- Feb 11, 2014
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Robert Craig authored
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
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- Feb 04, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
This doesn't compile on non-manta devices because of a missing drmserver_socket declaration. external/sepolicy/mediaserver.te":68:ERROR 'unknown type drmserver_socket' at token ';' on line 6764: #line 68 allow mediaserver drmserver_socket:sock_file write; checkpolicy: error(s) encountered while parsing configuration make: *** [out/target/product/flo/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1 make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... This reverts commit 8cd400d3. Change-Id: Ib8f07b57008b9ed1165b945057502779e806f0f8
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I7d5a5f964133177e7d466b9759fcf6300fec345d Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Jan 31, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
We can read any efs_files, but can't look in the directory containing them. Allow it. Without this patch, high resolution movie playback is broken. Addresses the following denial: [ 276.780046] type=1400 audit(1391105234.431:5): avc: denied { search } for pid=125 comm="drmserver" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p1" ino=2 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:efs_file:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 12819852 Change-Id: Ie9d13a224cef5e229de1bdb78d605841ed387a21
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- Jan 25, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Change-Id: I7c1d2fc7b4d5a962f872d5f032b6d9e31efe7a24
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- Jan 16, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I35728c4f058fa9aeb51a7960395759590e20b083 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Jan 11, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Permissive domains are only intended for development. When a device launches, we want to ensure that all permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing. Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During development, this flag is false, and permissive domains are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into unconfined+enforcing. This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a minimal level of protection. Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds. Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
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- Jan 06, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files. Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc: denied { read } for pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc: denied { read } for pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the chracter devices may not be reachable. Bug: 12416198 Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074
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- Oct 29, 2013
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I8f344dda3ab9766b4a72c404061f242e054129cd Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Oct 21, 2013
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Nick Kralevich authored
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving these domains into enforcing should be a no-op. The following domains were deliberately NOT changed: 1) kernel 2) init In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually work. When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains, we can: 1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line. 2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined. 3) Remove the permissive line 4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change. For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP. After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing. We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing and out of unconfined. Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
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- May 20, 2013
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repo sync authored
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy. Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve security. Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
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- May 15, 2013
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repo sync authored
Bug: 4070557 Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
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- Apr 05, 2013
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I6a9c3247688f49bed4a1637c728e77c2e865afd2
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I255930759ce0612f6ec9b931bfe545342ef808fc
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I87165fd83b1abef9eb7bf4c403714150aaefed6e
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I31e7a3ae6ba783b78c3b38756966950a20f2f2aa
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- Apr 03, 2013
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I6a9c3247688f49bed4a1637c728e77c2e865afd2
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I255930759ce0612f6ec9b931bfe545342ef808fc
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I87165fd83b1abef9eb7bf4c403714150aaefed6e
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Geremy Condra authored
Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I31e7a3ae6ba783b78c3b38756966950a20f2f2aa
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- Mar 27, 2013
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Geremy Condra authored
This reverts commit ba84bf1d Hidden dependency resolved. Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392
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- Mar 22, 2013
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Geremy Condra authored
This reverts commit 8a814a76 Change-Id: Id1497cc42d07ee7ff2ca44ae4042fc9f2efc9aad
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I5a3584b6cc5eda2b7d82e85452f9fe457877f1d1 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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William Roberts authored
Two new types are introduced: sdcard_internal sdcard_external The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute sdcard_type is introduced. The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external sdcards. Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
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- Aug 13, 2012
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rpcraig authored
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- Aug 10, 2012
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rpcraig authored
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- Mar 07, 2012
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Stephen Smalley authored
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- Jan 04, 2012
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Stephen Smalley authored
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