Revert "Allow kernel domain, not init domain, to set SELinux enforcing mode."

The build is broken. Reverting temporarily to fix breakage.

libsepol.check_assertion_helper: neverallow on line 4758 violated by allow init kernel:security { setenforce };
Error while expanding policy
make: *** [out/target/product/mako/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....


This reverts commit bf12e225.

Change-Id: I78a05756d8ce3c7d06e1d9d27e6135f4b352bb85

domain.te

@@ -130,17 +130,8 @@ neverallow { domain -relabeltodomain } *:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
 
-# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.
-# The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain,
-# but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet.
-# Policy reload requires allowing this to the init domain.
-neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security load_policy;
-
-# Only init prior to switching context should be able to set enforcing mode.
-# init starts in kernel domain and switches to init domain via setcon in
-# the init.rc, so the setenforce occurs while still in kernel. After
-# switching domains, there is never any need to setenforce again by init.
-neverallow { domain -kernel } kernel:security setenforce;
+# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies and set enforcing mode.
+neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security { load_policy setenforce };
 
 # Only init, ueventd and system_server should be able to access HW RNG
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server -ueventd -unconfineddomain } hw_random_device:chr_file *;

init.te

@@ -11,4 +11,3 @@ allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
 allow init kernel:security { load_policy setenforce };
 allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
 allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
-allow init kernel:security load_policy;

kernel.te

@@ -6,6 +6,3 @@ relabelto_domain(kernel)
 
 allow kernel {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
 allow kernel unlabeled:filesystem mount;
-
-# Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
-allow kernel self:security setenforce;