This change renames the non-platform sepolicy files on a DUT from
nonplat_* to vendor_*.

It also splits the versioned platform sepolicy from vendor_sepolicy.cil
to a new file /vendor/etc/selinux/plat_pub_versioned.cil. And only keeps
vendor customizations in vendor_sepolicy.cil.

Build variable BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS is also renamed to
BOARD_VENDOR_SEPOLICY_DIRS.

Bug: 64240127
Test: boot an existing device
Change-Id: I53a9715b2f9ddccd214f4cf9ef081ac426721612

Test: make/sync
Bug: 68751119
Change-Id: Ie3c60ff68b563cef07f20d15f298d6b62e9356bc

This allows to format sdcard for adoptable storage.

Bug: 69641635
Change-Id: I8d471be657e2e8f4df56c94437239510ca65096e
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>

Corresponds to commit 410cdebaf966746d6667d6d0dd4cee62262905e1 in
system/extras.

Bug: 32286026
Test: m
Change-Id: I1e0934aa5bf4649d598ec460128de6f02711597f

This reverts commit c2241a8d.

Reason for revert: build breakage b/70040773

Change-Id: I6af098ae20c4771a1070800d02c98e5783999a39

Add write access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_leds
sysfs_power
sysfs_zram

Add setattr access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_devices_system_cpu
sysfs_lowmemorykiller
sysfs_power
sysfs_leds
sysfs_ipv4

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye boots with no denials from init to sysfs.

Change-Id: Ibc9a54a5f43f3d53ab7cbb0fdb9589959b31ebde

Now that creating a symlink automatically sets its context,
init needs permission to create this file.

Bug: 69965807
Test: Booted device and tested wifi and camera.
Change-Id: I41f5ca8f4d877312c9b2a909001fe9cd80c3d458

Bug: 63908748
Test: built, flashed, able to boot
Change-Id: I3cfead1d687112b5f8cd485c8f84083c566fbce2

This is needed in order to get the stat-size of the files.

Bug: 30934496
Test: gts-tradefed -m GtsAndroidRuntimeManagerHostTestCases
Change-Id: I1df0ba941e8f9ff13a23df4063acc3c4f1555c1b

Tclass was omitted for two entries.

Bug: 69928154
Bug: 69366875
Test: build
Change-Id: Ie12c240b84e365110516bcd786b98dc37295fdb9

/proc/uid/ provides the same per-uid time_in_state data as
/proc/uid_time_in_state, so apply the same type and let system_server
read directories of this type.

Bug: 66953705
Test: system_server can read /proc/uid/*/time_in_state files without
denials on sailfish
Change-Id: Iab7fd018c5296e8c0140be81c14e5bae9e0acb0b
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>

bug: 69430536
Test: make ats-tradefed && ats-tradefed run ats -m
GtsSecurityHostTestCases

Merged-In: I617a7d08b1bf480f970bc8b4339fa6bbdc347311
Change-Id: I1d4af47662de5db4e5f7bba244e42930b6de164b

Allow system_server to open profile snapshots for read.
System server never reads the actual content. It passes the descriptor to
to privileged apps which acquire the permissions to inspect the profiles.

Test: installd_dexopt_test
Bug: 30934496
Change-Id: I1d1f07a05261af25f6640040af1500c9a4d5b8d5

And give shell domain read access to /proc/sys/kernel/pic_max.

Bug: 69569397
Test: adb shell /data/nativetest/bionic-unit-tests/bionic-unit-tests
--gtest_filter=pthread.pthread_mutex_owner_tid_limit
Change-Id: Ib56c18ed553ad2c2113e6913788a4c00965483cc

Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.

Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Bug: 69664758
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I22aa208859b8478a2a90e1ed1c0f0d6b62a6664e

9b2e0cbe changed all uses of capability
to global_capability_class_set but accidentally omitted one entry.
Fix the one entry.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I1bb8c494a2660d9f02783c93b07d4238a2575106

Self sideload OTA installation is aborted in #PPR1.171122.001.
Likely cause is the removal of the file-based OTA rules. Revert
the change while I investigate.

This reverts commit 73885755.

Bug: 35853185
Bug: 69664758
Bug: 15575013

Change-Id: I65ca3bad7251f06df33eae8b2d4bcfada93ae9b8

Commit 7688161c "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.

Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.

Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
    remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Test: build taimen-user/userdebug

Change-Id: I619e71529e078235ed30dc06c60e6e448310fdbc

In P, we will be supporting privileged apps in vendor partition, thus
need to label /vendor/priv-app as vendor_app_file so that apps can exist
under the dir.

Bug: 35301609
Test: N/A since there is no /vendor/priv-app yet. Framework change
which is currently in the internal is required.

Change-Id: I86a765ef9da5267113e64a7cbb38ba0abf5c2835

Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.

Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I4238d17808bed6a81f47e14eb1797496c07642e2

This reverts commit ed876a5e.

Fixes user builds.
libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 513 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 9149 of policy.conf) violated by allow update_verifier misc_block_device:blk_file { ioctl read write lock append open }; 
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred 
Error while expanding policy
Bug: 69566734
Test: build taimen-user
Change-Id: I969b7539dce547f020918ddc3e17208fc98385c4

Commit 7688161c "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.

Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.

Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
    remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Change-Id: I83dcb33c3a057f126428f88a90b95f3f129d9f0e

Test: build
Bug: 63710530
Change-Id: I85cddfaf3ec004165040935f8723e9eed0ef7900

In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.

This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.

This is essentially:
  1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
     that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
     respectively.
  2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
  3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
  4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
     so that it covers all capabilities.  This set was used by several
     neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
     classes are still appropriate.

Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
      only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
      Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831

Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f

Bug: 69175449
Bug: 69197466
Test: build
Change-Id: I11e46b65449cb6f451ecab8d4dff9adc162fe115

Bug: 64831661
Test: adb shell cmd window tracing start && adb shell cmd window tracing stop
Test: adb shell su root dmesg | grep 'avc: '
Change-Id: I1578aac9e102246ec722c78a6e9efb5581259d81

Unconditionally compile treble_sepolicy_tests. Make compat
files conditional on running the compat tests.

Bug: 37008075
Test: build
Change-Id: Ib3aee6e93d285ca141803a13958fbcb38b891b68

Similar to the way we handle /dev/random and /dev/urandom, make
/proc/sys/kernel/random available to everyone.

  hostname:/proc/sys/kernel/random # ls -laZ
  total 0
  dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 .
  dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc:s0        0 2017-11-20 18:32 ..
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 boot_id
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 entropy_avail
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 poolsize
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 read_wakeup_threshold
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 urandom_min_reseed_secs
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 uuid
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 write_wakeup_threshold

boot_id (unique random number per boot) is commonly used by
applications, as is "uuid". As these are random numbers, no sensitive
data is leaked. The other files are useful to allow processes to
understand the state of the entropy pool, and should be fairly benign.

Addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:207): avc: denied { read } for name="boot_id"
  dev="proc" ino=76194 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
  tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 69294418
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ieeca1c654ec755123e19b4693555990325bd58cf

Sharing data folders by path will be disallowed because it violates
the approved API between platform and vendor components tested by
VTS. Move all violating permissions from core selinux policy to
device specific policy so that we can exempt existing devices from
the ban and enforce it on new devices.

Bug: 34980020
Test: Move permissions. Build and test wifi, wifi AP, nfc, fingerprint
    and Play movies on Marlin and Taimen.
Test: build on Angler, Bullhead, Dragon, Fugu, Marlin, Walleye

Change-Id: Ib6fc9cf1403e74058aaae5a7b0784922f3172b4e