Extend check_seapp to accept the use of the new path= specifier
in seapp_contexts and use it to ensure proper labeling of the cache
subdirectory of com.android.providers.downloads for restorecon.

After this change, restorecon /data/data/com.android.providers.downloads/cache
does not change the context, leaving it in download_file rather than
relabeling it to platform_app_data_file.

Depends on Iddaa3931cfd4ddd5b9f62cd66989e1f26553baa1.

Change-Id: Ief65b8c8dcb44ec701d53e0b58c52d6688cc2a14
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Allow the use of debug.db.uid on userdebug / eng builds.
Setting this property allows debuggerd to suspend a process
if it detects a crash.

Make debug.db.uid only accessible to the su domain. This should
not be used on a user build.

Only support reading user input on userdebug / eng builds.

Steps to reproduce with the "crasher" program:

  adb root
  adb shell setprop debug.db.uid 20000
  mmm system/core/debuggerd
  adb sync
  adb shell crasher

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[  580.637442] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:149): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  580.637589] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:150): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  580.637706] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:151): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[  580.637823] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:152): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[  580.637958] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:153): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=182 comm="debuggerd" path="/dev/input/event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 12532622
Change-Id: I63486edb73efb1ca12e9eb1994ac9e389251a3f1

Should resolve b/13060688 - emulator writes to /storage/sdcard failing.

Change-Id: I9f00d9dfcd1c4f84c2320628257beca71abf170b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I4cd33a296de0d0597aa6166aa1be48f1b0b52129

dhcpcd opens a raw ip socket in ipv6rs_open() to use ICMPv6.  This
facility should be available for all devices which have a need to
use it.

Addresses the following denials:
<5>[   42.699877] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:8): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket
<5>[   42.699993] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:9): avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket
<5>[   42.732208] type=1400 audit(1392332560.338:10): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket

Bug: 12473306
Change-Id: Iee57a0cb4c2d2085a24d4b5fb23a5488f0fd3e03

Start enforcing SELinux rules for lmkd. Security policy
violations will return an error instead of being allowed.

Change-Id: I2bad2c2094d93ebbcb8ccc4b7f3369419004a3f0

* Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj
* Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/*

Addresses the following denials:
<5>[    3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[   48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc:  denied  { dac_override } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1  scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability
<5>[   48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[  214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
<5>[  214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4

Only allow to domains as required and amend the existing
neverallow on block_device:blk_file to replace the
exemption for unconfineddomain with an explicit whitelist.
The neverallow does not check other device types as specific
ones may need to be writable by device-specific domains.

Change-Id: I0f2f1f565e886ae110a719a08aa3a1e7e9f23e8c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Remove sys_ptrace and add a neverallow for it.
Remove sys_rawio and mknod, explicitly allow to kernel, init, and recovery,
and add a neverallow for them.
Remove sys_module.  It can be added back where appropriate in device
policy if using a modular kernel.  No neverallow since it is device
specific.

Change-Id: I1a7971db8d247fd53a8f9392de9e46250e91f89b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Only allow to specific domains as required, and add a neverallow
to prevent allowing it to other domains not explicitly whitelisted.
sdcard_type is exempted from the neverallow since more domains
require the ability to mount it, including device-specific domains.

Change-Id: Ia6476d1c877f5ead250749fb12bff863be5e9f27
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.

Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Change I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e changed the type
on /data/misc/wifi/sockets to wpa_socket and change
I51b09c5e40946673a38732ea9f601b2d047d3b62 fixed the type on existing
devices.  Consequently hostapd now needs access to wpa_socket dir
and sock_file.

Change-Id: I58f552b3cd55821f57e6ef33ebe6bb8587e7b3fd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and
never make progress on confining it.  clatd does exist in AOSP
and is built by default, and is started via netd.

Change-Id: Iee6e0845fad7647962d73cb6d047f27924fa799a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also add rules from our policy.

Change-Id: I86f07f54c5120c511f9cab2877cf765c3ae7c1a8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also add rules from our policy.

Change-Id: I096025c1820f0b51f1abdf249c744cba387e0a65
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also add rules from our policy.

Change-Id: I6f552538cc4f6b28b2883aa74832230944cbdb7a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also add allow rules from our policy.

Change-Id: Id480eb7c8cd4e5544a1ec46cb39a55abc653ddb9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and
never make progress on confining it.  Of course we cannot truly
test until it is released into AOSP, but this prepares the way
and potentially allows for internal testing and collection of denials.

Change-Id: Ic9d1ba872d43f322e39ca6cffa0e725f1e223e7b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and
never make progress on confining it.  Of course we cannot truly
test until it is released into AOSP, but this prepares the way
and potentially allows for internal testing and collection of denials.

Change-Id: I800ab23baee1c84b7c4cf7399b17611a62ca6804
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I8830c4b26f3fd9e8356e090ede1d7b4eaa6cb733
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Steps to reproduce across devices.
  adb shell screenrecord --bit-rate 8000000 --time-limit 10 /data/local/tmp/test.mp4

* Allow surfaceflinger to talk to mediaserver
   avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=122 comm="surfaceflinger" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=binder

* Give mediaserver access to gpu_device
   avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: Id1812ec95662f4b2433e2989f5fccce6a85c3a41
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

In order to prevent Zygote descriptors from leaking into the child
environment, they should be closed by the forked-off child process
before the child switches to the application UID.  These changes close
the descriptors via dup2(), substituting a descriptor open to
/dev/null in their place; this allows the Zygote Java code to close
the FileDescriptor objects cleanly.

This is a multi-project change: dalvik, art, libcore, frameworks/base,
and external/sepolicy are affected.  The CLs need to be approved
together, lest the build break or the software fail to boot.

Bug: 12114500
Change-Id: Ie45ddf6d661a1ea8570cd49dfea76421f2cadf72

Image transfer over NFC is broken.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  -----------------------------------------
  1. Launch Gallery and open any picture
  2. Keep two devices close each other
  3. Tap on 'Touch to Beam' option on sender device and observe receiver device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  'Beam did not complete' message showing in Notification window.

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  Beam should complete successfully and able to share picture through Beam

  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION :
  Device : Hammerhead
  Reproducibility : 3/3

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[ 3030.955024] type=1400 audit(1391625834.066:72): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=311 comm="Binder_2" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tclass=binder
<5>[ 3049.606559] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:74): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="0" dev="fuse" ino=3086221568 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.606802] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:75): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="beam" scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.607068] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:76): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="beam" scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.610602] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:77): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="IMG_20140205_104344.jpg" dev="fuse" ino=3086246328 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 3049.610870] type=1400 audit(1391625852.716:78): avc:  denied  { rename } for  pid=26850 comm="id.nfc:handover" name="IMG_20140205_104344.jpg" dev="fuse" ino=3086246328 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 12891504
Change-Id: I10dc964db9249f53a2b4d8fe871ad9a036c423a2

This doesn't compile on non-manta devices because of a
missing drmserver_socket declaration.

external/sepolicy/mediaserver.te":68:ERROR 'unknown type drmserver_socket' at token ';' on line 6764:
#line 68
allow mediaserver drmserver_socket:sock_file write;
checkpolicy:  error(s) encountered while parsing configuration
make: *** [out/target/product/flo/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

This reverts commit 8cd400d3.

Change-Id: Ib8f07b57008b9ed1165b945057502779e806f0f8

So that we do not relabel them on a restorecon -R /data.

Change-Id: I8dd915d9bb80067339621b905ea2b4ea0fa8d71e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>