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  1. Feb 15, 2014
    • dcashman's avatar
      Allow dhcp rawip_socket permissions. · 515a76b8
      dcashman authored
      dhcpcd opens a raw ip socket in ipv6rs_open() to use ICMPv6.  This
      facility should be available for all devices which have a need to
      use it.
      
      Addresses the following denials:
      <5>[   42.699877] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:8): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket
      <5>[   42.699993] type=1400 audit(1392332560.306:9): avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket
      <5>[   42.732208] type=1400 audit(1392332560.338:10): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=983 comm="dhcpcd" lport=58 scontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tcontext=u:r:dhcp:s0 tclass=rawip_socket
      
      Bug: 12473306
      Change-Id: Iee57a0cb4c2d2085a24d4b5fb23a5488f0fd3e03
      515a76b8
  2. Jan 11, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Support forcing permissive domains to unconfined. · 623975fa
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Permissive domains are only intended for development.
      When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
      permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
      
      Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
      development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
      are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
      frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
      to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
      unconfined+enforcing.
      
      This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
      minimal level of protection.
      
      Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
      
      Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
      623975fa
  3. Jan 08, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Drop extra _system_file types. · c0493c8d
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      They serve no purpose; these directories/files are normally accessible
      in the same way as the rest of /system.  Also one of them has the wrong
      attributes (data_file_type), thereby making it writable by some domains,
      and under current policy, shell and apps cannot do ls -l /etc/ppp /etc/dhcpcd.
      
      Change-Id: I0c1baa434fe78373684f4eaab40a41fddf2bdd79
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      c0493c8d
  4. Jan 07, 2014
  5. Dec 24, 2013
  6. Oct 21, 2013
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Move unconfined domains out of permissive mode. · 353c72e3
      Nick Kralevich authored
      This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
      domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
      these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
      
      The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
      1) kernel
      2) init
      
      In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
      rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
      work.
      
      When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
      we can:
      
      1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
      2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
      3) Remove the permissive line
      4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
      
      For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
      a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
      the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
      After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
      We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
      and out of unconfined.
      
      Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
      353c72e3
  7. May 20, 2013
    • repo sync's avatar
      Make all domains unconfined. · 77d4731e
      repo sync authored
      This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
      Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
      security.
      
      Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
      77d4731e
  8. May 15, 2013
  9. Apr 05, 2013
  10. Apr 03, 2013
  11. Mar 27, 2013
  12. Mar 22, 2013
  13. Oct 16, 2012
    • Joshua Brindle's avatar
      allow apps access to the keystore, dhcp/pptp fixes, wifi fixes and isolated_app access · f26d8130
      Joshua Brindle authored
      
      - allow all apps to connect to the keystore over unix socket
      - dhcp runs scripts in /system/etc/dhcpcd/dhcpcd-hooks and creates/removes lease files
      - mtp connects to dnsproxyd when a pptp vpn connection is established
      - allow appdomain to also open qtaguid_proc and release_app to read qtaguid_device
      - WifiWatchDog uses packet_socket when wifi comes up
      - apps interact with isolated_apps when an app uses an isolated service and uses sockets for that interaction
      - for apps with levelFromUid=true to interact with isolated_app, isolated_app must be an mlstrustedsubject
      
      Change-Id: I09ff676267ab588ad4c73f04d8f23dba863c5949
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJoshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>
      f26d8130
  14. Aug 15, 2012
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