d5e83cb4..c198e2a650d191508cbe6378be10cb3d641fd1ff 100644
--- a/installd.te
+++ b/installd.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:file { relabelto link };
 # Allow movement of APK files between volumes
 allow installd apk_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
 allow installd apk_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom link };
-allow installd apk_data_file:lnk_file { create read unlink };
+allow installd apk_data_file:lnk_file { create r_file_perms unlink };
 
 allow installd asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow installd apk_tmp_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
@@ -21,10 +21,13 @@ allow installd apk_tmp_file:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
 allow installd oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow installd oemfs:file r_file_perms;
 allow installd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd cgroup:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
 allow installd mnt_expand_file:dir { search getattr };
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(installd)
 
+r_dir_file(installd, rootfs)
+
 # Search /data/app-asec and stat files in it.
 allow installd asec_image_file:dir search;
 allow installd asec_image_file:file getattr;
diff --git a/kernel.te b/kernel.te
index bcd09352b6e01dab9c76499f5f7f8ba8cd6391a1..3b77947092a27e7515d0029801acafb2a0d4cb04 100644
--- a/kernel.te
+++ b/kernel.te
@@ -4,9 +4,8 @@ type kernel, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
 allow kernel self:capability sys_nice;
 
 # Root fs.
-allow kernel rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow kernel rootfs:file r_file_perms;
-allow kernel rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(kernel, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(kernel, proc)
 
 # Get SELinux enforcing status.
 allow kernel selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/keystore.te b/keystore.te
index 9dca43c1d01ad6479dc03df016ae46749c142868..bb2e9d89160487f83f8ebf0c5199daa837d6860a 100644
--- a/keystore.te
+++ b/keystore.te
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ allow keystore keystore_service:service_manager { add find };
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(keystore)
 
+allow keystore ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup)
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/logd.te b/logd.te
index 7665385b04a2dea270a644ebbfefea0f1ba94aa1..99d13e662c6d8fd91589c92a6f214599e728528d 100644
--- a/logd.te
+++ b/logd.te
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ type logd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(logd)
 
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc)
+r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_net)
 
 allow logd self:capability { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
@@ -13,7 +15,7 @@ allow logd self:capability2 syslog;
 allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_write };
 allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
 allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
-allow logd system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow logd system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 # logpersist is only allowed on userdebug and eng builds
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow logd misc_logd_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/mediaextractor.te b/mediaextractor.te
index 3ebb5b70ffd8dcc7745958156f84f6da016218e4..7b873d621f4e91db98b5ceef67332c94feb8ea25 100644
--- a/mediaextractor.te
+++ b/mediaextractor.te
@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ binder_service(mediaextractor)
 
 allow mediaextractor mediaextractor_service:service_manager add;
 
+allow mediaextractor system_server:fd use;
+
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup)
+allow mediaextractor proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/mediaserver.te b/mediaserver.te
index 5fbaa30305a47a70eadfd5760c7b604e58c9c55a..d6b68d27e73d3849152c04a63ed5b8b446f01473 100644
--- a/mediaserver.te
+++ b/mediaserver.te
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ net_domain(mediaserver)
 init_daemon_domain(mediaserver)
 
 r_dir_file(mediaserver, sdcard_type)
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup)
 
 # stat /proc/self
 allow mediaserver proc:lnk_file getattr;
@@ -123,6 +124,9 @@ allow mediaserver media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 # Access to /data/preloads
 allow mediaserver preloads_data_file:file { getattr read ioctl };
 
+allow mediaserver ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow mediaserver system_server:fd use;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/netd.te b/netd.te
index c411f671bccc14436c2c861a954bfdbd69e91c21..515ad4fd42275f5bb66980307ed12bb0b4322200 100644
--- a/netd.te
+++ b/netd.te
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(netd)
 net_domain(netd)
 
+r_dir_file(netd, cgroup)
+allow netd system_server:fd use;
+
 allow netd self:capability { net_admin net_raw kill };
 # Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
 # triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
@@ -26,7 +29,7 @@ allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
 allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
-allow netd proc_net:file write;
+allow netd proc_net:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others)
 r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_type)
diff --git a/postinstall_dexopt.te b/postinstall_dexopt.te
index dbc76dfb5e524f08d49037c654b134eef80c6510..3d00c310952cf754d526972cd4f2447d07d7e8f2 100644
--- a/postinstall_dexopt.te
+++ b/postinstall_dexopt.te
@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:dir relabelto;
 allow postinstall_dexopt dalvikcache_data_file:file { relabelto link };
 
-allow postinstall_dexopt selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
-
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(postinstall_dexopt)
 selinux_check_access(postinstall_dexopt)
diff --git a/priv_app.te b/priv_app.te
index d380a67a2252b63b955adcf4cf42094df574fe2f..d5de58bc49d3e3cac5dc841502cd648cbb7f8633 100644
--- a/priv_app.te
+++ b/priv_app.te
@@ -78,9 +78,10 @@ allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
 allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms;
 
-# /sys access
-allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
-allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
+# /sys and /proc access
+r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
+r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
 
 # access the mac address
 allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
diff --git a/rild.te b/rild.te
index c63f2e7292994a226d43b77cd847e967fa0c92f6..e721c9085bf1ccf6db830a64d7211e3e1a36fe85 100644
--- a/rild.te
+++ b/rild.te
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ allow rild kernel:system module_request;
 allow rild self:capability { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
 allow rild alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow rild cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow rild cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 allow rild radio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow rild radio_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
 allow rild mtd_device:dir search;
@@ -42,3 +43,7 @@ allow rild self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
 wakelock_use(rild)
 
 allow rild self:socket create_socket_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(rild, proc)
+r_dir_file(rild, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(rild, system_file)
diff --git a/servicemanager.te b/servicemanager.te
index 84605d1acc6247d5c6f596927801a37fd1f095f4..4f07a559492d4958284c708596636085f87894f7 100644
--- a/servicemanager.te
+++ b/servicemanager.te
@@ -13,5 +13,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(servicemanager)
 allow servicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr;
 allow servicemanager { domain -init }:binder transfer;
 
+r_dir_file(servicemanager, rootfs)
+
 # Check SELinux permissions.
 selinux_check_access(servicemanager)
diff --git a/surfaceflinger.te b/surfaceflinger.te
index 7364e5fa14172342698204d33ca23ea49962b711..cc07e5b105e6c65f890bc56be07073d4d439726e 100644
--- a/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ allow surfaceflinger window_service:service_manager find;
 
 # allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
 allow surfaceflinger self:capability sys_nice;
+allow surfaceflinger proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, system_file)
+allow surfaceflinger tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow surfaceflinger system_server:fd use;
+allow surfaceflinger ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
diff --git a/system_app.te b/system_app.te
index 3db5f211376fc16ce68bfe6bcef4586d7e89d8b0..b05bcb9f293ec8ba9b901b27c04fb5508632d1f7 100644
--- a/system_app.te
+++ b/system_app.te
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
 };
 
 # /sys access
-allow system_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
-allow system_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(system_app, sysfs_type)
 
 control_logd(system_app)
diff --git a/system_server.te b/system_server.te
index a2be42163a2335151611111c00dafa5a6a1923d1..795e255401c9f4b6a0c181d61e3961d77d329977 100644
--- a/system_server.te
+++ b/system_server.te
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ type system_server, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject;
 tmpfs_domain(system_server)
 
 # For art.
-allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
 allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
 
 # Enable system server to check the foreign dex usage markers.
 # We need search on top level directories so that we can get to the files
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
 
 # Manage /data/app.
 allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow system_server apk_data_file:file { create_file_perms link };
+allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
 allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;
 
@@ -368,7 +368,9 @@ allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file { relabelfrom create
 allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:fifo_file create_file_perms;
 
 # Run system programs, e.g. dexopt. Needed? (b/28035297)
-allow system_server system_file:file x_file_perms;
+allow system_server system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow system_server system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 auditallow system_server system_file:file execute_no_trans;
 
 # LocationManager(e.g, GPS) needs to read and write
@@ -538,6 +540,16 @@ allow system_server update_engine:fifo_file write;
 allow system_server preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
 allow system_server preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name };
 
+r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
+allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc)
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc_meminfo)
+r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net)
+r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_type)
+
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/te_macros b/te_macros
index eb1b92112b8b1180c36c1c622f8bbb7a3cea63e6..1e70c4ceda8b7645840b90c21335ee463b88bc65 100644
--- a/te_macros
+++ b/te_macros
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ define(`tmpfs_domain', `
 type $1_tmpfs, file_type;
 type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs;
 allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read write };
+allow $1 tmpfs:dir { getattr search };
 ')
 
 #####################################
@@ -219,7 +220,8 @@ allow $1 self:capability2 block_suspend;
 # selinux_check_access(domain)
 # Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs.
 define(`selinux_check_access', `
-allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
+r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
+allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
 allow $1 kernel:security compute_av;
 allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append bind connect listen accept getopt setopt shutdown recvfrom sendto recv_msg send_msg name_bind };
 ')
@@ -228,7 +230,8 @@ allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { read write create getattr setattr lock re
 # selinux_check_context(domain)
 # Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs.
 define(`selinux_check_context', `
-allow $1 selinuxfs:file rw_file_perms;
+r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs)
+allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms;
 allow $1 kernel:security check_context;
 ')
 
diff --git a/tee.te b/tee.te
index 8ea6b95bc7e47e01a5f6faa121e5dd9a05c72b30..d0b73910b266a3735c5333675a04add15249c2e9 100644
--- a/tee.te
+++ b/tee.te
@@ -13,3 +13,7 @@ allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
 allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)
+allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
+allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/ueventd.te b/ueventd.te
index 6a44367ec72cd8c3a633f33122befd95b28facf5..657c25b0fb359a069a54055128ce1ee61dd5d88d 100644
--- a/ueventd.te
+++ b/ueventd.te
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow ueventd self:capability { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override fowner };
 allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
 allow ueventd device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ueventd sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
-allow ueventd sysfs_usb:file rw_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(ueventd, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
+allow ueventd sysfs:file w_file_perms;
+allow ueventd sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
 allow ueventd sysfs_hwrandom:file w_file_perms;
 allow ueventd sysfs_zram_uevent:file w_file_perms;
 allow ueventd sysfs_type:{ file lnk_file } { relabelfrom relabelto setattr getattr };
@@ -25,6 +27,9 @@ allow ueventd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
 allow ueventd efs_file:dir search;
 allow ueventd efs_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Get SELinux enforcing status.
+r_dir_file(ueventd, selinuxfs)
+
 # Use setfscreatecon() to label /dev directories and files.
 allow ueventd self:process setfscreate;
 
diff --git a/uncrypt.te b/uncrypt.te
index 2ebde86a17a21b2aa03a629fdb43c6406d303d49..d1dea785bc1ddcce8920b0a88e2e65d464434578 100644
--- a/uncrypt.te
+++ b/uncrypt.te
@@ -32,3 +32,5 @@ allow uncrypt block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Access userdata block device.
 allow uncrypt userdata_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(uncrypt, rootfs)
diff --git a/untrusted_app.te b/untrusted_app.te
index 6b24a62ca420bedafccf495fb6addb8013617d3e..310f1f35d58e5cf40b62cd2732be14a262ec1ae8 100644
--- a/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/untrusted_app.te
@@ -90,9 +90,6 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
 # gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
 allow untrusted_app self:process ptrace;
 
-# access /proc/net/xt_qtguid/stats
-r_dir_file(untrusted_app, proc_net)
-
 # Cts: HwRngTest
 allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
 allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/vold.te b/vold.te
index 75b6f36660954f759629a1a5fcbd91c7872b1b15..98ccab450ebf43ad31b9e0b447653d60f92d3b5f 100644
--- a/vold.te
+++ b/vold.te
@@ -16,8 +16,14 @@ allow vold cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(vold, proc)
 r_dir_file(vold, proc_net)
-r_dir_file(vold, sysfs)
+r_dir_file(vold, sysfs_type)
+# XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
+allow vold sysfs:file w_file_perms;
+allow vold sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
+allow vold sysfs_zram_uevent:file w_file_perms;
+
 r_dir_file(vold, rootfs)
+allow vold proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 # For a handful of probing tools, we choose an even more restrictive
 # domain when working with untrusted block devices
@@ -99,6 +105,8 @@ allow vold fsck_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };
 allow vold fscklogs:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow vold fscklogs:file create_file_perms;
 
+allow vold ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
 #
 # Rules to support encrypted fs support.
 #
@@ -177,10 +185,6 @@ allow vold fuse:filesystem { relabelfrom };
 allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { relabelfrom relabelto };
 allow vold app_fusefs:filesystem { mount unmount };
 
-# coldboot of /sys/block
-allow vold sysfs_zram:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow vold sysfs_zram_uevent:file rw_file_perms;
-
 # MoveTask.cpp executes cp and rm
 allow vold toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/wpa.te b/wpa.te
index a49e041e30e1ead534a39aecdf98ba33a372264b..3a2450f0d31185e2177ff24df12ecd06633141e9 100644
--- a/wpa.te
+++ b/wpa.te
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(wpa)
 
 net_domain(wpa)
 
+r_dir_file(wpa, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(wpa, proc_net)
+
 allow wpa kernel:system module_request;
 allow wpa self:capability { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
 allow wpa cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/zygote.te b/zygote.te
index 9e155efb6ac6e16a7b076f1be28070e29589e0ce..4708c3b8ceaad44f1ef53879d71913b9fe5e1d43 100644
--- a/zygote.te
+++ b/zygote.te
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ allow zygote idmap_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow zygote dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 # Control cgroups.
 allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 allow zygote self:capability sys_admin;
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(zygote)
@@ -67,11 +68,10 @@ allow zygote zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 r_dir_file(zygote, proc_net)
 
 # Root fs.
-allow zygote rootfs:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(zygote, rootfs)
 
 # System file accesses.
-allow zygote system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow zygote system_file:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(zygote, system_file)
 
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   # Allow zygote to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow zygote method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
 ')
 
+allow zygote ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow zygote tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 ###
 ### A/B OTA
 ###