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40 results

kernel.te

Blame
  • kernel.te 2.56 KiB
    # Life begins with the kernel.
    type kernel, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
    
    allow kernel self:capability sys_nice;
    
    # Allow init relabel itself.
    allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom;
    allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto;
    # TODO: investigate why we need this.
    allow kernel init:process share;
    
    # cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label.
    allow kernel unlabeled:dir search;
    
    # Mount usbfs.
    allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount;
    allow kernel usbfs:dir search;
    
    # Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
    # We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace
    # process from turning off SELinux once enabled.
    dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
    
    # Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain.
    allow kernel self:capability sys_resource;
    
    # Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
    allow kernel selinuxfs:file write;
    allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
    
    # MTP sync (b/15835289)
    # kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723)
    allow kernel untrusted_app:fd use;
    allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
    
    # Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116)
    # Kernel thread "loop0" reads a vold supplied file descriptor.
    # Fixes CTS tests:
    #  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountObbNormal
    #  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountTwoObbs
    allow kernel vold:fd use;
    allow kernel app_data_file:file read;
    allow kernel asec_image_file:file read;
    
    domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init)
    
    ###
    ### neverallow rules
    ###
    
    # The initial task starts in the kernel domain (assigned via
    # initial_sid_contexts), but nothing ever transitions to it.
    neverallow domain kernel:process { transition dyntransition };
    
    # The kernel domain is never entered via an exec, nor should it
    # ever execute a program outside the rootfs without changing to another domain.
    # If you encounter an execute_no_trans denial on the kernel domain, then
    # possible causes include:
    # - The program is a kernel usermodehelper.  In this case, define a domain
    #   for the program and domain_auto_trans() to it.
    # - You failed to setcon u:r:init:s0 in your init.rc and thus your init
    #   program was left in the kernel domain and is now trying to execute
    #   some other program.  Fix your init.rc file.
    # - You are running an exploit which switched to the init task credentials
    #   and is then trying to exec a shell or other program.  You lose!
    neverallow kernel { file_type fs_type -rootfs }:file { entrypoint execute_no_trans };