* commit '3bcdec8a':
  Allow radio access to netd_pid file.

They need to see when it changes so they know when netd bounces.

(cherrypicked from commit 71e9a7c4)

bug:18069270
Change-Id: I954cf43ff02f1d352015f128ef88b659e6d0f95a

* commit 'ca62a8b7':
  allow coredump functionality

(cherrypick of commit d7e004eb)

Change-Id: I7993698ac96f21db0039681275280dbd43ff61ba

* commit 'bdc8c77a':
  Accept command-line input for neverallow-check.

Also, divide each sepolicy-analyze function into its own component for simplified
command-line parsing and potentially eventual modularization.

Bug: 18005561
Change-Id: I45fa07d776cf1bec7d60dba0c03ee05142b86c19

* commit 'c457572b':
  Allow init to restorecon /data directories on upgrades.

Resolves (permissive) denials on upgrades from 4.4.

Change-Id: Ia9eed4938a7235c23bb65de7ad65e6e7c325dfd7
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit 'f3926937':
  Switch kernel and init to permissive_or_unconfined().

Switch the kernel and init domains from unconfined_domain()
to permissive_or_unconfined() so that we can start collecting
and addressing denials in -userdebug/-eng builds.

Also begin to address denials for kernel and init seen after
making this switch.

I intentionally did not allow the following denials on hammerhead:
avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="memory.move_charge_at_immigrate" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:init_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="memory.move_charge_at_immigrate" dev="tmpfs" ino=6550 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:init_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file

These occur when init.rc does:
write /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/memory.move_charge_at_immigrate 1
because the prior command to mount the cgroup failed:
mount cgroup none /sys/fs/cgroup/memory memory

I think this is because that cgroup is not enabled in the
kernel configuration.  If the cgroup mount succeeded,
then this would have been a write to a cgroup:file and
would have been allowed already.

Change-Id: I9d7e31bef6ea91435716aa4312c721fbeaeb69c0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit '0ae33a8d':
  zygote/dex2oat: Grant additional symlink permissions

* commit '5fad3d98':
  recovery: allow changing unlabeled symbolic links

* commit 'b519949d':
  system_server: assert app data files never opened directly

* zygote needs to be able to symlink from dalvik cache to system
  to avoid having to copy boot.oat
  (when the boot.oat file was built with --compile-pic)
* dex2oat needs to be able to read the symlink in the dalvik cache
  (the one that zygote creates)

Bug: 18035729
Change-Id: Ie1acad81a0fd8b2f24e1f3f07a06e6fdb548be62

* commit '46f3ce87':
  remove init_shell

* commit 'd4731ad8':
  Remove -kernel -recovery from keystore_data_file neverallow.

Currently, recovery is allowed write access to the following three
file labels:

* system_file (directories, files, and symbolic links)
* exec_type (directories, files, and symbolic links)
* unlabeled (directory and files)

system_file is the default label on all files in /system. exec_type
is the attribute used to mark executables on /system.

The third file type, "unlabeled", refers to filesystem objects where
the label hasn't been set, or a label is set but isn't defined by the
currently loaded policy.

The current policy only allows unlabeled files or directories to
be modified. Symbolic links were accidentally excluded. This causes
problems when trying to fix up labels/permissions on unlabeled
symbolic links.

Allow unlabeled symbolic link modifications.

(cherrypicked from commit 683ac49d)

Bug: 18079773
Change-Id: I8e5c33602cdc38ec9a95b4e83f9ccbb06fe9da7c

Add a compile time assertion that app data files are never
directly opened by system_server. Instead, system_server always
expects files to be passed via file descriptors.

This neverallow rule will help prevent accidental regressions and
allow us to perform other security tightening, for example
bug 7208882 - Make an application's home directory 700

Bug: 7208882
Change-Id: I49c725982c4af0b8c76601b2a5a82a5c96df025d

Aside from the keystore daemon itself, only init needs any access
to keystore_data_file (in order to create and potentially restorecon
/data/misc/keystore).  The exceptions for the kernel and recovery domains
are unnecessary; no allow rule permits this access in current policy.

Change-Id: I5cf6f29ec08174017ac8f5fb36fef166ce360ca0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This domain was originally intended to be a place to hold rules for
all init.*.rc shell scripts. However, it's now recommended that every
init service have it's own SELinux domain, and the use of init_shell
is to be avoided.

Delete init_shell. No policy is using it anymore, and it's causing
confusion for people implementing device specific SELinux policy.

Bug: 18062250
Change-Id: I7c90851784b233443642ea69722f3281fd457621

With the sepolicy-analyze neverallow checking, attribute
expansion is performed against the device policy and therefore
we do not want our neverallow rules to exempt domains from
consideration based on an attribute (e.g. -unconfineddomain).
Otherwise, device policy could pass the neverallow check just
by adding more domains to unconfineddomain.  We could of course
add a CTS test to check the list of unconfineddomains against
a whitelist, but it seems desirable regardless to narrow these
neverallow rules to only the specific domains required.

There are three such neverallow rules in current policy: one
on creating unlabeled files, one on accessing /dev/hw_random, and
one on accessing a character device without a specific type.  The
only domain in unconfineddomain that appears to have a legitimate
need for any of these permissions is the init domain.  Replace
-unconfineddomain with -init in these neverallow rules, exclude these
permissions from unconfineddomain, and add these permissions to init if
not already explicitly allowed.  auditallow accesses by init to files
and character devices left in the generic device type so we can monitor
what is being left there, although it is not necessarily a problem unless
the file or device should be accessible to others.

Change-Id: If6ee1b1a337c834971c6eb21dada5810608babcf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

adbd writes debugging information to /data/adb
when persist.adb.trace_mask is set. Allow it.

Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895
Change-Id: Ia5af09045e9f72a95325b429c30a5ae78e104bdc

Now that we have assigned specific types to userdata and cache
block devices, we can remove the ability of fsck to run on other
block devices.

Change-Id: I8cfb3dc0e4ebe6b73346ff291ecb11397bb0c2d0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit 'beb279c7':
  allow init swapon()

swapon(2) requires write access to the underlying block device.
Allow it.

Addresses the following denial:

   avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="zram0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6267 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:swap_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

Change-Id: Id1a4f51038d0b6ce7351294698a0ff146d6e4643

* commit '57a17d14':
  add support for fsck.f2fs

The Nexus 9 uses f2fs for /data. Make sure to properly label
/system/bin/fsck.f2fs so that the appropriate domain transition occurs.
Add support for getattr on devpts, required for fsck.f2fs.

Addresses the following denials:

  avc:  denied  { execute_no_trans } for  pid=172 comm="init" path="/system/bin/fsck.f2fs" dev="dm-0" ino=272 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
  avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=170 comm="fsck.f2fs" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

Change-Id: I34b3f91374d1eb3fb4ba76abce14ff67db259f96

* commit 'ad151a23':
  Label block devices created or accessed by vold with specific types.

* commit '44cb98a7':
  Revert "Do not allow isolated_app to directly open app data files."

This is causing the version of Chrome in Android's tree to crash. The
version of Chrome in Android's tree does not have the following patch:
https://codereview.chromium.org/630123003

Until Chrome updates the version in Android's tree, we need to revert.

Works around the following denials:

audit(0.0:19): avc: denied { search } for name="com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
audit(0.0:20): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/data/com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
audit(0.0:21): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/data/com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir

This reverts commit 669a9773.

Bug: 18006219
Change-Id: Id44137ec6a0dfe4a597b34ab3dad9e3feecc2a5e

* commit 'e9623d8f':
  Exclude isolated_app from ptrace self.

* commit '38936af0':
  Fix compile time / CTS gps_data_files neverallow assertion

* commit '480374e4':
  Fix compile time / CTS gps_data_files neverallow assertion