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Benjamin Gordon authoredIn kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode. This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels. This is essentially: 1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns, respectively. 2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g 3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g 4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new classes are still appropriate. Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add only cap_userns or cap2_userns; Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel. Bug: crbug.com/754831 Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95fBenjamin Gordon authoredIn kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode. This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels. This is essentially: 1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns, respectively. 2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g 3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g 4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new classes are still appropriate. Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add only cap_userns or cap2_userns; Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel. Bug: crbug.com/754831 Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
hal_bluetooth.te 1.07 KiB
# HwBinder IPC from clients into server, and callbacks
binder_call(hal_bluetooth_client, hal_bluetooth_server)
binder_call(hal_bluetooth_server, hal_bluetooth_client)
add_hwservice(hal_bluetooth_server, hal_bluetooth_hwservice)
allow hal_bluetooth_client hal_bluetooth_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
wakelock_use(hal_bluetooth);
# The HAL toggles rfkill to power the chip off/on.
allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
# bluetooth factory file accesses.
r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_efs_file)
allow hal_bluetooth { uhid_device hci_attach_dev }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# sysfs access.
r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, sysfs_type)
allow hal_bluetooth sysfs_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
# Allow write access to bluetooth-specific properties
set_prop(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
# /proc access (bluesleep etc.).
allow hal_bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;