Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.

Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b743050)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7

Test: adbd_test (with and without adb root)
  Note: one test fails without root with and without this change
        because of an unrelated shell selinux denial.
Test: adb screencap, pull, and verify
Test: Android Studio screenshot
Bug: 36643190
Change-Id: Ib534240bc9bb3a1f32b8865ca66db988902a0f4a

Remove system_file:file { lock ioctl } from domain_deprecated. The only
domains triggering this were dex2oat and netd, which are fixed in this
change.

Addresses the following logspam similar to:

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="iptables"
  path="/system/etc/xtables.lock" dev="sda22" ino=3745
  scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="dex2oat"
  path="/system/framework/arm/boot-okhttp.art" dev="dm-0" ino=1295
  scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Bug: 28760354
Bug: 36879751
Change-Id: Iac851c0e49a52ce4000fdfe16e68c17ff819693f

SELinux policy no longer has allow rules which permit core/non-vendor
domains to communicate with tee domain over sockets. This commit thus
removes tee from the list of temporary exceptions for the socket
communications prohibition.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266
Change-Id: Iccbd9ea0555b0c9f1cb6c5e0f5a6c0d3f8730b4d

Currently update_verifier only verifies the blocks when dm-verity is in
'enforcing' mode; and dm-verity will reboot the device upon detection of
errors. However, sometimes the verity mode is not guaranteed to be
correct. When mode is 'eio' for example, dm-verity will not trigger
a reboot but rather fail the read. So update_verifier need to take the
responsibility to reboot the device. Otherwise the device will continue
to boot without setting the flag "isSlotMarkedSuccessful".

Denial message:
update_verifier: type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { write } for
name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=14678 scontext=u:r:update_verifier:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0

Bug: 36260064
Test: powerctl property sets successfully

Change-Id: I1260e60f2ef4db50573e515ba95c332512c8ae62
(cherry picked from commit 0d8c1e0a)

Test: manual (verified no denials in basic telephony operations)
Bug: 36613472
Change-Id: I31274adee2cb6293102446cd2d6d547c50616836

android.framework.sensorservice@1.0 pass a file
descriptor from hidl_memory into
android.hardware.sensors@1.0, hence requiring the latter
to use the file descriptor.

Test: VtsHalSensorManagerV1_0TargetTest under selinux
enforcing mode
Bug: 35219747
Change-Id: I0185c8af0714776842c90ebb687b684324b55cd8

when GMSCore collects information for uploading via 'dumpsys
media.metrics', it provides the metrics service with a file descriptor
to hold the data, which is post-processed by the log collecting code
in GMScore.  This temp file lives in /data/, a place where our
restrictive policies for media.metrics doesn't allow any writing.

This relaxes the restrictions -- allowing media.metrics to
write to already open file descriptors it might be given on that
partition.

Bug: 36660639
Test: build/boot
Change-Id: Icbaa76b04ecf731014b6b1bb1283bc2951a6ae4b

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

Test: Test: make cts && \
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
      -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForBinderInVendorBan
      Fails as expected.
Bug: 36002573

Change-Id: I298c526789b25734d5f18666c64497e5d1e181d0

So we can limit vndservicemanager access to
just vndservice_contexts.

Bug: 36052864
Test: servicemanager,vndservicemanager work
Change-Id: I7b132d4f616ba1edd0daf7be750d4b7174c4e188

The tee domain is a vendor domain. Thus it cannot be accessed by
non-vendor components over Unix domain sockets.

It appears that the rules granting this access are not needed.

Test: Flash a clean build with this change. Confirm that bullhead,
      angler, sailfish, ryu, boot without new denials.
      Confirm that YouTube, Netflix, Google Play Movies play back
      videos without new denials.
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266

Change-Id: I639cecd07c9a3cfb257e62622b51b7823613472a

"tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the
vendor image.

What's left as public API is that:
1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability,
2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access
   character devices labeled tee_device.

If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling
/dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as
tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific
file_contexts.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36720355
Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6

Bug: 36855921
Test: compile, wifi works with toggling
Change-Id: Ib0819a2d552472e482e192a69530441cfc2c0fd7

Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
ioctl/stat/read/write/append.

This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute
coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute
core_data_file_type.

A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on
access.

(cherry picked from commit cd97e710)

Bug: 34980020
Test: build Marlin policy
Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc

This CL changes the policy for ASAN files on-disk to support the
changes made by the following CLs -
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/359087/
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/359389/

which refactor the on-disk layout of sanitized libraries in the following
manner -
/data/lib* --> /data/asan/system/lib*
/data/vendor/* --> /data/asan/vendor/*

There are a couple of advantages to this, including better isolation
from other components, and more transparent linker renaming and
SELinux policies.

(cherry picked from commit 33ebdda8)

Bug: 36574794
Bug: 36674745
Test: m -j40 && SANITIZE_TARGET="address" m -j40 and the device
boots. All sanitized libraries are correctly located in /data/asan/*,
and have the right SELinux permissions.

Change-Id: Ib08e360cecc8d77754a768a9af0f7db35d6921a9

Bug: 33239267
Test: compile, run wifi, no selinux complaint for wificond
Change-Id: I9b3e874381ac6cd7c6ff1058cc4f313bd85481b8

Init is no longer calling vdc with logwrapper, so it must take care of
logging to kmsg directly.

avc: denied { write } for pid=367 comm="vdc" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=11056 scontext=u:r:vdc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 36278706
Test: observe vdc logging in kmsg on boot and stderr on normal usage

(cherry picked from commit bc4d3630)

Change-Id: Id7bc2fa87518aa0678c09495267c9e198ca8c968

Test: build, flash; adb shell lshal
Bug: 36562029
Change-Id: If8f6d8dbd99d31e6627fa4b7c1fd4faea3b75cf2