- Apr 04, 2017
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: fbccda34 Change-Id: I1dd3889756bcc6324f80d20aeecba95587e68f20
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Roshan Pius authored
am: 29f273ce Change-Id: I0dc5693bddd9574eb36ee4a711652b4130afdd8e
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Martijn Coenen authored
am: c3a9e7df Change-Id: Ifcb4f63b7111252ee3a0deb58e6471b06df58587
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Martijn Coenen authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
am: bab5872c Change-Id: I0341e66bd3a8fcbddf9daf7da84187430b5747d6
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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- Apr 03, 2017
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Ningyuan Wang authored
am: 9337a4dd Change-Id: Ib3273650207e0b64cdca1d6e0e3bbdf48d292a6b
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Ningyuan Wang authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Test: Test: make cts && \ cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \ --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \ --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \ -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForBinderInVendorBan Fails as expected. Bug: 36002573 Change-Id: I298c526789b25734d5f18666c64497e5d1e181d0
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Martijn Coenen authored
So we can limit vndservicemanager access to just vndservice_contexts. Bug: 36052864 Test: servicemanager,vndservicemanager work Change-Id: I7b132d4f616ba1edd0daf7be750d4b7174c4e188
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Tom Cherry authored
am: 0c31c85a Change-Id: I2e6c151eb6b3413054f52d0dea5ab93c91065319
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Tom Cherry authored
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Shubang Lu authored
am: a1c06508 Change-Id: I7e586b6bf9c22ab0380f9982889f0c8c86115df1
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Shubang Lu authored
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Alex Klyubin authored
"tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the vendor image. What's left as public API is that: 1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability, 2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access character devices labeled tee_device. If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling /dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific file_contexts. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36720355 Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6
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Ningyuan Wang authored
Bug: 36855921 Test: compile, wifi works with toggling Change-Id: Ib0819a2d552472e482e192a69530441cfc2c0fd7
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Daniel Nicoara authored
am: ed82acb9 Change-Id: I2c7dc59f0ea468fba1e34d38a55cc2e8e6cc3289
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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- Apr 02, 2017
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Ningyuan Wang authored
am: a299bc80 Change-Id: I94b99a1ace48fafeb47280d1d6764cac70fb9464
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Ningyuan Wang authored
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- Apr 01, 2017
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
am: 814edf8c Change-Id: I9a8cd19a081ab7731f8caf098e406d0af9ce9c48
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as ioctl/stat/read/write/append. This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute core_data_file_type. A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on access. (cherry picked from commit cd97e710) Bug: 34980020 Test: build Marlin policy Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc
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Vishwath Mohan authored
am: 45f699c7 Change-Id: Ib868a803f480a3c756102e59d49275b6eb4e6372
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
am: 386f9460 Change-Id: Ieba3686f331cfa1c3a0907bf15db188a19d3f140
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TreeHugger Robot authored
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Vishwath Mohan authored
This CL changes the policy for ASAN files on-disk to support the changes made by the following CLs - https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/359087/ https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/359389/ which refactor the on-disk layout of sanitized libraries in the following manner - /data/lib* --> /data/asan/system/lib* /data/vendor/* --> /data/asan/vendor/* There are a couple of advantages to this, including better isolation from other components, and more transparent linker renaming and SELinux policies. (cherry picked from commit 33ebdda8) Bug: 36574794 Bug: 36674745 Test: m -j40 && SANITIZE_TARGET="address" m -j40 and the device boots. All sanitized libraries are correctly located in /data/asan/*, and have the right SELinux permissions. Change-Id: Ib08e360cecc8d77754a768a9af0f7db35d6921a9
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Alex Klyubin authored
am: ad80182a Change-Id: I8ecf3458b0974043e4ded8ed343e8191b01b1942
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Ningyuan Wang authored
Bug: 33239267 Test: compile, run wifi, no selinux complaint for wificond Change-Id: I9b3e874381ac6cd7c6ff1058cc4f313bd85481b8
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Alex Klyubin authored
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- Mar 31, 2017
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Tom Cherry authored
Init is no longer calling vdc with logwrapper, so it must take care of logging to kmsg directly. avc: denied { write } for pid=367 comm="vdc" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=11056 scontext=u:r:vdc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 Bug: 36278706 Test: observe vdc logging in kmsg on boot and stderr on normal usage (cherry picked from commit bc4d3630) Change-Id: Id7bc2fa87518aa0678c09495267c9e198ca8c968
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Shubang authored
Test: build, flash; adb shell lshal Bug: 36562029 Change-Id: If8f6d8dbd99d31e6627fa4b7c1fd4faea3b75cf2
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Daniel Cashman authored
am: 537e9e98 Change-Id: Ia100e124b6d1bb4c0f37959acbbca63a26867c9b
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Daniel Cashman authored
am: 22b00be7 Change-Id: Id8e7c42e8e92fed47611c083d40c2d574d3d6918
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Daniel Cashman authored
am: cb6f8f02 Change-Id: I47b6a0362f268ba1a599ab2354f72357fc7b79cc
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Daniel Cashman authored