am: 63211f8d

Change-Id: If8aa9152a643522fc896b7a412d3fafb19043649

am: 871e44c4

Change-Id: I1c261dc247b93306c6d1a70dd0014532c84843c5

am: 6456542f

Change-Id: I353c8d695a5c995f72fe865f27682a05011f8f55

ASAN builds may require additional permissions to launch processes
with ASAN wrappers. In this case, system_server needs permission to
execute /system/bin/sh.

Create with_asan() macro which can be used exclusively on debug
builds. Note this means that ASAN builds with these additional
permission will not pass the security portion of CTS - like any
other debug build.

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute } for name="sh" dev="dm-0" ino=571
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
tclass=file

Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-user;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Bug: 36138508
Change-Id: I6e39ada4bacd71687a593023f16b45bc16cd7ef8

/proc/interrupts may be dumped by dumpstate HAL if required.

Bug: 36486169
Test: 'adb shell bugreport' on sailfish

Change-Id: Ifc41a516aeea846bc56b86b064bda555b43c58ed
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

am: e1a350a0

Change-Id: Ib2f28bdd5aa8dc1a6641f3f114965ac3ddec17e2

am: cc45b87c

Change-Id: I17fe3e79b7f673a0703be5be7bb93838cd2f7ed6

am: bbe7213f

Change-Id: I0c82b4e73e54cf7ac1f434c97558bd3cef3c36e7

Now that the android wifi framework has fully switched over to HIDL,
remove the sepolicy permissions for accessing wpa_supplicant using
socket control interface.

While there, also removed the redundant |hwbinder_use|.

Bug: 35707797
Test: Device boots up and able to connect to wifi networks.
Test: Wifi integration tests passed.
Change-Id: I55e24b852558d1a905b189116879179d62bdc76c

Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b

Test: no neverallows triggered
Bug: 36494354
Change-Id: I52e21a9be5400027d4e96a8befdd4faaffb06a93

am: 9d5f97b3

Change-Id: Ic75010f7e11129e879a7eea1605969f2511f6fc9

am: 6de0d9a7

Change-Id: I7f971d6f1a9fe4247490070f2f00bede2b828494

am: 2e7fa9d8

Change-Id: I85d2895bb6f44bf3461214e4c679954a79b30cee

am: d3266558

Change-Id: I626cbb06628b9df635efdd4d3a9cc4fb46c7bcc3

This is a follow-up to 93391686
which added both
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator) and
binder_call(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator). The latter
binder_call rule is no longer needed because it is automatically
granted by virtue of cameraserver being marked as a client of
Graphics Allocator HAL --
see 49274721.

Test: Take a photo (both HDR and conventional) using Google Camera
Test: Record video using Google Camera
Test: Record slow motion video using Google Camera
Test: No denials to do with cameraserver and hal_graphics_allocator*
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: If93fe310fa62923b5107a7e78d158f6e4b4d0b3a

Test: Boots, runs
Bug: 32713782
Change-Id: Ia58db3c4c0159482f08e72ef638f3e1736095918

HALs are intended to be limited responsibility and thus limited
permission. In order to enforce this, place limitations on:
1. What processes may transition into a HAL - currently only init
2. What methods may be used to transition into a HAL - no using
   seclabel
3. When HALs exec - only allow exec with a domain transition.

Bug: 36376258
Test: Build aosp_marlin, aosp_bullhead, aosp_dragon. Neverallow rules
      are compile time assertions, so building is a sufficient test.

Change-Id: If4df19ced730324cf1079f7a86ceba7c71374131

am: 1222ece9

Change-Id: I981e6081451d4a26eabcce1473f39681de952a69

All previous users of this macro have been switched to
hal_server_domain macro.

Test: no hal_impl_domain in system/sepolicy/ and device/**/sepolicy
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I4a71b3fd5046c0d215b056f1cae25fe6bda0fb45

am: cc877324

Change-Id: I41b9754e467918d04aa97fe68bf93790062fc66d

Apps should be able to access the configstore HAL since framework
libraries which are loaded into app process can call configstore.

Letting apps have direct access to this HAL is OK because: 

(1) the API of this HAL does not make clients provide any sensitive 
information to the HAL, which makes it impossible for the HAL to 
disclose sensitive information of its clients when the HAL is 
compromised, 

(2) we will require that this HAL is binderized (i.e., does not run 
inside the process of its clients), 

(3) we will require that this HAL runs in a tight seccomp sandbox 
(this HAL doesn't need much access, if at all) and,

(4) we'll restrict the HALs powers via neverallows.

Test: apps can use configstore hal.

Change-Id: I04836b7318fbc6ef78deff770a22c68ce7745fa9

am: 10184efa

Change-Id: I57d847a050217c8564d1b9f64e35aab276d27e40

am: 08d6f566

Change-Id: Ib9a4687273a0aa6f43fb4c15ce499d5c41db3d4d

Test: Google camera app snapshot/record/
      slow motion recording
Bug: 36383997
Change-Id: I565fb441aec529464474e0dd0e01dbfe0b167c82

am: 00a03d42

Change-Id: I0d66b07b8fa3f1a992fd2b3a864dafb3c9c7eb0c

This switches Allocator HAL policy to the design which enables us to
identify all SELinux domains which host HALs and all domains which are
clients of HALs.

Allocator HAL is special in the sense that it's assumed to be always
binderized. As a result, rules in Camera HAL target hal_allocator_server
rather than hal_allocator (which would be the server and any client, if
the Allocator HAL runs in passthrough mode).

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: YouTube video plays back
Test: Take photo using Google Camera app, recover a video, record a slow
      motion video
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Ifbbca554ec221712361ee6cda94c82f254d84936