- Mar 22, 2016
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Nick Kralevich authored
See https://groups.google.com/d/msg/android-ndk/BbEOA9pnR-I/HgLkGy5qAgAJ Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { lock } for path="/data/data/com.mypackage/files/somefilename" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=114736 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir permissive=0 While I'm here, also add lock to w_file_perms. (cherrypicked from commit 4ee494cc) Change-Id: I2568a228099c4e112e4a8b80da3bfcf2e35eb0ea
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- Mar 03, 2016
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Stephen Smalley authored
Define new netlink socket security classes introduced by upstream kernel commit 6c6d2e9bde1c1c87a7ead806f8f5e2181d41a652 ("selinux: update netlink socket classes"). This was merged in Linux 4.2 and is therefore only required for Android kernels based on 4.2 or newer (e.g. the android-4.4 branch of the kernel/common tree). Add the new socket classes to socket_class_set. Add an initial set of allow rules although further refinement will likely be necessary. Any allow rule previously written on :netlink_socket may need to be rewritten or duplicated for one or more of the more specific classes. For now, we retain the existing :netlink_socket rules for compatibility on older kernels. Change-Id: I5040b30edd2d374538490a080feda96dd4bae5bf Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 27, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
Modify create_file_perms and create_dir_perms so it doesn't have the "link" permission. This permission controls whether hard links are allowed or not on the given file label. Hard links are a common source of security bugs, and isn't something we want to support by default. Get rid of link_file_perms and move the necessary permissions into create_file_perms and create_dir_perms. Nobody is using this macro, so it's pointless to keep it around. Get rid of unlink on directories. It returns EISDIR if you attempt to do it, independent of SELinux permissions. SELinux domains which have a need for hard linking for a particular file type can add it back to their permission set on an as-needed basis. Add a compile time assertion (neverallow rule) for untrusted_app. It's particularly dangerous for untrusted_app to ever have hard link capabilities, and the neverallow rule will prevent regressions. Bug: 19953790 Change-Id: I5e9493d2bf5da460d074f0bc5ad8ba7c14dec6e0
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- Dec 12, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Addresses denials such as: type=1400 : avc: denied { lock } for comm="PushCheckSendS" path="socket:[1834573]" dev="sockfs" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=tcp_socket Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (cherry picked from commit 2c759185) Bug: 18730521 Change-Id: Ie68955c26ddedb3acd7b7aa18afbf8b35c2c2f78
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- Dec 11, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Addresses denials such as: type=1400 : avc: denied { lock } for comm="PushCheckSendS" path="socket:[1834573]" dev="sockfs" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=tcp_socket Change-Id: Idbf6120cca9df634e2f8a876fd1cd836551e5ad7 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Feb 25, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules, but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping. The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app domain. Resolve this overlap by: 1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket. 2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already have it. 3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te. Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed network access. Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than * and add macros for stream socket permissions. Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 23, 2013
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Robert Craig authored
Initial policy for racoon (IKE key management). Signed-off-by:
Robert Craig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil> Change-Id: If1e344f39ea914e42afbaa021b272ba1b7113479
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- Oct 04, 2012
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William Roberts authored
Change-Id: I328bc882b3d6e200742e017aa23154fb01e638a5
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- Jun 28, 2012
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Stephen Smalley authored
Add key_socket class to socket_class_set macro. Allow system to trigger module auto-loading and to write to sockets created under /dev.
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- Jan 04, 2012
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Stephen Smalley authored
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