Rework neverallow for /data execute permission

am: eedacf83

Change-Id: I6a31820decb5aeabbff79490e1976aedbe560286

app.te

@@ -438,6 +438,22 @@ neverallow appdomain {
   tmpfs
 }:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
 
+# Blacklist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
+neverallow {
+  bluetooth
+  isolated_app
+  nfc
+  platform_app
+  radio
+  shared_relro
+  system_app
+} {
+  data_file_type
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
+  -apk_data_file
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
+
 # Foreign dex profiles are just markers. Prevent apps to do anything but touch them.
 neverallow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
 neverallow appdomain user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file:dir { open getattr read ioctl remove_name };

domain.te

@@ -292,9 +292,7 @@ neverallow domain { cache_file cache_backup_file cache_private_backup_file cache
 # Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
 neverallow {
   domain
-  -untrusted_app
-  -priv_app
-  -shell
+  -appdomain
 } {
   data_file_type
   -dalvikcache_data_file
@@ -485,6 +483,11 @@ neverallow {
   -zygote
 } shell:process { transition dyntransition };
 
+# Only domains spawned from zygote and runas may have the appdomain attribute.
+neverallow { domain -runas -zygote } {
+  appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:process { transition dyntransition };
+
 # Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
 # This is to prevent malicious symlink attacks.
 neverallow {