Similar to the way we handle /dev/random and /dev/urandom, make
/proc/sys/kernel/random available to everyone.

  hostname:/proc/sys/kernel/random # ls -laZ
  total 0
  dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 .
  dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc:s0        0 2017-11-20 18:32 ..
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 boot_id
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 entropy_avail
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 poolsize
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 read_wakeup_threshold
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 urandom_min_reseed_secs
  -r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 uuid
  -rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 write_wakeup_threshold

boot_id (unique random number per boot) is commonly used by
applications, as is "uuid". As these are random numbers, no sensitive
data is leaked. The other files are useful to allow processes to
understand the state of the entropy pool, and should be fairly benign.

Addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:207): avc: denied { read } for name="boot_id"
  dev="proc" ino=76194 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
  tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 69294418
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ieeca1c654ec755123e19b4693555990325bd58cf

Sharing data folders by path will be disallowed because it violates
the approved API between platform and vendor components tested by
VTS. Move all violating permissions from core selinux policy to
device specific policy so that we can exempt existing devices from
the ban and enforce it on new devices.

Bug: 34980020
Test: Move permissions. Build and test wifi, wifi AP, nfc, fingerprint
    and Play movies on Marlin and Taimen.
Test: build on Angler, Bullhead, Dragon, Fugu, Marlin, Walleye

Change-Id: Ib6fc9cf1403e74058aaae5a7b0784922f3172b4e

Exclude vendor processes.

Bug: 69309298
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsCompilationTestCases
    completed in 33s. 5 passed, 0 failed
Test: runtest frameworks-services -c \
    com.android.server.pm.dex.DexoptOptionsTests \
    --install=".*FrameworksServicesTests.apk"
    OK (5 tests)

Change-Id: Ic02caf373e2214b4b931a724ca8d4f4effbc0741

Added access to proc_uptime and proc_asound to address these denials:

avc: denied { read } for name="uptime" dev="proc" ino=4026532080
scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_uptime:s0 tclass=file
permissive=1

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/proc/asound/version" dev="proc"
ino=4026532017 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_asound:s0
tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 65643247
Test: device boots with no denial from 'shell' domain.
Test: lsmod, ps, top, netstat
Test: No denials triggered from CtsSecurityHostTestCases
Test: external/toybox/run-tests-on-android.sh does not pass, but triggers
no denials from 'shell' domain to 'proc' type.

Change-Id: Ia4c26fd616e33e5962c6707a855dc24e338ec153

- Allow system_server to create and write to /data/misc/wmtrace/*
- Allow surfaceflinger to create and write files from /data/misc/wmtrace/*
- Allow dumpstate to read files from /data/misc/wmtrace/*
permissions are restricted to userdebug or eng builds

Bug: 64831661

Test: adb shell cmd window tracing start && adb shell cmd window tracing stop
Test: adb shell su root service call SurfaceFlinger 1025 i32 1 >/dev/null && adb shell su root service call SurfaceFlinger 1025 i32 0 >/dev/null
Test: adb bugreport ~/tmp.zip && adb shell su root dmesg | grep 'avc: '

Change-Id: I0b15166560739d73d7749201f3ad197dbcf5791c

Bug: 65643247
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev -m \
CtsMediaTestCases --compatibility:module-arg \
CtsMediaTestCases:include-annotation:\
android.platform.test.annotations.RequiresDevice
No denials from mediaserver domain to sysfs type are observed.
Change-Id: Icb5c12f04af213452d82e226993fe13085c5c33f

Label /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size with new type proc_pipe_conf and give
system_server access to it.

Addresses this denial:
avc: denied { read } for name="pipe-max-size" dev="proc" ino=93817
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
permissive=0

Bug: 69175449
Bug: 69324398
Test: sailfish boots
Test: adb bugreport
Test: craft an unresponsive app, trigger ANR, make sure traces are dumped
into /data/anr
Above denial from system_server not observed, no denials to proc_pipe_conf
observed.
Change-Id: I7c71f05820a4945ba982e29f76e9d9f4458b2b59

Only getattr and read are necessary for lnk_file. Open violates a new
neverallow for separating system and vendor data.

Bug: 34980020
Test: Enroll fingerprint on Taimen
Change-Id: I9434afbd5b4ecc1ead9f0ba47c7582fb5a6c6bf0

This reverts commit 248b6dc6.

Reason for revert: The dashboard complains that devices don't boot after this revert.

Change-Id: I6a4648b64b096cbaa97c67aae6bc38b76d54cb48

Copy init's dontaudit for sysfs:dir write; to calm the below denials:

avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=542 comm="init" name="1da4000.ufshc" dev="sysfs" ino=21752 scontext=u:r:vendor_init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for pid=542 comm="init" name="1da4000.ufshc" dev="sysfs" ino=21752 scontext=u:r:vendor_init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1

Bug: 62875318
Test: use pixel + factory reset + vendor_init
Change-Id: I686b51c4f340b3565ea24f00516ebde846be7a89

This reverts commit d1cf3a40.

Reason for revert: It breaks CTS b/69309298 and other platform tests which read pm.dexopt properties.

Change-Id: I5c7cde041113e9c19bb23218edd99f699fcf4a06

After move qtaguid control interface into netd. Netd need to open the
xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev to make sure xt_qtaguid module is
successfully initialized before taking action. This selinux rule change
allows netd to do so and it is the same privilege normal apps currently
have.

Test: No more selinux denials on netd access qtaguid_device
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: I79a98bbda3f3fdb85140a06a7532cdcc4354c518

Bug: 65643247
Test: aosp_walleye-userdebug builds
Test: aosp_sailfish-userdebug builds
Change-Id: Iaebd368b84259783fbdc4778988bdb7ba0df300b

Fixes these denials:
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=585 comm="charger" name="state"
dev="sysfs" ino=18844 scontext=u:r:charger:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=585 comm="charger"
path="/sys/power/state" dev="sysfs" ino=18844 scontext=u:r:charger:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Test: above denials not observed in charger mode.
Change-Id: I5660e63315fada7f24d6cfe2e0bd2b383b556670

avc: denied { search } for name="com.sf.activity" dev="sda35"
ino=1444147 scontext=u:r:crash_dump:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for comm="crash_dump64"
name="com.android.bluetooth" dev="sda13" ino=1442292
scontext=u:r:crash_dump:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
tclass=dir
avc: denied { search } for comm="crash_dump64" name="overlay" dev="dm-1"
ino=938 scontext=u:r:crash_dump:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 68705274
Bug: 68319037
Test: build
Change-Id: I44075ac6bf6447d863373c97ba10eadf59d2d22f

There's a selinux denial for update_engine after go/aog/530462; the
denial is likely due to the setgid bit of the
update_engine_log_data_file.
Message:
11-11 02:07:54.843   870   870 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc:
denied { fsetid } for comm="update_engine" capability=4
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0
11-11 02:07:54.843   870   870 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:5): avc:
denied { fsetid } for comm="update_engine" capability=4
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0
11-11 02:07:54.843   870   870 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc:
denied { fsetid } for comm="update_engine" capability=4
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0
11-11 02:07:54.843   870   870 I auditd  : type=1400 audit(0.0:5): avc:
denied { fsetid } for comm="update_engine" capability=4
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability permissive=0

Bug: 69197466
Test: denial message gone on sailfish.
Change-Id: I0fdc285e4a4faa8dc37b4907484b3c79d4cc49cf

This restriction causes issues with dynamite.

Since untrusted_v2_app was about enforcing this constraint put installed
v2 applications back into the normal untrusted_app domain.

Bug: 64806320
Test: Manual test with app using dynamite module

(cherrypicked from commit fe836817)

Change-Id: I3abf3ade64aaf689039a515de642759dd39ae6f7

This reverts commit a61b99bb.

Reason for revert: breaks aosp_walleye-userdebug

Change-Id: I3246b8cac862b53fc76609df60b90149fbc8098d

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye-userdebug builds
Change-Id: I12d8239ca85bb68eab76a2d0001a722fea3045c5

These denials should not be allowed. Adding a bug number to the
denial properly attributes them to a bug.

Bug: 69197466
avc: denied { fsetid } for comm="update_engine" capability=4
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tclass=capability

Bug: 62140539
avc: denied { open }
path="/data/system_de/0/spblob/17a358cf8dff62ea.weaver"
scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=file
avc: denied { unlink } for name="17a358cf8dff62ea.weaver"
scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
tclass=file

Bug: 69175449
avc: denied { read } for name="pipe-max-size" dev="proc"
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Test: build
Change-Id: I62dc26a9076ab90ea4d4ce1f22e9b195f33ade16

HALs are supposed to only access /data/vendor/*

Test: Camera CTS/ITS on walleye
Bug: 36601397
Change-Id: I8f586938127b5a9acaace4d5b8c3fc42ab13e0cf
(cherry picked from commit d7241d62)

PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE is being broken up into smaller,
more manageable components.

Bug: 62019611
Test: manual
Change-Id: I9b65f120851d9ea134a0059a417f0282777717fc

Since all qtaguid related userspace implementation are moved into netd
and will use netd to choose which module to run at run time. Netd module
should be the only process can directly read/write to the ctrl file of
qtaguid located at /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl. This sepolicy change grant
netd the privilege to access qtaguid proc files. It also grant netd the
permission to control trigger to turn on and off qtaguid module by write
parameters to files under sys_fs. The file and directory related is
properly labled.

Bug: 68774956
Bug: 30950746
Test: qtaguid function still working after the native function is
redirected.

Change-Id: Ia6db6f16ecbf8c58f631c79c9b4893ecf2cc607b