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    8a0c25ef
    Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. · 8a0c25ef
    Stephen Smalley authored
    
    Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system
    without changing domains.  This forces all helper programs and
    services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain.
    
    Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs
    executed from the fs_mgr library by init.  This requires a domain
    for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running
    mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox
    binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not
    based on the symlink in any way).
    
    e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount
    option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never
    system.  We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and
    cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default
    block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned
    in all of the device-specific policies.
    
    mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file.
    We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be
    assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies,
    and only allow it to read/write such block devices.  As there seem to be
    no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does
    not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices.
    
    With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to
    only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it
    no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT.
    
    To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell,
    we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to
    run toolbox in their own domain.  This is broader than strictly required;
    we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had
    x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change
    with device-specific policy.
    
    Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4
    Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
    8a0c25ef
    History
    Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains.
    Stephen Smalley authored
    
    Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system
    without changing domains.  This forces all helper programs and
    services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain.
    
    Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs
    executed from the fs_mgr library by init.  This requires a domain
    for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running
    mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox
    binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not
    based on the symlink in any way).
    
    e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount
    option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never
    system.  We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and
    cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default
    block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned
    in all of the device-specific policies.
    
    mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file.
    We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be
    assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies,
    and only allow it to read/write such block devices.  As there seem to be
    no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does
    not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices.
    
    With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to
    only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it
    no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT.
    
    To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell,
    we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to
    run toolbox in their own domain.  This is broader than strictly required;
    we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had
    x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change
    with device-specific policy.
    
    Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4
    Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>