mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files.
Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses
the following denials:

<5>[   22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also
have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the
chracter devices may not be reachable.

Bug: 12416198
Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074

When a bugreport is triggered using the device keys,
it generates a screenshot and places it into
/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports. SELinux is denying
those writes.

Addresses the following denials:

<5> type=1400 audit(1389047451.385:23): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=267 comm="Binder_1" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=binder
<5> type=1400 audit(1389046083.780:37): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=4191 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-06-14-07-35.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=81874 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 12416329
Change-Id: I318145591cda500094d98103d30b784df48a67be

Change-Id: I55d059cf6b9e13a81545d3d8b8ff86befc89d6b3
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Leave the domain permissive initially until it gets more testing.

Change-Id: I9d88d76d1ffdc79a2eff4545d37a9e615482df50
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I3ce0b4bd25e078698a1c50242aaed414bf5cb517
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: Id6d89e7d87642fba22445484034e39f94bb90f5b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1

This reverts commit 69fbbdd5.

Some of these will get factored out into device-specific
configs later.

Change-Id: I359915e2607b56112bb22456d28e06c162fcbdff

This reverts commit e7e54fac

Change-Id: I26b577cf46a0eaccf6adf7ae851383a10bf03b4b

This reverts commit 1c101164

Restoring now that the conflict with tuna has passed.

Change-Id: I587dab8d7102c913fc03825a006e96d76680858d

This reverts commit f51e9007

Looks like this caused a build breakage in master, may have a duplicate rule from AOSP.

Change-Id: I4ea83a47baec4ffa2840b5fe50b6f55e1eeda53c

Some of these will get factored out into device-specific
configs later.

Change-Id: I7ea9c22a666b13bca2d867e5bcc7084ed7129de3

This reverts commit ba84bf1d

Hidden dependency resolved.

Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392

This reverts commit 8a814a76

Change-Id: Id1497cc42d07ee7ff2ca44ae4042fc9f2efc9aad

Change-Id: I5a3584b6cc5eda2b7d82e85452f9fe457877f1d1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The binder_transfer_binder hook was changed in the kernel, obsoleting
the receive permission and changing the target of the transfer permission.
Update the binder-related policy to match the revised permission checking.

Change-Id: I1ed0dadfde2efa93296e967eb44ca1314cf28586
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.