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41 results

blkid_untrusted.te

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    • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
      84e1c611
      Different blkid and fsck execution domains. · 84e1c611
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices
      that come in from the wild, and trusted devices.
      
      When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain
      to use based on which class the device belongs to.
      
      Bug: 19993667
      Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
      84e1c611
      History
      Different blkid and fsck execution domains.
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices
      that come in from the wild, and trusted devices.
      
      When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain
      to use based on which class the device belongs to.
      
      Bug: 19993667
      Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
    init.te 925 B
    typeattribute init coredomain;
    
    tmpfs_domain(init)
    
    # Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
    domain_trans(init, rootfs, charger)
    domain_trans(init, rootfs, healthd)
    domain_trans(init, rootfs, slideshow)
    domain_auto_trans(init, e2fs_exec, e2fs)
    recovery_only(`
      domain_trans(init, rootfs, adbd)
      domain_trans(init, rootfs, recovery)
    ')
    domain_trans(init, shell_exec, shell)
    domain_trans(init, init_exec, ueventd)
    domain_trans(init, init_exec, watchdogd)
    domain_trans(init, init_exec, vendor_init)
    domain_trans(init, { rootfs toolbox_exec }, modprobe)
    # case where logpersistd is actually logcat -f in logd context (nee: logcatd)
    userdebug_or_eng(`
      domain_auto_trans(init, logcat_exec, logpersist)
    ')
    
    # Creating files on sysfs is impossible so this isn't a threat
    # Sometimes we have to write to non-existent files to avoid conditional
    # init behavior. See b/35303861 for an example.
    dontaudit init sysfs:dir write;