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  1. Dec 08, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Migrate to upstream policy version 30 · 2ea23a6e
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Grant untrusted_app and isolated_app unpriv_sock_perms, neverallow
      priv_sock_perms to disallow access to MAC address and ESSID.
      
      Change-Id: Idac3b657a153e7d7fdc647ff34b876a325d759b3
      2ea23a6e
  2. Oct 23, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Temporarily downgrade to policy version number · 0fc831c3
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Temporarily move from policy version 30 to 29 until device kernels
      and prebuilts are all upgraded to the accepted upstream version of
      the selinux ioctl command whitelisting code.
      
      (cherry picked from commit 89765083)
      
      Bug: 22846070
      
      Change-Id: I31d1e80aaee164cf41a2f01c6ca846a000898ef4
      0fc831c3
  3. Oct 01, 2015
  4. Sep 29, 2015
  5. Sep 28, 2015
  6. Sep 18, 2015
  7. Aug 13, 2015
  8. Aug 12, 2015
    • Richard Haines's avatar
      Update Android.mk to support file_contexts.bin · c2d01914
      Richard Haines authored
      
      This change supports external/libselinux changes to implement
      PCRE formatted binary file_contexts and general_file_contexts.bin
      files.
      
      The $(intermediates) directory will contain the original text file
      (that is no longer used on the device) with a .tmp extension as well
      as the .bin file to aid analysis.
      
      A CleanSpec.mk file is added to remove the old file_contexts file.
      
      Change-Id: I75a781100082c23536f70ce3603f7de42408b5ba
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRichard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
      c2d01914
  9. Aug 11, 2015
    • Dan Willemsen's avatar
      Don't assume ordering of $(wildcard ...) · bc2a49f2
      Dan Willemsen authored
      There are no guarantees on the order of the results from a call to the
      wildcard function. In fact, the order usually changes between make 3.81
      and make 4.0 (and kati).
      
      Instead, sort the results of wildcard in each sepolicy directory, so
      that directory order is preserved, but content ordering is reliable.
      
      Change-Id: I1620f89bbdd2b2902f2e0c40526e893ccf5f7775
      bc2a49f2
  10. Jul 24, 2015
  11. Jul 17, 2015
    • Colin Cross's avatar
      Use build fingerprint from file · 29a463d5
      Colin Cross authored
      Improve incremental ninja builds by keeping the command line the same
      across builds.
      
      Change-Id: Iedbaa40c9f816f91afc8f073a9ed7f9ffd5d9a53
      29a463d5
  12. Jul 16, 2015
  13. Jul 10, 2015
  14. Jul 07, 2015
  15. Jun 30, 2015
  16. Jun 29, 2015
  17. Jun 27, 2015
  18. Jun 25, 2015
    • William Roberts's avatar
      check_seapp: add support for "neverallow" checks · 81e1f90c
      William Roberts authored
      
      Introduce "neverallow" rules for seapp_contexts. A neverallow rule is
      similar to the existing key-value-pair entries but the line begins
      with "neverallow". A neverallow violation is detected when all keys,
      both inputs and outputs are matched. The neverallow rules value
      parameter (not the key) can contain regular expressions to assist in
      matching. Neverallow rules are never output to the generated
      seapp_contexts file.
      
      Also, unless -o is specified, checkseapp runs in silent mode and
      outputs nothing. Specifying - as an argument to -o outputs to stdout.
      
      Sample Output:
      Error: Rule in File "external/sepolicy/seapp_contexts" on line 87: "user=fake domain=system_app type=app_data_file" violates neverallow in File "external/sepolicy/seapp_contexts" on line 57: "user=((?!system).)* domain=system_app"
      
      Change-Id: Ia4dcbf02feb774f2e201bb0c5d4ce385274d8b8d
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWilliam Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
      81e1f90c
  19. Jun 13, 2015
  20. Jun 05, 2015
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      restrict app access to socket ioctls · de9b5301
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Create a macro of unprivileged ioctls including
      - All common socket ioctls except MAC address
      - All wireless extensions ioctls except get/set ESSID
      - Some commonly used tty ioctls
      
      Bug: 21657002
      Change-Id: Ib08be9cb70d08c1fa2c8bddbae519e7c2df5293c
      de9b5301
  21. May 04, 2015
  22. Apr 01, 2015
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Drop BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION. · 8e0ca886
      Stephen Smalley authored
      As suggested in the comments on
      https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/141560/
      
      
      drop BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION and simplify the build_policy logic.
      Union all files found under BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS.
      
      Unlike BOARD_SEPOLICY_REPLACE/IGNORE, on which we trigger an error
      to catch any lingering uses and force updating of the BoardConfig.mk
      files, we only warn on uses of BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION to avoid
      breaking the build until all device BoardConfig*.mk files have been
      updated, and since they should be harmless - the files will be unioned
      regardless.
      
      Change-Id: I4214893c999c23631f5456cb1b8edd59771ef13b
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      8e0ca886
  23. Mar 13, 2015
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      sepolicy: Drop BOARD_SEPOLICY_IGNORE/REPLACE support. · b4f17069
      Stephen Smalley authored
      With changes I431c1ab22fc53749f623937154b9ec43469d9645 and
      Ia54aa263f2245c7090f4b9d9703130c19f11bd28, it is no longer
      legitimate to use BOARD_SEPOLICY_IGNORE or REPLACE with
      any of the *_contexts files since the CTS requires the AOSP
      entries to be present in the device files.
      
      Further, these changes render BOARD_SEPOLICY_IGNORE unusable for
      most policy files since all domains and types referenced within any
      of the AOSP *_contexts entries must be defined in the kernel policy, so
      you cannot use BOARD_SEPOLICY_IGNORE to exclude any .te file
      that defines a type referenced in any of those *_contexts files.
      There does not seem to be a significant need for such a facility,
      as AOSP policy is small and only domains and types used by most
      devices should be defined in external/sepolicy.
      
      BOARD_SEPOLICY_REPLACE is commonly misused to eliminate neverallow rules
      from AOSP policy, which will only lead to CTS failures, especially
      since change Iefe508df265f62efa92f8eb74fc65542d39e3e74 introduced neverallow
      checking on the entire policy via sepolicy-analyze.  The only remaining
      legitimate function of BOARD_SEPOLICY_REPLACE is to support overriding
      AOSP .te files with more restrictive rule sets.  However, the need for this
      facility has been significantly reduced by the fact that AOSP policy
      is now fully confined + enforcing for all domains, and further restrictions
      beyond AOSP carry a compatibility risk.
      
      Builders of custom policies and custom ROMs still have the freedom to
      apply patches on top of external/sepolicy to tighten rule sets (which are
      likely more maintainable than maintaining a completely separate copy of
      the file via BOARD_SEPOLICY_REPLACE) and/or of using their own separate
      policy build system as exemplified by
      https://bitbucket.org/quarksecurity/build-policies
      
      
      
      Change-Id: I2611e983f7cbfa15f9d45ec3ea301e94132b06fa
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      b4f17069
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Fix rules for general_property_contexts. · c9361731
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      Failed to include base_rules.mk, so this target was not being built.
      
      Change-Id: I2414fa6c3e3e37c74f63c205e3694d1a811c956e
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      c9361731
  24. Mar 12, 2015
  25. Feb 28, 2015
  26. Dec 20, 2014
    • William Roberts's avatar
      Allow overiding FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED · 754f5ea7
      William Roberts authored
      It's beneficial to be able to overide this in a device makefile
      if you need to get the domains into an unconfined state to keep
      the logs from filling up on kernel entries without having to add
      rules into device specific policy.
      
      Change-Id: I7778be01256ac601f247e4d6e12573d0d23d12a1
      754f5ea7
  27. Nov 13, 2014
    • William Roberts's avatar
      Remove network shell script · f330f375
      William Roberts authored
      This seems to not really being used, especially considering
      that the init.rc does not have a oneshot service for it, and its
      not using the build_policy() and other things to even make it
      configurable.
      
      Change-Id: I964f94b30103917ed39cf5d003564de456b169a5
      f330f375
  28. Nov 07, 2014
  29. Nov 05, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      recovery.te: add /data neverallow rules · a17a266e
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Recovery should never be accessing files from /data.
      In particular, /data may be encrypted, and the files within
      /data will be inaccessible to recovery, because recovery doesn't
      know the decryption key.
      
      Enforce write/execute restrictions on recovery. We can't tighten
      it up further because domain.te contains some /data read-only
      access rules, which shouldn't apply to recovery but do.
      
      Create neverallow_macros, used for storing permission macros
      useful for neverallow rules. Standardize recovery.te and
      property_data_file on the new macros.
      
      Change-Id: I02346ab924fe2fdb2edc7659cb68c4f8dffa1e88
      a17a266e
  30. Sep 20, 2014
  31. Jul 29, 2014
  32. Jul 14, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      DO NOT MERGE: Flip FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to true · 2aa727e3
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Force any experimental SELinux domains (ones tagged with
      "permissive_or_unconfined") into unconfined. This flag is
      intended to be flipped when we're preparing a release,
      to eliminate inconsistencies between user and userdebug devices,
      and to ensure that we're enforcing a minimal set of rules for all
      SELinux domains.
      
      Without this change, our user builds will behave differently than
      userdebug builds, complicating testing.
      
      Change-Id: I52fd5fbe30a7f52f1143f176915ce55fb6a33f87
      2aa727e3
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