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  1. Aug 23, 2013
  2. Aug 20, 2013
  3. Aug 17, 2013
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  5. Aug 14, 2013
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  7. Aug 06, 2013
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  11. Jul 17, 2013
  12. Jul 16, 2013
  13. Jul 15, 2013
  14. Jul 14, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      untrusted_app.te / isolated_app.te / app.te first pass · 6634a108
      Nick Kralevich authored
      This is my first attempt at creating an enforcing SELinux domain for
      apps, untrusted_apps, and isolated_apps. Much of these rules are based on the
      contents of app.te as of commit 11153ef3
      with extensive modifications, some of which are included below.
      
      * Allow communication with netd/dnsproxyd, to allow netd to handle
        dns requests
      * Allow binder communications with the DNS server
      * Allow binder communications with surfaceflinger
      * Allow an app to bind to tcp/udp ports
      * Allow all domains to read files from the root partition, assuming
        the DAC allows access.
      
      In addition, I added a bunch of "neverallow" rules, to assert that
      certain capabilities are never added.
      
      This change has a high probability of breaking someone, somewhere.
      If it does, then I'm happy to fix the breakage, rollback this change,
      or put untrusted_app into permissive mode.
      
      Change-Id: I83f220135d20ab4f70fbd7be9401b5b1def1fe35
      6634a108
  15. Jul 13, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      remove "self:process ptrace" from domain, netd neverallow rules · 9a19885c
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Remove "self:process ptrace" from all SELinux enforced domains.
      In general, a process should never need to ptrace itself.
      We can add this back to more narrowly scoped domains as needed.
      
      Add a bunch of neverallow assertions to netd.te, to verify that netd
      never gets unexpected capabilities.
      
      Change-Id: Ie862dc95bec84068536bb64705667e36210c5f4e
      9a19885c
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Move *_app into their own file · 748fdef6
      Nick Kralevich authored
      app.te covers a lot of different apps types (platform_app, media_app,
      shared_app, release_app, isolated_app, and untrusted_app), all
      of which are going to have slightly different security policies.
      
      Separate the different domains from app.te. Over time, these
      files are likely to grow substantially, and mixing different domain types
      is a recipe for confusion and mistakes.
      
      No functional change.
      
      Change-Id: Ida4e77fadb510f5993eb2d32f2f7649227edff4f
      748fdef6
  16. Jul 12, 2013
  17. Jul 11, 2013
  18. Jul 10, 2013
  19. Jul 08, 2013
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      Grant fsetid Linux capability to vold. · 79d59edc
      Alex Klyubin authored
      This fixes the issue where paid apps failed to install via Google
      Play with "Package file has a bad manifest" error. The issue appears
      to be caused by vold being prevented by SELinux policy from setting
      the setgid bit on the ASEC container directory into which the APK is
      decrypted. As a result, the APK is not readable to PackageParser.
      
      Bug: 9736808
      Change-Id: I07546a9f9caac3de8b720499bd1bf1604edea0fe
      79d59edc
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      Grant fsetid Linux capability to vold. · b25fe91e
      Alex Klyubin authored
      This fixes the issue where paid apps failed to install via Google
      Play with "Package file has a bad manifest" error. The issue appears
      to be caused by vold being prevented by SELinux policy from setting
      the setgid bit on the ASEC container directory into which the APK is
      decrypted. As a result, the APK is not readable to PackageParser.
      
      Bug: 9736808
      Change-Id: I07546a9f9caac3de8b720499bd1bf1604edea0fe
      b25fe91e
    • The Android Automerger's avatar
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