auditallow says not needed.

Change-Id: Iafa048377e159ca3c7cc1f31653002c41ef9ef2b

auditallow says not needed.

Change-Id: If44f64aeb5d0be78fd166d1b3eee298c5f7c860d

This is actually used. Addresses the following SELinux audit logs:

  avc: granted { create } for comm="Thread-157" name="uncrypt_file" scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
  avc: granted { add_name } for comm="Thread-157" name="uncrypt_file" scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir
  avc: granted { write } for comm="Thread-157" path="/cache/recovery/uncrypt_file" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=22 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
  avc: granted { write } for comm="Thread-157" path="/cache/recovery/command" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=23 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
  avc: granted { setattr } for comm="Thread-157" name="uncrypt_file" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=22 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file

Change-Id: Idab00ebc8eacd7d8bb793b9342249227f91986a1

auditallow says it's not used.

Bug: 25331459
Change-Id: Ic414efcd0a3be6d744ab66382c20f0ea4c9ea116

* changes:
  fc_sort: initial commit
  checkfc: do not die on 0 length fc's

auditallow says never used.

Change-Id: I789f32bd7d2bbfc583a12bf8a05662e812f09a38

no SELinux denials from auditallow

Change-Id: Ied61f7f97b148b1c10d0f71e9ab30c136a123738

auditallow says no denials.

Change-Id: Ib4e38f5393d3f3ba67277017abc848f5e7c04efd

auditallow says never used.

Change-Id: I6a3f82740bfecf483e0ccbb528b7218af36d37b8

Ordering matters in fc files; the last match wins. In builds where
many BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS are set, the order of that list becomes
increasingly important in order to maintain a cohesive built
file_contexts.

To correct this, we sort the device specific file_contexts entries
with the upstream fc_sort tool.

Change-Id: I3775eae11bfa5905cad0d02a0bf26c76ac03437c
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Checkfc was treating 0 size fc files as a fatal error.
An empty fc file should be treated as "nothing to check"
so long as the -e option is passed.

We add this option, so we don't allow empty file_context
files to pass CTS checking.

Change-Id: Ibca6bd948a13389e10c605d613acc48c5504443e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Breaks builds with no device specific policy.

Bug: 26568553
This reverts commit 29d14688.

Change-Id: If9254d4ad3f104a96325beedebc05dd22664084a

Change-Id: I0e63f90cafc5b1ca9cc112e852e172046b16a17e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

toolbox_exec is executed by dhcpcd-run-hooks.

Addresses the following auditallow log spam:

  avc: granted { read open } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read } for comm="setprop" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { execute } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=650 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read execute } for comm="setprop" path="/system/bin/toybox" dev="dm-0" ino=639 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ib83c291961a5573397830032a67a2f6861ae2e71

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I300899d610258704eb2d45488700eadb7a686606

Address the following denial when running CTS:
avc: denied { search } for comm=73657276696365203136 name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 26290097
Change-Id: Icf51061a65a5fda15f7e7ef78200a62ffbd1ca9b

camera_device didn't really offer much in terms of control considering
that most domains that need camera_device, also need video_device and
vice versa.

Thus, drop camera_device from the policy and add a temporary typealias.

Change-Id: I144c0bb49a9a68ab1bdf636c64abe656f3e677b4
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Currently, properties that begin with "ro." are special cased to skip
over the "ro." part of the prefix before matching with entries in
property_contexts.  A change to init is removing this special case and
therefore, the "ro." prefixes must be explicitly added to
property_contexts.

Bug 26425619

Change-Id: I343f139a39abef99924e84e0d27699284f335d63

Previously granted to only untrusted_app, allow all apps except
isolated_app read write permissions to tun_device.

avc: denied { read write } for path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=8906 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 26462997
Change-Id: Id6f5b09cda26dc6c8651eb76f6791fb95640e4c7

and as a consequence open up for other appdomains (e.g. platform_app)
to write system properties.

Change-Id: Ie6ad4d17247165564456e5b0d78f705a82cdcde7

priv_app reads from /cache/recovery, but I'm still not sure if
it writes. Eliminate the read auditallow rules and allow the
writes to show up (if any).

Eliminates the following auditallow messages:

  avc: granted { search } for comm="IntentService[S" name="recovery" dev="mmcblk0p38" ino=12 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir
  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="Thread-1" path="/cache/recovery/last_install" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=29891 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c525,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read open } for comm="Thread-1" name="recovery" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=29889 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c525,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: Ibc0640f5366aae50e3fd09d17657374390b24a5c

su is in permissive all the time. We don't want SELinux log
spam from this domain.

Addresses the following logspam:

  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="lsof" path="/sys/devices/virtual/graphics/fb0/vsync_event" dev="sysfs" ino=10815 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { getattr } for comm="lsof" path="/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone2/temp" dev="sysfs" ino=15368 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
  avc: granted { read } for comm="sh" name="emmc_therm" dev="sysfs" ino=17583 scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I8e17d3814e41b497b25ce00cd72698f0d22b3ab0

Address the following denial:
avc: denied { read } for name="battery" dev="sysfs" ino=17945 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Bug: 26219114
Change-Id: I862b40a6514bffaa455dd7f06368acf9bcdc4782

Not actually needed as demonstrated by the auditallow rule.

Change-Id: Ia92c82ec237ab3490a1d51fa3371778e43e09504

This will allow init to terminate services cleanly (SIGTERM, wait,
SIGKILL) when needed.

Bug: 26216447
Test: manual: init is able to send a SIGTERM signal without denials.

Change-Id: Id2471ca08c0b011be64a36956628e965bc999bc6

auditallow shows no hits.

Change-Id: I5ae33d34cd4bfa48f4384926fcafd84bec60e899