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  1. Jan 17, 2017
  2. Jan 14, 2017
  3. Jan 13, 2017
    • Jim Miller's avatar
      New SeLinux policy for fingerprint HIDL · 54e0e5af
      Jim Miller authored
      Move from fingerprintd to new fingerprint_hal and update SeLinux policy.
      
      Test: Boot with no errors related to fingerprint sepolicy
      Bug: 33199080
      Change-Id: Idfde0cb0530e75e705033042f64f3040f6df22d6
      54e0e5af
    • Hridya Valsaraju's avatar
      add selinux policy for GNSS hal · 67c5cdfd
      Hridya Valsaraju authored
      am: 953c4396
      
      Change-Id: Ia67c8271cfd6641a117415d439ce1c75b63e2580
      67c5cdfd
    • Hridya Valsaraju's avatar
      add selinux policy for GNSS hal · 953c4396
      Hridya Valsaraju authored
      The following are the avc denials that are addressed:
      
      avc: denied { call } for pid=889 comm="system_server"
      scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
      tclass=binder permissive=0
      
      avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
      tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
      
      avc: denied { read } for name="hw" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1837
      scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
      tclass=dir permissive=0
      
      avc: denied { open } for path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="mmcblk0p43"
      ino=1837 scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
      tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
      
      Bug:31974439
      
      Test: Checked that there no more related avc denial messages related to
      the GNSS HAL in dmesg.
      
      Change-Id: I5b43dc088017a5568dd8e442726d2bf52e95b1d5
      953c4396
    • Max Bires's avatar
      Auditing init and ueventd access to chr device files. · 845a8e80
      Max Bires authored
      am: 9e7a5b0a
      
      Change-Id: Ice41f3c804a4dd0aad058e39a2a8a0bcff80eb5a
      845a8e80
    • Max Bires's avatar
      Auditing init and ueventd access to chr device files. · 9e7a5b0a
      Max Bires authored
      It seems likely that there is no reason to keep around a number of
      devices that are configured to be included into the pixel kernels. Init
      and ueventd should be the only processes with r/w access to these
      devices, so auditallow rules have been added to ensure that they aren't
      actually used.
      
      /dev/keychord was given its own type since it's one of the few character
      devices that's actually legitimately used and would cause log spam in
      the auditallow otherwise.
      
      Bug: 33347297
      Test: The phone boots without any apparent log spam.
      
      Change-Id: I3dd9557df8a9218b8c802e33ff549d15849216fb
      9e7a5b0a
    • Myles Watson's avatar
      Allow debuggerd to access native tests · 82a8f40c
      Myles Watson authored
      am: 926dc331
      
      Change-Id: I0ea98702d907e04d0fe1f3af242e0ec4a0712582
      82a8f40c
  4. Jan 12, 2017
  5. Jan 11, 2017
  6. Jan 10, 2017
  7. Jan 09, 2017
  8. Jan 08, 2017
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