- Feb 21, 2014
-
-
Stephen Smalley authored
<5>[ 216.710405] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:17): avc: denied { use } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9368]" dev="sockfs" ino=9368 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fd <5>[ 216.710553] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:18): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9368]" dev="sockfs" ino=9368 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket <5>[ 216.710727] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:19): avc: denied { read } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="pipe:[9369]" dev="pipefs" ino=9369 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fifo_file <5>[ 216.710872] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:20): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[8214]" dev="sockfs" ino=8214 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket <5>[ 216.711037] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:21): avc: denied { write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="pipe:[9369]" dev="pipefs" ino=9369 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=fifo_file <5>[ 216.711208] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:22): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9370]" dev="sockfs" ino=9370 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket <5>[ 216.711334] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:23): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[9372]" dev="sockfs" ino=9372 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=netlink_nflog_socket <5>[ 216.711513] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:24): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" path="socket:[11078]" dev="sockfs" ino=11078 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:netd:s0 tclass=udp_socket <5>[ 216.713390] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:25): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 216.713528] type=1400 audit(1392934645.702:26): avc: denied { read write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" name="tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6127 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file <5>[ 314.513898] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:42): avc: denied { setopt } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket <5>[ 314.514482] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:43): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket <5>[ 314.515196] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:44): avc: denied { write } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket <5>[ 314.516077] type=1400 audit(1392934743.501:45): avc: denied { connect } for pid=2273 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket <5>[ 22.257024] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:12): avc: denied { open } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" name="tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6117 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file <5>[ 22.257274] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:13): avc: denied { net_admin } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=12 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 22.257445] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:14): avc: denied { write } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" name="forwarding" dev="proc" ino=10684 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.257618] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:15): avc: denied { setgid } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=6 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 22.257753] type=1400 audit(1393016186.443:16): avc: denied { setuid } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" capability=7 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 22.385005] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:17): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=6117 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file <5>[ 22.385269] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:18): avc: denied { create } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=tun_socket <5>[ 22.388955] type=1400 audit(1393016186.573:19): avc: denied { nlmsg_write } for pid=1934 comm="clatd" scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=netlink_route_socket Change-Id: Ic760597df1aa4b33b3cb6e9a504dbcbd6f5d0116 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
- Feb 20, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Per https://android-review.googlesource.com/82814 , uncrypt needs to be able to read shell_data_files on userdebug / eng builds. Allow it. Bug: 13083922 Change-Id: I72299673bb5e36be79413227105b5cad006d504f
-
Robert Craig authored
Change-Id: If4de8d3515727c0b2f95c88c1125410d9894a9ba Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
-
- Feb 19, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Add initial support for uncrypt, started via the pre-recovery service in init.rc. On an encrypted device, uncrypt reads an OTA zip file on /data, opens the underlying block device, and writes the unencrypted blocks on top of the encrypted blocks. This allows recovery, which can't normally read encrypted partitions, to reconstruct the OTA image and apply the update as normal. Add an exception to the neverallow rule for sys_rawio. This is needed to support writing to the raw block device. Add an exception to the neverallow rule for unlabeled block devices. The underlying block device for /data varies between devices within the same family (for example, "flo" vs "deb"), and the existing per-device file_context labeling isn't sufficient to cover these differences. Until I can resolve this problem, allow access to any block devices. Bug: 13083922 Change-Id: I7cd4c3493c151e682866fe4645c488b464322379
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following denial / error: E/lowmemorykiller( 187): Error writing /proc/1148/oom_adj; errno=13 [ 118.264668] type=1400 audit(947231128.209:140): avc: denied { sys_resource } for pid=187 comm="lmkd" capability=24 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability Change-Id: Ief2a7ead9cdd8a33e3add111ee99f7a29c12a3f2
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Extend check_seapp to accept the use of the new path= specifier in seapp_contexts and use it to ensure proper labeling of the cache subdirectory of com.android.providers.downloads for restorecon. After this change, restorecon /data/data/com.android.providers.downloads/cache does not change the context, leaving it in download_file rather than relabeling it to platform_app_data_file. Depends on Iddaa3931cfd4ddd5b9f62cd66989e1f26553baa1. Change-Id: Ief65b8c8dcb44ec701d53e0b58c52d6688cc2a14 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
/data/data subdirectories are labeled by installd at creation time based on seapp_contexts, not based on file_contexts, so we do not need the /data/data/.* entry, and the wallpaper file was moved from under com.android.settings/files to /data/system/users/N long ago so we can delete the old entry for it. Change-Id: I32af6813ff284e8fe9fd4867df482a642c728755 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
- Feb 18, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Allow the use of debug.db.uid on userdebug / eng builds. Setting this property allows debuggerd to suspend a process if it detects a crash. Make debug.db.uid only accessible to the su domain. This should not be used on a user build. Only support reading user input on userdebug / eng builds. Steps to reproduce with the "crasher" program: adb root adb shell setprop debug.db.uid 20000 mmm system/core/debuggerd adb sync adb shell crasher Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 580.637442] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:149): avc: denied { read } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 580.637589] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:150): avc: denied { open } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 580.637706] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:151): avc: denied { read write } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file <5>[ 580.637823] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:152): avc: denied { open } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file <5>[ 580.637958] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:153): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" path="/dev/input/event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file Bug: 12532622 Change-Id: I63486edb73efb1ca12e9eb1994ac9e389251a3f1
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Should resolve b/13060688 - emulator writes to /storage/sdcard failing. Change-Id: I9f00d9dfcd1c4f84c2320628257beca71abf170b Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
- Feb 16, 2014
-
-
Dan Willemsen authored
Change-Id: I4cd33a296de0d0597aa6166aa1be48f1b0b52129
-
- Feb 15, 2014
-
-
dcashman authored
dhcpcd opens a raw ip socket in ipv6rs_open() to use ICMPv6. This facility should be available for all devices which have a need to use it. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 42.699877] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:8): avc: denied { create } for pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket <5>[ 42.699993] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:9): avc: denied { setopt } for pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket <5>[ 42.732208] type=1400 audit(1392332560.338:10): avc: denied { write } for pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket Bug: 12473306 Change-Id: Iee57a0cb4c2d2085a24d4b5fb23a5488f0fd3e03
-
- Feb 14, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
Start enforcing SELinux rules for lmkd. Security policy violations will return an error instead of being allowed. Change-Id: I2bad2c2094d93ebbcb8ccc4b7f3369419004a3f0
-
- Feb 13, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
* Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/* Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
- Feb 12, 2014
-
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Nick Kralevich authored
-
Dave Platt authored
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Only allow to domains as required and amend the existing neverallow on block_device:blk_file to replace the exemption for unconfineddomain with an explicit whitelist. The neverallow does not check other device types as specific ones may need to be writable by device-specific domains. Change-Id: I0f2f1f565e886ae110a719a08aa3a1e7e9f23e8c Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Remove sys_ptrace and add a neverallow for it. Remove sys_rawio and mknod, explicitly allow to kernel, init, and recovery, and add a neverallow for them. Remove sys_module. It can be added back where appropriate in device policy if using a modular kernel. No neverallow since it is device specific. Change-Id: I1a7971db8d247fd53a8f9392de9e46250e91f89b Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
- Feb 11, 2014
-
-
Daniel Cashman authored
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Only allow to specific domains as required, and add a neverallow to prevent allowing it to other domains not explicitly whitelisted. sdcard_type is exempted from the neverallow since more domains require the ability to mount it, including device-specific domains. Change-Id: Ia6476d1c877f5ead250749fb12bff863be5e9f27 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Robert Craig authored
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Change I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e changed the type on /data/misc/wifi/sockets to wpa_socket and change I51b09c5e40946673a38732ea9f601b2d047d3b62 fixed the type on existing devices. Consequently hostapd now needs access to wpa_socket dir and sock_file. Change-Id: I58f552b3cd55821f57e6ef33ebe6bb8587e7b3fd Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and never make progress on confining it. clatd does exist in AOSP and is built by default, and is started via netd. Change-Id: Iee6e0845fad7647962d73cb6d047f27924fa799a Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Also add rules from our policy. Change-Id: I86f07f54c5120c511f9cab2877cf765c3ae7c1a8 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Also add rules from our policy. Change-Id: I096025c1820f0b51f1abdf249c744cba387e0a65 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Also add rules from our policy. Change-Id: I6f552538cc4f6b28b2883aa74832230944cbdb7a Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-
Stephen Smalley authored
Also add allow rules from our policy. Change-Id: Id480eb7c8cd4e5544a1ec46cb39a55abc653ddb9 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-