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Jeff Sharkey authored
An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage
works.  At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in
managing devices that dynamically appear.

This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing
low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk
and blkid.  It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since
launching by init will eventually go away.

For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are
marked with "TODO" to eventually remove.

Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls
like statfs().  Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they
can cause kernel to kill us.

Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow:

avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file
avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd
avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd

Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
f063f461
History
This directory contains the core Android SELinux policy configuration.
It defines the domains and types for the AOSP services and apps common to
all devices.  Device-specific policy should be placed under a
separate device/<vendor>/<board>/sepolicy subdirectory and linked
into the policy build as described below.

Policy Generation:

Additional, per device, policy files can be added into the
policy build.

They can be configured through the use of two variables,
they are:
1. BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION
2. BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS

The variables should be set in the BoardConfig.mk file in
the device or vendor directories.

BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION is a list of files that will be
"unioned", IE concatenated, at the END of their respective
file in external/sepolicy. Note, to add a unique file you
would use this variable.

BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS contains a list of directories to search
for BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION files. Order matters in this list.
eg.) If you have BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION += widget.te and have 2
instances of widget.te files on BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS search path.
The first one found (at the first search dir containing the file)
gets processed first.
Reviewing out/target/product/<device>/etc/sepolicy_intermediates/policy.conf
will help sort out ordering issues.

It is an error to specify a BOARD_POLICY_UNION file that
doesn't appear in any of the BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS locations.

Example BoardConfig.mk Usage:
From the Tuna device BoardConfig.mk, device/samsung/tuna/BoardConfig.mk

BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS += \
        device/samsung/tuna/sepolicy

BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION += \
        genfs_contexts \
        file_contexts \
        sepolicy.te

SPECIFIC POLICY FILE INFORMATION

mac_permissions.xml:
  ABOUT:
    The mac_permissions.xml file is used for controlling the mmac solutions
    as well as mapping a public base16 signing key with an arbitrary seinfo
    string. Details of the files contents can be found in a comment at the
    top of that file. The seinfo string, previously mentioned, is the same string
    that is referenced in seapp_contexts.

    This file can be appended to by using the BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION
    variable. It is important to note the final processed version of this file
    is stripped of comments and whitespace. This is to preserve space on the
    system.img. If one wishes to view it in a more human friendly format,
    the "tidy" or "xmllint" command will assist you.

  TOOLING:
    insertkeys.py
      Is a helper script for mapping arbitrary tags in the signature stanzas of
      mac_permissions.xml to public keys found in pem files. This script takes
      a mac_permissions.xml file(s) and configuration file in order to operate.
      Details of the configuration file (keys.conf) can be found in the subsection
      keys.conf. This tool is also responsible for stripping the comments and
      whitespace during processing.

      keys.conf
        The keys.conf file is used for controlling the mapping of "tags" found in
        the mac_permissions.xml signature stanzas with actual public keys found in
        pem files. The configuration file can be used in BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION
        variables and is processed via m4.

        The script allows for mapping any string contained in TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT
        with specific path to a pem file. Typically TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT is either
        user, eng or userdebug. Additionally, one can specify "ALL" to map a path to
        any string specified in TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT. All tags are matched verbatim
        and all options are matched lowercase. The options are "tolowered" automatically
        for the user, it is convention to specify tags and options in all uppercase
        and tags start with @. The option arguments can also use environment variables
        via the familiar $VARIABLE syntax. This is often useful for setting a location
        to ones release keys.

        Often times, one will need to integrate an application that was signed by a separate
        organization and may need to extract the pem file for the insertkeys/keys.conf tools.
        Extraction of the public key in the pem format is possible via openssl. First you need
        to unzip the apk, once it is unzipped, cd into the META_INF directory and then execute
        openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in CERT.RSA -out CERT.pem -outform PEM  -print_certs
        On some occasions CERT.RSA has a different name, and you will need to adjust for that.
        After extracting the pem, you can rename it, and configure keys.conf and
        mac_permissions.xml to pick up the change. You MUST open the generated pem file in a text
        editor and strip out anything outside the opening and closing scissor lines. Failure to do
        so WILL cause a compile time issue thrown by insertkeys.py

        NOTE: The pem files are base64 encoded and PackageManagerService, mac_permissions.xml
              and setool all use base16 encodings.