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  1. Feb 21, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Address SELinux denials with clatd. · a770ee5b
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      <5>[  216.710405] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:17): avc:  denied  { use } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9368]" dev="sockfs" ino=9368 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fd
      
      <5>[  216.710553] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:18): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9368]" dev="sockfs" ino=9368 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
      
      <5>[  216.710727] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:19): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="pipe:[9369]" dev="pipefs" ino=9369 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fifo_file
      
      <5>[  216.710872] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:20): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[8214]" dev="sockfs" ino=8214 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
      
      <5>[  216.711037] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:21): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="pipe:[9369]" dev="pipefs" ino=9369 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fifo_file
      
      <5>[  216.711208] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:22): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9370]" dev="sockfs" ino=9370 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      <5>[  216.711334] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:23): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9372]" dev="sockfs" ino=9372 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_nflog_socket
      
      <5>[  216.711513] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:24): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[11078]" dev="sockfs" ino=11078 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      <5>[  216.713390] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:25): avc:  denied  { dac_override } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability
      
      <5>[  216.713528] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:26): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" name="tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6127 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      <5>[  314.513898] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:42): avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      <5>[  314.514482] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:43): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      <5>[  314.515196] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:44): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      <5>[  314.516077] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:45): avc:  denied  { connect } for  pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      <5>[ 22.257024] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:12): avc: denied { open } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" name="tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6117 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      <5>[ 22.257274] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:13): avc: denied { net_admin } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=12 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability
      
      <5>[ 22.257445] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:14): avc: denied { write } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" name="forwarding" dev="proc" ino=10684 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
      
      <5>[ 22.257618] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:15): avc: denied { setgid } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=6 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability
      
      <5>[ 22.257753] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:16): avc: denied { setuid } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=7 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability
      
      <5>[ 22.385005] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:17): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6117 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      <5>[ 22.385269] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:18): avc: denied { create } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=tun_socket
      
      <5>[ 22.388955] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:19): avc: denied { nlmsg_write } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket
      
      Change-Id: Ic760597df1aa4b33b3cb6e9a504dbcbd6f5d0116
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      a770ee5b
  2. Feb 11, 2014
  3. Oct 21, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Move unconfined domains out of permissive mode. · 353c72e3
      Nick Kralevich authored
      This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
      domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
      these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
      
      The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
      1) kernel
      2) init
      
      In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
      rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
      work.
      
      When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
      we can:
      
      1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
      2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
      3) Remove the permissive line
      4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
      
      For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
      a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
      the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
      After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
      We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
      and out of unconfined.
      
      Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
      353c72e3
  4. Aug 05, 2013
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