Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.

Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d

surfaceflinger has been enforcing for a while now. Remove
the reference to the unconfined domain.

Change-Id: Ia86a0553e9c2db3c89f93e26179c79278d1d3bed

As of sepolicy commit a16a59e2
(https://android-review.googlesource.com/94580), adf_device
and graphics_device have the exact same security properties.

Merge them into one type to avoid a proliferation of SELinux
types.

Change-Id: Ib1a24f5d880798600e103b9e14934e41abb1ef95

Change-Id: Id6d9a7cabc2fe9c18de10c6e9bc0080cdcd7033d
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

ADF is a modern replacement for fbdev.

ADF's device nodes (/dev/adf[X]), interface nodes
(/dev/adf-interface[X].[Y]), and overlay engine nodes
(/dev/adf-overlay-engine[X].[Y]) are collectively used in similar
contexts as fbdev nodes.  Vendor HW composers (via SurfaceFlinger) and
healthd will need to send R/W ioctls to these nodes to prepare and
update the display.

Ordinary apps should not talk to ADF directly.

Change-Id: Ic0a76b1e82c0cc1e8f240f219928af1783e79343
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>

When SurfaceFlinger -- or any BufferQueue consumer -- releases a buffer, the
BufferQueue calls back into the producer side in case the producer cares.
This results in a notification from surfaceflinger to bootanim.

This callback started in d1c103655533321b5c74fbefff656838a8196153.

Addresses the following denial:

6.164348   type=1400 audit(1397612702.010:5): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=128 comm="surfaceflinger" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:bootanim:s0 tclass=binder

Change-Id: I6f2d62a3ed81fde45150d2ae3ff05822bfda33fe

The ctl_default_prop label is a bit too generic for some
of the priveleged domains when describing access rights.
Instead, be explicit about which services are being started
and stopped by introducing new ctl property keys.

Change-Id: I1d0c6f6b3e8bd63da30bd6c7b084da44f063246a
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=3772 comm="Binder_4" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=26103 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=file

This seems harmless, although I am unclear as to why/where it occurs.
Likely just for logging/debugging.

Change-Id: I7be38deabb117668b069ebdf086a9ace88dd8dd1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps.  But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket.  So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.

Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.

Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:

avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=257 comm="Binder_2" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tclass=binder

avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=1002 comm="Binder_4" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=binder

avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1468 comm="Binder_1" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=10222 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=file

avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1275 comm="Binder_5" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=38036 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I92147a1636b44a851d0e0e059f70ec8267cecf08
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.

Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.

For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table.   Clarification:  read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.

Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.

This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC).  We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.

Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Steps to reproduce across devices.
  adb shell screenrecord --bit-rate 8000000 --time-limit 10 /data/local/tmp/test.mp4

* Allow surfaceflinger to talk to mediaserver
   avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=122 comm="surfaceflinger" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=binder

* Give mediaserver access to gpu_device
   avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: Id1812ec95662f4b2433e2989f5fccce6a85c3a41
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Image transfer over NFC is broken.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  -----------------------------------------
  1. Launch Gallery and open any picture
  2. Keep two devices close each other
  3. Tap on 'Touch to Beam' option on sender device and observe receiver device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  'Beam did not complete' message showing in Notification window.

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  Beam should complete successfully and able to share picture through Beam

  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION :
  Device : Hammerhead
  Reproducibility : 3/3

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[ 3030.955024] type=1400 audit(1391625834.066:72): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=311 comm="Binder_2" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tclass=binder
<5>[ 3049.606559] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:74): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="0" dev="fuse" ino=3086221568 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.606802] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:75): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="beam" scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.607068] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:76): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="beam" scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.610602] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:77): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="IMG_20140205_104344.jpg" dev="fuse" ino=3086246328 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.610870] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:78): avc:  denied  { rename } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="IMG_20140205_104344.jpg" dev="fuse" ino=3086246328 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 12891504
Change-Id: I10dc964db9249f53a2b4d8fe871ad9a036c423a2

Triggering a bug report via
Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report
generates a number of denials.

Two bugs here:

1) According to the "allowed" list in
frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c ,
media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register
as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the
binder_service domain. Fix them.

2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java
programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the
corresponding SELinux capability.

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[  149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3

Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.

Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.

This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.

Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.

Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858

When playing protected content on manta, surfaceflinger would crash.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  1. Launch Play Movies & TV
  2. Play any movie and observe

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  Device reboot while playing movies

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No device reboot

Even though this only reproduces on manta, this seems appropriate
for a general policy.

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[   36.066819] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:9): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" name="tlcd_sock" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=627097 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file
<5>[   36.066985] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:10): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" path="/data/app/tlcd_sock" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[   41.379708] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:15): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[   41.380051] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:16): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[   41.380209] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:17): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[   41.380779] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:18): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path="/dev/mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: I20286ec2a6cf0d190a84ad74e88e94468bab9fdb
Bug: 12434847

Change-Id: Ief925f1f49a6579d5a7a1035f3732834238fa590
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

There are continued complaints about not being able to generate
bug reports and surfaceflinger crashes. Move surfaceflinger
out of enforcing until I can resolve this.

Here are some denials I'm seeing. I'm not sure what binder service is
running in the shell domain... Need to do more digging.

nnk@nnk:~/Downloads$ grep "avc: " screenshot_runtime_restart.txt  | grep surfaceflinger
<5>[    5.182699] type=1400 audit(1389111729.860:9): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=186 comm="surfaceflinger" name="tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=627090 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  744.988702] type=1400 audit(1389112469.578:188): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=596 comm="Binder_3" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:shell:s0 tclass=binder

This reverts commit a11c56e1.

Bug: 12416329
Change-Id: I7b72608c760c4087f73047ad751a5bd069fa2ec7

When a bugreport is triggered using the device keys,
it generates a screenshot and places it into
/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports. SELinux is denying
those writes.

Addresses the following denials:

<5> type=1400 audit(1389047451.385:23): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=267 comm="Binder_1" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=binder
<5> type=1400 audit(1389046083.780:37): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4191 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-06-14-07-35.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=81874 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 12416329
Change-Id: I318145591cda500094d98103d30b784df48a67be

mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files.
Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses
the following denials:

<5>[   22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also
have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the
chracter devices may not be reachable.

Bug: 12416198
Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074

Change-Id: I55d059cf6b9e13a81545d3d8b8ff86befc89d6b3
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Leave the domain permissive initially until it gets more testing.

Change-Id: I9d88d76d1ffdc79a2eff4545d37a9e615482df50
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I3ce0b4bd25e078698a1c50242aaed414bf5cb517
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: Id6d89e7d87642fba22445484034e39f94bb90f5b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1

This reverts commit 69fbbdd5.

Some of these will get factored out into device-specific
configs later.

Change-Id: I359915e2607b56112bb22456d28e06c162fcbdff

This reverts commit e7e54fac

Change-Id: I26b577cf46a0eaccf6adf7ae851383a10bf03b4b

This reverts commit 1c101164

Restoring now that the conflict with tuna has passed.

Change-Id: I587dab8d7102c913fc03825a006e96d76680858d

This reverts commit f51e9007

Looks like this caused a build breakage in master, may have a duplicate rule from AOSP.

Change-Id: I4ea83a47baec4ffa2840b5fe50b6f55e1eeda53c

Some of these will get factored out into device-specific
configs later.

Change-Id: I7ea9c22a666b13bca2d867e5bcc7084ed7129de3

This reverts commit ba84bf1d

Hidden dependency resolved.

Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392

This reverts commit 8a814a76

Change-Id: Id1497cc42d07ee7ff2ca44ae4042fc9f2efc9aad

Change-Id: I5a3584b6cc5eda2b7d82e85452f9fe457877f1d1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The binder_transfer_binder hook was changed in the kernel, obsoleting
the receive permission and changing the target of the transfer permission.
Update the binder-related policy to match the revised permission checking.

Change-Id: I1ed0dadfde2efa93296e967eb44ca1314cf28586
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.