From 83ac242fb9a01e5cd07babfcf680185c0db2ae4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Klyubin <klyubin@google.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 12:41:44 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Move blkid policy to private
This leaves only the existence of blkid and blkid_untrusted domains as
public API. All other rules are implementation details of these
domains' policy and are thus now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules to do with blkid_current and
blkid_untrusted_current (as expected).
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: I0dda2feeb64608b204006eecd8a7c9b9c7bb2b81
---
private/blkid.te | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
private/blkid_untrusted.te | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
public/blkid.te | 18 ------------------
public/blkid_untrusted.te | 34 ----------------------------------
4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 private/blkid.te
create mode 100644 private/blkid_untrusted.te
diff --git a/private/blkid.te b/private/blkid.te
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9c4cfccc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/blkid.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# blkid called from vold
+
+type blkid_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allowed read-only access to encrypted devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allow blkid dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid vold:fd use;
+allow blkid vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/private/blkid_untrusted.te b/private/blkid_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae18e6860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/blkid_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# blkid for untrusted block devices
+
+# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
+neverallow blkid_untrusted {
+ boot_block_device
+ frp_block_device
+ metadata_block_device
+ recovery_block_device
+ root_block_device
+ swap_block_device
+ system_block_device
+ userdata_block_device
+ cache_block_device
+ dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/public/blkid.te b/public/blkid.te
index c8df183f8..dabe01452 100644
--- a/public/blkid.te
+++ b/public/blkid.te
@@ -1,20 +1,2 @@
# blkid called from vold
type blkid, domain;
-type blkid_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-
-# Allowed read-only access to encrypted devices to extract UUID/label
-allow blkid block_device:dir search;
-allow blkid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
-allow blkid dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
-
-# Allow stdin/out back to vold
-allow blkid vold:fd use;
-allow blkid vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-# For blkid launched through popen()
-allow blkid blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-
-# Only allow entry from vold
-neverallow { domain -vold } blkid:process transition;
-neverallow * blkid:process dyntransition;
-neverallow blkid { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/public/blkid_untrusted.te b/public/blkid_untrusted.te
index cbbbbae57..4be4c0cb2 100644
--- a/public/blkid_untrusted.te
+++ b/public/blkid_untrusted.te
@@ -1,36 +1,2 @@
# blkid for untrusted block devices
type blkid_untrusted, domain;
-
-# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
-allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
-allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
-
-# Allow stdin/out back to vold
-allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
-allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-# For blkid launched through popen()
-allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-
-###
-### neverallow rules
-###
-
-# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
-neverallow blkid_untrusted {
- boot_block_device
- frp_block_device
- metadata_block_device
- recovery_block_device
- root_block_device
- swap_block_device
- system_block_device
- userdata_block_device
- cache_block_device
- dm_device
-}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
-neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
-neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
-neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;
--
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