- Sep 19, 2017
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Tri Vo authored
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Tri Vo authored
Bug: 65643247 Test: device boots without denials from bootanim to sysfs and cgroup. Change-Id: Icf8c45906cb83e1b0a60737d67ae584b9d1b34aa
- Sep 18, 2017
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Tri Vo authored
Bug: 65643247 Test: device boots without denials from rild to proc. Change-Id: I142a228347ef07266cb612e99c90fb5ec187988a
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Tri Vo authored
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
am: 4c159eb9 Change-Id: Ic826a808c51cbef2865047be245600491f170c1b
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
am: 7bb31061 Change-Id: I235d0cfa039241c2df830392c1736c60718d5d53
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
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Tri Vo authored
Bug: 65643247 Test: device boots without denials from bootstat to proc. Change-Id: Ie31a0488239dbb1614fbcce07540d23afa805b0e
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- Sep 16, 2017
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Tri Vo authored
Bug: 65643247 Test: device boots without denials from bootanim to proc. Change-Id: I0454a2bd4489d7816d82a299f5bc199d6a299ec0
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- Sep 15, 2017
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
am: 6ba6705c Change-Id: I3c61feaac2a38a92fa42a29d79f7e8b4eab38642
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
Test: after cherry-pick - it builds Merged-In: I57c0150a52c13f1ce21f9ae2147e3814aad0fb7e Change-Id: I7da8160a95e09946d283bd849628bd5392410353
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
Bug: 62945293 Test: instrumentation, VTS Change-Id: I7e896b64bf0ee907af21d08f6b78561fadc7f0e3
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Bill Yi authored
Change-Id: I88e2887b0691ce3c5018578556abf7c420fe5a1b
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
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Tomasz Wasilczyk authored
Bug: 63600413 Test: VTS, instrumentation, audit2allow Test: after cherry-pick - it builds Change-Id: I57c0150a52c13f1ce21f9ae2147e3814aad0fb7e (cherry picked from commit 567b947d)
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Tri Vo authored
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Mark Salyzyn authored
am: 67ec37a3 Change-Id: Ic221e8a29daf603a17bbf26506f5bbacc2c68337
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Mark Salyzyn authored
am: 397b07b3 Change-Id: I59221e03d3cdbbaa4fb416605ba66e9243afb5b9
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Mark Salyzyn authored
Add series of neverallow rules to restrict components from reading or writing bootloader_boot_reason_prop, system_boot_reason_prop and last_boot_reason_prop to trusted set of domains. The policy is that bootloader_boot_reason_prop (ro.boot.bootreason) has a compliance issue due to the sheer momentum of near unparseable content as filed by the wide variety (8000 different devices at last count) bootloaders and is only to be accessible to a series of responsible system components. It can be inaccurate as it provides no means to evaluate a shutdown, likely reporting "cold" (from initial power up) or the more generic "reboot". The last_boot_reason_prop (persist.sys.boot.reason) contains inaccurate information as it is only valid after a controlled reboot or shutdown. The value can linger around after less controlled scenarios. Since the information could be false, we do not want to support it as an open API, so we again block access to only responsible components. The system_boot_reason_prop (sys.boot.reason) is a canonical boot reason that takes into account parsing bootloader_boot_reason_prop, boot_loader_boot_reason_prop and other system and HAL generated hints to determine a parseable and most accurate reason for the last time the system was rebooted. For now the policy for system_boot_reason_prop is to audit users of the API, and on a need to know basis via device additions to the selinux rules. If vendors need their components to access the boot reason, they need to comply first with CTS tests and spirit with regards to controlled reboot messaging and in turn read the system_boot_reason_prop for the canonical information. It will contain validated content derived from bootloader_boot_reason_prop in the scenarios that count. The controlled reboot APIs include: - android_reboot(ANDROID_RB_<TYPE>, int flag, const char* reason) - PowerManagerService.lowLevelShutdown(String reason); - PowerManagerService.lowLevelReboot(String reason); - ShutdownThread.shutdown(context, String reason, boolean confirm); - ShutdownThread.reboot(context, String reason, boolean confirm); - PowerManager.shutdown(boolean confirm, String reason, boolean wait); - PowerManager.reboot(String reason); Any others (including the direct linux reboot syscall) create problems for generating an accurate canonical boot reason. Test: compile Bug: 63736262 Bug: 65686279 Change-Id: I2e5e55bbea1c383c06472eb2989237cfeb852030
- Sep 14, 2017
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Treehugger Robot authored
* changes: Allow sensor hal to use wakelock Allow sensor to use gralloc handle and access ion device
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Tri Vo authored
labeled /proc/kmsg as proc_kmsg, changed logd's access from proc to proc_kmsg, and added a compat mapping. Bug: 65643247 Test: device boots without selinux denials to the newly introduced proc_kmsg Test: logd-unit-tests passes Merged-In: I92c9f5694289eb6a94c4d90f14e2de4d46b5228e Change-Id: I92c9f5694289eb6a94c4d90f14e2de4d46b5228e (partial CP of commit 528da6fe)
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Peng Xu authored
Added permission related to use of wake lock. Wakelock in sensor HAL is used to gurantee delivery of wake up sensor events before system go back to sleep. Bug: 63995095 Test: QCOM and nanohub sensor hal are able to acquire wakelock successfuly. Change-Id: Id4ac3552e18a1cad252017e3dc9ab3d4be8d4ab9
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Peng Xu authored
Allow sensor hal to sue gralloc handle and access ion device so that sensor direct report feature can function correctly when HardwareBuffer shared memory is used. Test: SensorDirectReportTest passes without setenforce 0 Change-Id: I2068f6f4a8ac15da40126892e1326e0b90a6576f Merged-In: I2068f6f4a8ac15da40126892e1326e0b90a6576f
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