- Sep 15, 2015
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Daniel Rosenberg authored
* commit 'a984a9bf': file_contexts: Change file_contexts to file_contexts.bin
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David Pursell authored
* commit '05056457': adb: add adbd -> shell signal permissions.
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Daniel Rosenberg authored
Change-Id: I0c17b4e36a14afd24763343c09eaca650ea4cefd
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David Pursell authored
adbd needs to kill spawned subprocesses if the client terminates the connection. SIGHUP will be used for this purpose, which requires the process:signal permission. Bug: http://b/23825725 Change-Id: I36d19e14809350dd6791a8a44f01b2169effbfd4
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- Sep 09, 2015
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Lorenzo Colitti authored
* commit 'c3712143': Allow system_server to bind ping sockets.
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Lorenzo Colitti authored
This allows NetworkDiagnostics to send ping packets from specific source addresses in order to detect reachability problems on the reverse path. This addresses the following denial: [ 209.744636] type=1400 audit(1441805730.510:14): avc: denied { node_bind } for pid=8347 comm="Thread-202" saddr=2400:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:40b1:7e:a1d7:b3ae scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:node:s0 tclass=rawip_socket permissive=0 Bug: 23661687 Change-Id: Ia93c14bc7fec17e2622e1b48bfbf591029d84be2
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- Sep 08, 2015
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Than McIntosh authored
* commit 'b55f10e9': Fix perfprofd denial (simpleperf debugfs read).
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- Sep 04, 2015
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Than McIntosh authored
Bug: http://b/23814810 Change-Id: I731bd70ec982e47b86befb32a9edcb71570e9d64
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- Sep 02, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '59c4aa75': auditallow gpu_device execute access
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Nick Kralevich authored
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- Sep 01, 2015
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
* commit '0243e5cf': system_server.te: remove policy load permissions
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Remove system server's permission to dynamically update SELinux policy on the device. 1) This functionality has never been used, so we have no idea if it works or not. 2) If system_server is compromised, this functionality allows a complete bypass of the SELinux policy on the device. In particular, an attacker can force a regression of the following patch * https://android-review.googlesource.com/138510 see also https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=181826 3) Dynamic policy update can be used to bypass neverallow protections enforced in CTS, by pushing a policy to the device after certification. Such an updated policy could bring the device out of compliance or deliberately introduce security weaknesses. Bug: 22885422 Bug: 8949824 Change-Id: I3c64d64359060561102e1587531836b69cfeef00
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Robert Craig authored
* commit '008d7f14': Drop the default stanza from mac_permissions.xml
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Daniel Micay authored
This permission appears to be unnecessary on some (most?) devices such as the Nexus 5. It should be moved to the device policy if it's truly required by the driver. Change-Id: I531dc82ba9030b805db2b596e145be2afb324492
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Robert Craig authored
All non matching apps will simply receive the seinfo label of "default" implicitly. No need to further clarify things anymore with an explicit default stanza. Change-Id: Ib7b01ee004775f24db9a69340a31784b967ce030 Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
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- Aug 28, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '2cc94205': install_recovery: drop toolbox auditallow
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Nick Kralevich authored
Toolbox is definitely used from install_recovery. Addresses the following denials: type=1400 audit(0.0:7): avc: granted { execute } for comm="install-recover" name="toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=463 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: granted { getattr } for comm="install-recover" path="/system/bin/toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=463 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file type=1400 audit(0.0:13): avc: granted { read } for comm="log" path="/system/bin/toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=463 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file type=1400 audit(0.0:9): avc: granted { read open } for comm="install-recover" path="/system/bin/toolbox" dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=463 scontext=u:r:install_recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I51d6e474f34afe1f33ea8294a344aa71e41deead
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- Aug 27, 2015
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Samuel Tan authored
* commit '72388335': sepolicy: Apply dhcpcd sepolicy to dhcpcd-6.8.2
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Samuel Tan authored
Apply the same sepolicy used on dhcpcd to dhcpcd-6.8.2, which is have it run with the dhcp context, and have its data files possess the dhcp_data_file context. BUG: 22956197 Change-Id: I7915b694038bb309d93691ef5d4d293593ef3b5e
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- Aug 25, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '7af012fc': Only allow toolbox exec where /system exec was already allowed.
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
* commit 'e5c7321e': file_contexts: label zram devices
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'aa0d8fef': dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list
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Jeffrey Vander Stoep authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { list } for service=NULL scontext=u:r:su:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=service_manager Change-Id: I70449b93307378481c986a60ca593eb2fc2de2c5
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William Roberts authored
Since ram devices are labeled in base contexts, also add a label for devices using zram. Change-Id: I002baebf40246e78c6f9fb367ac6fb019101cc86 Signed-off-by:
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
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Stephen Smalley authored
When the toolbox domain was introduced, we allowed all domains to exec it to avoid breakage. However, only domains that were previously allowed the ability to exec /system files would have been able to do this prior to the introduction of the toolbox domain. Remove the rule from domain.te and add rules to all domains that are already allowed execute_no_trans to system_file. Requires coordination with device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id. Change-Id: Ie46209f0412f9914857dc3d7c6b0917b7031aae5 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Aug 24, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '4abd409a': Relax neverallow rule for loading an updated SELinux policy.
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '6d0e9c8f': init.te: delete kernel load policy support
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Nick Kralevich authored
Revert the neverallow change portion of 356df327, in case others need to do dynamic policy updates. (cherrypicked from commit e827a8ab) Bug: 22885422 Bug: 8949824 Change-Id: If0745e7f83523377fd19082cfc6b33ef47ca0647
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Nick Kralevich authored
Remove the ability to dynamically update SELinux policy on the device. 1) This functionality has never been used, so we have no idea if it works or not. 2) If system_server is compromised, this functionality allows a complete bypass of the SELinux policy on the device. In particular, an attacker can force a regression of the following patch * https://android-review.googlesource.com/138510 see also https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=181826 3) Dynamic policy update can be used to bypass neverallow protections enforced in CTS, by pushing a policy to the device after certification. Such an updated policy could bring the device out of compliance or deliberately introduce security weaknesses. (cherrypicked from commit e827a8ab) Bug: 22885422 Bug: 8949824 Change-Id: I802cb61fd18a452a2bb71c02fe57cfce5b7e9dc8
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '48d98e35': system_server: remove old dalvik JIT rules on user/userdebug builds
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'be98d9cf': Add /data/local/tmp neverallow rules
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Nick Kralevich authored
On user and userdebug builds, system_server only loads executable content from /data/dalvik_cache and /system. JITing for system_server is only supported on eng builds. Remove the rules for user and userdebug builds. Going forward, the plan of record is that system_server will never use JIT functionality, instead using dex2oat or interpreted mode. Inspired by https://android-review.googlesource.com/98944 Change-Id: I54515acaae4792085869b89f0d21b87c66137510
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- Aug 22, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion) for /data/local/tmp access. /data/local/tmp is intended entirely for the shell user, and it's dangerous for other SELinux domains to access it. See, for example, this commit from 2012: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/f3ef1271f225d9f00bb4ebb0573eb3e03829f9a8 Change-Id: I5a7928ae2b51a574fad4e572b09e60e05b121cfe
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'acfd140c': eliminate some anr_data_file permissions.
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Nick Kralevich authored
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- Aug 17, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'f4d39ca1': allow domain adbd:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
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- Aug 15, 2015
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Nick Kralevich authored
https://android-review.googlesource.com/166419 changed the handling of non-interactive adb shells to use a socket instead of a PTY. When the stdin/stdout/stderr socket is received by /system/bin/sh, the code runs isatty() (ioctl TCGETS) to determine how to handle the file descriptor. This is denied by SELinux. Allow it for all domains. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=4394 comm="sh" path="socket:[87326]" dev="sockfs" ino=87326 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=0 TODO: When kernels are publicly available which support SELinux ioctl filtering, limit this just to ioctl 5401 (TCGETS) instead of all ioctls. Bug: 21215503 Change-Id: I5c9394f27b8f198d96df14eac4b0c46ecb9b0898
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