diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 4e7e33075ad950e1ae97aff8c7c439da0707de78..9cb287d1deddb7c00b1e707750f2bf3aabcd335c 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -1,5 +1,153 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
+###
+
+typeattribute priv_app domain_deprecated;
+
 app_domain(priv_app)
 
+# Access the network.
+net_domain(priv_app)
+# Access bluetooth.
+bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
+
 # Allow the allocation and use of ptys
 # Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
 create_pty(priv_app)
+
+# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
+allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
+
+# Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
+# to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
+allow priv_app app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Write to /cache.
+allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
+allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
+allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
+
+# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
+allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
+# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
+# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
+allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow priv_app vold:fd use;
+allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# /sys and /proc access
+r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
+r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
+
+# access the mac address
+allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
+binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
+allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
+
+# Access to /data/preloads
+allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
+# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
+allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
+# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
+allow priv_app functionfs:dir search;
+allow priv_app functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
+# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
+# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
+allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
+
+# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
+# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
+# services.
+neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+
+# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
+# or set properties. b/10243159
+neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
+# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
+# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
+# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
+# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
+# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
+# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
+# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
+neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+
+# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
+# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
+# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
+# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
+# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
+# capability.
+neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
diff --git a/public/priv_app.te b/public/priv_app.te
index fb73b1539bab73232e131baecd8ed16892386649..0761fc30f88ff713c127b5ce3d105ae9072e807f 100644
--- a/public/priv_app.te
+++ b/public/priv_app.te
@@ -1,146 +1,5 @@
 ###
 ### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
 ###
-type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
 
-# Access the network.
-net_domain(priv_app)
-# Access bluetooth.
-bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
-
-# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
-allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
-
-# Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
-# to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
-allow priv_app app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
-
-allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
-allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Write to /cache.
-allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Access to /data/media.
-allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
-# running "adb install foo.apk".
-allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
-allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
-
-# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
-allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
-# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
-# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-')
-
-# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
-allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
-
-# For AppFuse.
-allow priv_app vold:fd use;
-allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
-
-# /sys and /proc access
-r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_type)
-r_dir_file(priv_app, proc)
-r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
-
-# access the mac address
-allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
-
-# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
-binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
-allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
-allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
-
-# Access to /data/preloads
-allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
-allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
-allow priv_app functionfs:dir search;
-allow priv_app functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
-# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
-allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
-
-###
-### neverallow rules
-###
-
-# Receive or send uevent messages.
-neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
-
-# Receive or send generic netlink messages
-neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
-
-# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
-# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
-neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
-
-# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
-# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
-# services.
-neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
-
-# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
-# or set properties. b/10243159
-neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
-neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
-
-# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
-# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
-# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
-# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
-# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
-# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
-# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
-# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
-neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
-
-# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
-# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
-# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
-# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
-# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
-# capability.
-neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
+type priv_app, domain;