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Nick Kralevich authored
Modify many "neverallow domain" rules to be "neverallow *" rules instead. This will catch more SELinux policy bugs where a label is assigned an irrelevant rule, as well as catch situations where a domain attribute is not assigned to a process. Change-Id: I5b83a2504c13b384f9dff616a70ca733b648ccdf
Nick Kralevich authoredModify many "neverallow domain" rules to be "neverallow *" rules instead. This will catch more SELinux policy bugs where a label is assigned an irrelevant rule, as well as catch situations where a domain attribute is not assigned to a process. Change-Id: I5b83a2504c13b384f9dff616a70ca733b648ccdf
keystore.te 1.06 KiB
type keystore, domain, domain_deprecated;
type keystore_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# keystore daemon
init_daemon_domain(keystore)
typeattribute keystore mlstrustedsubject;
binder_use(keystore)
binder_service(keystore)
allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow keystore keystore_exec:file { getattr };
allow keystore tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow keystore tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow keystore keystore_service:service_manager { add find };
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(keystore)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### Protect ourself from others
###
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
neverallow { domain -keystore } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -keystore -init } keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
neverallow * keystore:process ptrace;