Init never uses binder, so allowing binder related operations
for init never makes sense. Disallow all binder opertions for
init.

This change expands on commit a730e50b,
disallowing any init binder operation, not just call operations, which
may be accidentally added by blindly running audit2allow.

Change-Id: I12547a75cf68517d54784873846bdadcb60c5112

Addresses the following denial when debuggerd attempts to stat Webview mmap'd
shared relro files on process crash.  Full read permissions may not be necessary:

W/debuggerd(  185): type=1400 audit(0.0:97): avc: denied { search } for name="shared_relro" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618955 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 17101854
Change-Id: I11eea85668ba033c554e5aab99b70a454fb75164

Before actual installation, apks are put in a staging area where they are
scanned by a verifier before completing the install flow.  This verifier runs as
a priv-app, which is in the untrusted_app domain.  Allow untrusted_app
read-access to these files.

Bug: 16515815

Change-Id: Ifedc12a33b1f53b62f45013e7b253dbc79b02a4e

Add patchoat selinux rules.

Bug: 15358152

Change-Id: Ibe92d8b55a24bbf718b0416a21b76e5df7a2de26

The list of processes comes from frameworks/native/cmds/dumpstate/utils.c.
dumpstate calls dump_backtrace_to_file() for each such process, which
asks debuggerd to dump the backtrace.

Resolves denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tclass=debuggerd

Change-Id: Idbfb0fef0aac138073b7217b7dbad826a1193098
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Fix two neverallow rules that yield Invalid SELinux context
warnings from the CTS SELinuxTest.

For transitions from app domains, we only need to check
{ domain -appdomain } (i.e. domains other than app domains),
not ~appdomain (i.e. all types other than app domains).  Otherwise
SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and
non-domain types for testing since the target class is process,
and such contexts are invalid.

For keeping file_type and fs_type exclusive, we only need to
check associate permission, not all filesystem permissions, as
only associate takes a file type as the source context.  Otherwise
SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and
non-domain types for testing filesystem permissions other than
associate, since the source of such checks is normally a process
context.

Change-Id: I6c2f63f4786d75294a6938613ba14b64212fc802
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Bug: 16563899
Bug: 14251916
Change-Id: Id3172b73f10186ba361caf6b7333e5d2a0648475

Do not auditallow dumpstate as it is the only instance
of listing services seen so far.

Change-Id: I1c142cf5a3a745ea64b22f3a14b8395b24f2e1d0

As described in the system/core commit with the same Change-Id,
there's a race condition between installd and sdcard when it
comes to accessing /data/media. Resolve the race by checking
/data/.layout_version to make sure the filesystem has been upgraded.

Maybe indirectly fixes the following SELinux denial:

  sdcard  : type=1400 audit(0.0:3): avc: denied { write } for name="media" dev="mmcblk0p17" ino=102753 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

(cherrypicked from commit 792d8650)

Bug: 16329437
Change-Id: I5e164f08009c1036469f8734ec07cbae9c5e262b

Define a new class, permissions, and rules for the debuggerd
SELinux MAC checks.

Used by Ib317564e54e07cc21f259e75124b762ad17c6e16 for debuggerd.

Change-Id: I8e120d319512ff207ed22ed87cde4e0432a13dda
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.

Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e

Change-Id: Iad32cfb4d5b69176fc551b8339d84956415a4fe7

Change-Id: I427c0f4828d45f2c43206c09cb37e3eb30455dee

Addresses the denial in charger mode:
[   17.993733] type=1400 audit(1405412231.119:4): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=123 comm="charger" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=10287 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Change-Id: I95e65753a99aa61ef86b8eebb7083b3d450e6b7b

Augment the already existing neverallow on loading executable content
from file types other than /system with one on loading executable content
from filesystem types other than the rootfs.  Include exceptions for
appdomain and recovery as required by current policy.

Change-Id: I73d70ab04719a67f71e48ac795025f2ccd5da385
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Further refined auditallow statements associated with
service_manager and added dumpstate to the
service_manager_local_audit_domain.

Change-Id: I2ecc42c8660de6a91f3b4e56268344fbd069ccc0

Add adbd as a service_manager_local_audit_domain and negate
surfaceflinger_service in its auditallow. Negate keystore_service
and radio_service in the system_app auditallow.

Change-Id: I05ea2a3e853b692f151182202f1b30786b44f1fb

The boot-time restorecon_recursive("/sys") occurs while still in
the kernel domain, but init.rc files may nonetheless perform
restorecon_recursive of parts of /sys created later and therefore
require this permission.   Required for:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/101800/



Change-Id: I68dc2c6019a1f9deae3eec5c2f068365ce2372e5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add com.android.net.IProxyService as a system_server_service
to service_contexts.

Bug: 16369427
Change-Id: I29ac87babe393f2fe3ce91c2d5eba9673d5a1be3

https://android-review.googlesource.com/94851 added an LD_PRELOAD
line to init.environ.rc.in. This has the effect of loading
libsigchain.so into every process' memory space, regardless of
whether it wants it or not.

For lmkd, it doesn't need libsigchain, so it doesn't make any sense
to load it and keep it locked in memory.

Disable noatsecure for lmkd. This sets AT_SECURE=1, which instructs the
linker to not honor security sensitive environment variables such
as LD_PRELOAD. This prevents libsigchain.so from being loaded into
lmkd's memory.

Change-Id: I6378ba28ff3a1077747fe87c080e1f9f7ca8132e

dex2oat fails when upgrading unlabeled asec containers.

Steps to reproduce:

1) Install a forward locked app on Android 4.1
  adb install -l foo.apk
2) Upgrade to tip-of-tree

Addresses the following denial:

  <4>[  379.886665] type=1400 audit(1405549869.210:4): avc: denied { read } for pid=2389 comm="dex2oat" path="/mnt/asec/jackpal.androidterm-1/pkg.apk" dev=dm-0 ino=12 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I58dc6ebe61a5b5840434077a55f1afbeed602137

Change-Id: I66a88b5dafc295e6daa9f4c0225aa593c97fe187

addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(1.871:3): avc:  denied  { ipc_lock } for  pid=1406 comm="lmkd" capability=14  scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability

Bug: 16236289
Change-Id: Id9923c16c6db026dd5d28996126f503c5c1d7c87

Define the service context for "webviewupdate", a new service that will
run in the system server.

Bug: 13005501
Change-Id: I841437c59b362fda88d130be2f2871aef87d9231

system_server auditallow statements were causing logspam and
there is not a good way to negate services from specific devices
so as a fix we are removing all system_server auditallows. These
logs may not be useful anyway because I suspsect that system_server
will probe for most all services anyway.

Change-Id: I27a05761c14def3a86b0749cdb895190bdcf9d71

dex2oat can't access file descriptors associated with asec_apk_files.
This breaks installing forward locked apps, and generates the following
denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { read } for path="/mnt/asec/com.example.android.simplejni-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-0" ino=12 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file

Steps to reproduce:

  $ adb install -r -l SimpleJNI.apk

Expected:

  app installs

Actual:

  app fails to install.

Change-Id: I5a468508014e9963460d13d78e1c4867187322b3
Bug: 16328233

Change untrusted_app to not auditallow radio_service find requests
to cut down on log spam.

Change-Id: I65d4a60ea1c7e81425937d5f1908e764fdec417f

Addresses the following selinux denials:
type=1400 audit(1405383429.107:22): avc: denied { remove_name } for pid=137 comm="lmkd" name="uid_10060" dev="cgroup" ino=18368 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
type=1400 audit(1405383794.109:6): avc: denied { sys_nice } for pid=1619 comm="lmkd" capability=23 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Change-Id: I7b6e5a396bf345c4768defd7b39af2435631a35b

1) Remove explicit allow statements. Since su is in permmissive,
there's no need to ever specify allow statements for su.

2) Remove unconfined_domain(su). Su is already permissive, so there's
no need to join the unconfined domain, and it just makes getting
rid of unconfined more difficult.

3) Put su into app_domain(). This addresses, in a roundabout sorta
way, the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc: denied { setsched } for scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=process permissive=0

which comes up while testing media processes as root. We already put
the shell user into this domain, so adding su to this domain ensures
other processes can communicate consistently with su spawned processes.

Bug: 16261280
Bug: 16298582
Change-Id: I30b6d3cc186bda737a23c25f4fa2a577c2afd4d7

Addresses the following denial:

  W/system_server( 2697): type=1400 audit(0.0:9): avc: denied { execute } for name="dex2oat" dev="mmcblk0p31" ino=118 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dex2oat_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Change-Id: I168842b3e281efcb0632049632ed3817c2025e4d