Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap")
added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation).  The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying).  The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.

This change defines map permission for the Android policy.  It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets.  This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33);
on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.

This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for
file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these
macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system
and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed,
although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the
global macros are not used.

Test: Policy builds

Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Linux kernel commit da69a5306ab9 ("selinux: support distinctions among all
network address families") triggers a build error if a new address family
is added without defining a corresponding SELinux security class.  As a
result, the smc_socket class was added to the kernel to resolve a build
failure as part of merge commit 3051bf36c25d that introduced AF_SMC circa
Linux 4.11.  Define this security class and its access vector, add
it to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude it from webview_zygote
like other socket classes.

Test:  Policy builds

Change-Id: Idbb8139bb09c6d1c47f1a76bd10f4ce1e9d939cb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The implementation for NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed from the kernel in commit
d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84 ("netfilter: remove ip_queue
support") circa Linux 3.5.  Unless we need to retain compatibility
for kernels < 3.5, we can drop these classes from the policy altogether.

Possibly the neverallow rule in app.te should be augmented to include
the newer netlink security classes, similar to webview_zygote, but
that can be a separate change.

Test: policy builds

Change-Id: Iab9389eb59c96772e5fa87c71d0afc86fe99bb6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used
to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network
address families rather than the generic socket class.  The capability
also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP
sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class.  Add
definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by
this capability.  Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set
macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket
classes.

Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security
classes is left to future commits.  Domains previously allowed
permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the
more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support.

The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11.  The
relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6
("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"),
ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6
consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f
("selinux: drop unused socket security classes").

This change requires selinux userspace commit
d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define
extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the
policy with this capability enabled.  This commit is already in
AOSP master.

Test: policy builds

Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I2e11ef4666048c94b4754d50de74d1c526c6933c

See https://groups.google.com/d/msg/android-ndk/BbEOA9pnR-I/HgLkGy5qAgAJ

Addresses the following denial:

  avc: denied { lock } for path="/data/data/com.mypackage/files/somefilename" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=114736 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0

While I'm here, also add lock to w_file_perms.

(cherrypicked from commit 4ee494cc)

Change-Id: I2568a228099c4e112e4a8b80da3bfcf2e35eb0ea

See https://groups.google.com/d/msg/android-ndk/BbEOA9pnR-I/HgLkGy5qAgAJ

Addresses the following denial:

  avc: denied { lock } for path="/data/data/com.mypackage/files/somefilename" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=114736 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0

While I'm here, also add lock to w_file_perms.

Change-Id: I2568a228099c4e112e4a8b80da3bfcf2e35eb0ea

Define new netlink socket security classes introduced by upstream kernel commit
6c6d2e9bde1c1c87a7ead806f8f5e2181d41a652 ("selinux: update netlink socket
classes").  This was merged in Linux 4.2 and is therefore only required
for Android kernels based on 4.2 or newer (e.g. the android-4.4 branch
of the kernel/common tree).

Add the new socket classes to socket_class_set.
Add an initial set of allow rules although further refinement
will likely be necessary.  Any allow rule previously written
on :netlink_socket may need to be rewritten or duplicated for
one or more of the more specific classes.  For now, we retain
the existing :netlink_socket rules for compatibility on older kernels.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

(cherry picked from commit 01d95c23)

Change-Id: Ic00a0d474730cda91ba3bc387e0cc14482f82114

Define new netlink socket security classes introduced by upstream kernel commit
6c6d2e9bde1c1c87a7ead806f8f5e2181d41a652 ("selinux: update netlink socket
classes").  This was merged in Linux 4.2 and is therefore only required
for Android kernels based on 4.2 or newer (e.g. the android-4.4 branch
of the kernel/common tree).

Add the new socket classes to socket_class_set.
Add an initial set of allow rules although further refinement
will likely be necessary.  Any allow rule previously written
on :netlink_socket may need to be rewritten or duplicated for
one or more of the more specific classes.  For now, we retain
the existing :netlink_socket rules for compatibility on older kernels.

Change-Id: I5040b30edd2d374538490a080feda96dd4bae5bf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Modify create_file_perms and create_dir_perms so it doesn't have
the "link" permission. This permission controls whether hard links
are allowed or not on the given file label. Hard links are a common
source of security bugs, and isn't something we want to support by
default.

Get rid of link_file_perms and move the necessary permissions into
create_file_perms and create_dir_perms. Nobody is using this macro,
so it's pointless to keep it around.

Get rid of unlink on directories. It returns EISDIR if you attempt to
do it, independent of SELinux permissions.

SELinux domains which have a need for hard linking for a particular
file type can add it back to their permission set on an as-needed basis.

Add a compile time assertion (neverallow rule) for untrusted_app.
It's particularly dangerous for untrusted_app to ever have hard
link capabilities, and the neverallow rule will prevent regressions.

Bug: 19953790
Change-Id: I5e9493d2bf5da460d074f0bc5ad8ba7c14dec6e0

Addresses denials such as:
type=1400 : avc: denied { lock } for comm="PushCheckSendS" path="socket:[1834573]" dev="sockfs" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

(cherry picked from commit 2c759185)

Bug: 18730521
Change-Id: Ie68955c26ddedb3acd7b7aa18afbf8b35c2c2f78

Addresses denials such as:
type=1400 : avc: denied { lock } for comm="PushCheckSendS" path="socket:[1834573]" dev="sockfs" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=tcp_socket

Change-Id: Idbf6120cca9df634e2f8a876fd1cd836551e5ad7
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules,
but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include
the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions
for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping.
The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app
domain.  Resolve this overlap by:

1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for
netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket.
2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already
have it.
3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te.

Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but
allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed
network access.

Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than *
and add macros for stream socket permissions.

Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Initial policy for racoon (IKE key management).

Signed-off-by: Robert Craig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
Change-Id: If1e344f39ea914e42afbaa021b272ba1b7113479

Change-Id: I328bc882b3d6e200742e017aa23154fb01e638a5

Add key_socket class to socket_class_set macro.  Allow system to trigger module auto-loading and to write to sockets created under /dev.