diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 33670aa6c6a722624c373de7904e57327c406308..a881d52df5e283300eb64502909ea434816beda5 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -2,26 +2,33 @@
 ### neverallow rules for untrusted app domains
 ###
 
+# Only allow domains in AOSP to use the untrusted_app_all attribute.
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all -untrusted_app -untrusted_app_25 } domain:process fork;
+
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
 
 # Receive or send generic netlink messages
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_socket *;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_socket *;
 
 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } debugfs_type:file read;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } debugfs_type:file read;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
 # Only trusted components of Android should be registering
 # services.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } service_manager_type:service_manager add;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
 # or set properties. b/10243159
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_socket:sock_file write;
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_type:property_service set;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_type:property_service set;
+
+# b/34115651 - net.dns* properties read
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_25 } net_dns_prop:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
 # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
@@ -31,7 +38,7 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_type:property_s
 # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
 # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
 # and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
 # In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
@@ -39,16 +46,16 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } mlstrustedsubject:proces
 # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
 # bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
 # capability.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } file_type:file link;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } file_type:file link;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
 
 # Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
 # ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
-neverallowxperm { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{
+neverallowxperm { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{
   socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
   netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
@@ -59,15 +66,15 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{
 } *;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
 # internal storage or sdcard.
 # World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
 # with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
 # application un-installation.
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } {
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } {
   fs_type
   -fuse                     # sdcard
   -sdcardfs                 # sdcard
@@ -85,12 +92,12 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } {
 }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open tun_device
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } tun_device:chr_file open;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } tun_device:chr_file open;
 
 # Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:dir ~search;
 
 # Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
 # Create a more specific label if needed
-neverallow { untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app } proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 0a30829bd4332e481ec4fb7207ab1adb074c4917..ee2740a4c42cd663a1a2b143572743a039ef7bbd 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 # Input selectors:
-#	isSystemServer (boolean)
-#	isEphemeralApp (boolean)
-#	isOwner (boolean)
-#	user (string)
-#	seinfo (string)
-#	name (string)
-#	path (string)
-#	isPrivApp (boolean)
+#       isSystemServer (boolean)
+#       isEphemeralApp (boolean)
+#       isOwner (boolean)
+#       user (string)
+#       seinfo (string)
+#       name (string)
+#       path (string)
+#       isPrivApp (boolean)
+#       minTargetSdkVersion (unsigned integer)
 # isSystemServer=true can only be used once.
 # An unspecified isSystemServer defaults to false.
 # isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
@@ -19,27 +20,32 @@
 # user=_isolated will match any isolated service UID.
 # isPrivApp=true will only match for applications preinstalled in
 #       /system/priv-app.
+# minTargetSdkVersion will match applications with a targetSdkVersion
+#       greater than or equal to the specified value. If unspecified,
+#       it has a default value of 0.
 # All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
 # Matching is case-insensitive.
 #
 # Precedence rules (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android.c seapp_context_cmp()):
-# 	  (1) isSystemServer=true before isSystemServer=false.
-# 	  (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp= boolean.
-# 	  (3) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
-#	  (4) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string.
-#	  (5) Fixed user= string before user= prefix (i.e. ending in *).
-#	  (6) Longer user= prefix before shorter user= prefix.
-#	  (7) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
-#	      ':' character is reserved and may not be used.
-#	  (8) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string.
-#	  (9) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
-# 	  (10) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
+#       (1) isSystemServer=true before isSystemServer=false.
+#       (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp= boolean.
+#       (3) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
+#       (4) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string.
+#       (5) Fixed user= string before user= prefix (i.e. ending in *).
+#       (6) Longer user= prefix before shorter user= prefix.
+#       (7) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
+#           ':' character is reserved and may not be used.
+#       (8) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string.
+#       (9) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
+#       (10) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
+#       (11) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of minTargetSdkVersion=
+#              integer. Note that minTargetSdkVersion= defaults to 0 if unspecified.
 #
 # Outputs:
-#	domain (string)
-#	type (string)
-#	levelFrom (string; one of none, all, app, or user)
-#	level (string)
+#       domain (string)
+#       type (string)
+#       levelFrom (string; one of none, all, app, or user)
+#       level (string)
 # Only entries that specify domain= will be used for app process labeling.
 # Only entries that specify type= will be used for app directory labeling.
 # levelFrom=user is only supported for _app or _isolated UIDs.
@@ -96,4 +102,5 @@ user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
-user=_app domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=26 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app domain=untrusted_app_25 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index 50d79ee8b32d0c911c3c8b277b6b71237c07159a..ead9a16b185f1d974327a36af1fb7a1e2e653e9e 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -18,93 +18,6 @@
 ###
 
 app_domain(untrusted_app)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app)
 net_domain(untrusted_app)
 bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
-
-# b/34115651 - net.dns* properties read
-# This will go away in a future Android release
-get_prop(untrusted_app, net_dns_prop)
-
-# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
-# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
-create_pty(untrusted_app)
-
-# Legacy text relocations
-allow untrusted_app apk_data_file:file execmod;
-
-# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
-# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
-allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
-
-# ASEC
-allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-# Execute libs in asec containers.
-allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
-
-# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
-# running "adb install foo.apk".
-# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
-# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
-allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
-# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
-# cropping or taking user photos.
-allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
-
-#
-# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
-# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
-#
-
-# Access to /data/media.
-allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
-# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
-allow untrusted_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
-
-# allow cts to query all services
-allow untrusted_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
-
-allow untrusted_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app radio_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
-allow untrusted_app vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
-# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
-# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-  allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-')
-
-# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
-allow untrusted_app self:process ptrace;
-
-# Cts: HwRngTest
-allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
-allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Allow apps to view preloaded content
-allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
-# are running in an emulated environment.
-# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
-# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
-allow untrusted_app proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4f926498c823a9df3de3c15c4a03752572a574a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_app_25
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion <= 25.
+###
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
+### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
+### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
+### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
+### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
+### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
+### seapp_contexts.
+###
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_25)
+
+# b/34115651 - net.dns* properties read
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+get_prop(untrusted_app_25, net_dns_prop)
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d6bee5298c4432ee47bb022e8471cc47090ebad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_app_all.
+###
+### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains.
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
+### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
+### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
+### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
+### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
+### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
+### seapp_contexts.
+###
+
+# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
+# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
+create_pty(untrusted_app)
+
+# Legacy text relocations
+allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;
+
+# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
+# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
+allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
+
+# ASEC
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+# Execute libs in asec containers.
+allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
+# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
+allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
+# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
+# cropping or taking user photos.
+allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+#
+# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
+# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
+#
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
+# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
+allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+
+# allow cts to query all services
+allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
+# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
+# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+')
+
+# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
+allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;
+
+# Cts: HwRngTest
+allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
+allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to view preloaded content
+allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
+# are running in an emulated environment.
+# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
+# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
+allow untrusted_app_all proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 75db022ccb93c86e7867cc029c0ae277780cbbc0..d9212fc1c0a51b680f429622303af3532f5bffc6 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ attribute mlstrustedobject;
 # All domains used for apps.
 attribute appdomain;
 
+# All third party apps.
+attribute untrusted_app_all;
+
 # All domains used for apps with network access.
 attribute netdomain;
 
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index e2ffb88f645da22208bad2069272ad7cef6070c5..9993f2fe195dc11ebdb818fdd3b11813380b8d2f 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ neverallow * self:process { execstack execheap };
 
 # prohibit non-zygote spawned processes from using shared libraries
 # with text relocations. b/20013628 .
-neverallow { domain -untrusted_app } file_type:file execmod;
+neverallow { domain -untrusted_app_all } file_type:file execmod;
 
 neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
 
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index 7a9eeb660eba6ad3ace7fdd66c79418c1f004122..4e334275f01841bbb178312c130f39db971ad7ef 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@ tmpfs_domain($1)
 allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute;
 ')
 
+#####################################
+# untrusted_app_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for all untrusted apps.
+define(`untrusted_app_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 untrusted_app_all;
+')
+
 #####################################
 # net_domain(domain)
 # Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
diff --git a/public/untrusted_app_25.te b/public/untrusted_app_25.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ca6e313447a9cd5c01253bd124cd5062fbeab44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+###
+### Untrusted apps.
+###
+### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
+### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
+### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
+### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
+### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
+### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
+### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
+### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
+### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
+### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
+### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
+### seapp_contexts.
+###
+
+type untrusted_app_25, domain;
+
diff --git a/tools/check_seapp.c b/tools/check_seapp.c
index d8fa636475f3e0f9052c63ae393f128560a21e92..96b9ebf89ced554f0726a3dbe5005dd510a7c378 100644
--- a/tools/check_seapp.c
+++ b/tools/check_seapp.c
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ static bool validate_bool(char *value, char **errmsg);
 static bool validate_levelFrom(char *value, char **errmsg);
 static bool validate_selinux_type(char *value, char **errmsg);
 static bool validate_selinux_level(char *value, char **errmsg);
+static bool validate_uint(char *value, char **errmsg);
 
 /**
  * The heart of the mapping process, this must be updated if a new key value pair is added
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ key_map rules[] = {
                 { .name = "name",           .dir = dir_in,                              },
                 { .name = "path",           .dir = dir_in,                              },
                 { .name = "isPrivApp",      .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+                { .name = "minTargetSdkVersion", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_uint },
                 /*Outputs*/
                 { .name = "domain",         .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_selinux_type  },
                 { .name = "type",           .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_selinux_type  },
@@ -417,6 +419,19 @@ static bool validate_selinux_level(char *value, char **errmsg) {
 	return true;
 }
 
+static bool validate_uint(char *value, char **errmsg) {
+
+	char *endptr;
+	long longvalue;
+	longvalue = strtol(value, &endptr, 10);
+	if (('\0' != *endptr) || (longvalue < 0) || (longvalue > INT32_MAX)) {
+		*errmsg = "Expecting a valid unsigned integer";
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /**
  * Validates a key_map against a set of enforcement rules, this
  * function exits the application on a type that cannot be properly