* commit 'bc1388d3':
  Make kernel / init enforcing

* commit '56f39193':
  Confine debuggerd, but leave it permissive for now.

* commit 'af47ebb6':
  Label /dev/fscklogs and allow system_server access to it.

Otherwise you get denials such as:
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:623): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" path="/dev/fscklogs/log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:624): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="fscklogs" dev="tmpfs" ino=1628 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590310.430:625): avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=1629 comm="Thread-78" name="log" dev="tmpfs" ino=1642 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ia7ae06a6d4cc5d2a59b8b85a5fb93cc31074fd37
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit '00739e3d':
  Make the ueventd domain enforcing.

Start running in enforcing mode for kernel / init.
This should be mostly a no-op, as the kernel / init
is in the unconfined domain.

Change-Id: I8273d936c9a4eecb50b78ae93490a4dd52f59eb6

All (known) denials have been addressed.

Change-Id: Ic12ed190a2efb7f20be589137a27b95d03dde25a

* commit 'a7716718':
  Label /data/misc/media and allow mediaserver access to it.

Otherwise we get denials like these on 4.4:

type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="media" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6416 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590170.360:29): avc:  denied  { write open } for  pid=61 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590255.100:231): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=832 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590255.100:231): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=832 comm="mediaserver" name="emulator.camera.hotplug.0" dev="mtdblock1" ino=6431 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit 'ddf98fa8':
  Neverallow access to the kmem device from userspace.

Change-Id: If26baa947ff462f5bb09b75918a4130097de5ef4

* commit '0ea4ac8a':
  Move goldfish-specific rules to their own directory.

* commit '842a1111':
  Confine healthd, but leave it permissive for now.

* commit 'fec3c5ad':
  Make the keystore domain enforcing.

* commit 'aaac2468':
  /system/bin/ash and /system/bin/mksh are dead.

Long live /system/bin/sh!

Change-Id: I5af63c1bdc3585835ee273ed9995d8fac14792da

Remove unconfined_domain() and add the allow rules required for
operation of healthd.  Restore the permissive declaration until
I8a3e0db15ec5f4eb05d455a57e8446a8c2b484c2 is applied to the 3.4
kernel.

Resolves the following denials in 4.4:
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:14): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" path="/sbin/healthd" dev="rootfs" ino=1232 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:15): avc:  denied  { mknod } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" capability=27  scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=capability
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:16): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:17): avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:17): avc:  denied  { net_admin } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" capability=12  scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=capability
type=1400 audit(1383590167.750:18): avc:  denied  { bind } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
shell@generic:/ $ type=1400 audit(1383590168.800:21): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder
type=1400 audit(1383590168.800:22): avc:  denied  { transfer } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=binder
type=1400 audit(1383590168.800:23): avc:  denied  { 0x10 } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" capability=36  scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=capability2
type=1400 audit(1383590168.800:24): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
type=1400 audit(1383590212.320:161): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=376 comm="system_server" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=binder
type=1400 audit(1383590212.320:161): avc:  denied  { transfer } for  pid=376 comm="system_server" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tclass=binder
type=1400 audit(1383590212.320:162): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder
type=1400 audit(1383590275.930:463): avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=49 comm="healthd" scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder

Change-Id: Iacd058edfa1e913a8f24ce8937d2d76c928d6740
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

* commit 'f232f25b':
  Move audio_firmware_file and /data/misc/audio entry to core sepolicy.

Change-Id: I7ef479ac1806b0a52bb0145a82d6d4265edc1f3e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Bug: 11518274

* commit '2d8dcb73':
  Revert "Make the keystore domain enforcing."

Change-Id:  Ib8c96ab9e19d34e8e34a4c859528345763be4906
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id:  I1bdd80f641db05fef4714654515c1e1fbb259794
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This is causing runtime restarts on flo/deb when uninstalling
some APKs. Revert while I investigate it.

11-04 21:52:41.487   687   704 I ActivityManager: Force stopping com.android.development appid=10078 user=-1: uninstall pkg
11-04 21:52:41.487   687   712 W PackageManager: Couldn't delete native library directory /data/app-lib/com.android.development
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 W dalvikvm: threadid=20: thread exiting with uncaught exception (group=0x959dfae8)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime: *** FATAL EXCEPTION IN SYSTEM PROCESS: PackageManager
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.NullPointerException
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.security.KeyStore.clearUid(KeyStore.java:327)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removeKeystoreDataIfNeeded(PackageManagerService.java:9787)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removePackageDataLI(PackageManagerService.java:9384)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deleteInstalledPackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9503)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9612)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageX(PackageManagerService.java:9239)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.access$4100(PackageManagerService.java:178)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService$7.run(PackageManagerService.java:9173)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Handler.handleCallback(Handler.java:733)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:95)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:136)
11-04 21:52:41.557   687   712 E AndroidRuntime:        at android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:61)
11-04 21:52:41.567   687   712 I Process : Sending signal. PID: 687 SIG: 9

and

[    7.324554] type=1400 audit(1383601030.823:5): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=192 comm="keystore" name="qseecom" dev="tmpfs" ino=7521 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=chr_file

This reverts commit 709d7183.

Bug: 11518274

* commit '7316b18a':
  README: recommend concatenation vs assignment

Recommend using concatenation versus assignment when making
policy declarations inside BoardConfig.mk. This will allow
sepolicy to exist in the vendor directory.

Change-Id: If982217fcb3645d9c6b37a341755b5b65f26fc5f

* commit 'cd95e0ac':
  Allow system_server to set powerctl_prop

Otherwise we break "adb root && adb shell svc power reboot",
which has the side effect of killing all of our test automation
(oops).

Bug: 11477487
Change-Id: I199b0a3a8c47a4830fe8c872dae9ee3a5a0cb631

* commit 'dd1ec6d5':
  Give system_server / system_app ability to write some properties

Allow writing to persist.sys and debug.

This addresses the following denials (which are actually being enforced):

<4>[  131.700473] avc:  denied  { set } for property=debug.force_rtl scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_prop:s0 tclass=property_service
<3>[  131.700625] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1000  name:debug.force_rtl
<4>[  132.630062] avc:  denied  { set } for property=persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_prop:s0 tclass=property_service
<3>[  132.630184] init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1000  name:persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib

Change-Id: I5d114c0d963bf393f49f1bf13d1ed84137fbcca6

* commit '58da198a':
  Confine system_server, but leave it permissive for now.

* commit '98f8b27f':
  Confine hci_attach, but leave it permissive for now.

* commit '893cbcfd':
  Confine surfaceflinger, but leave it permissive for now.