- Dec 22, 2014
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dcashman authored
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dcashman authored
Shell domain needs to be able to access system_server_services, e.g. when running the pm command. Addresses the following denials: 10-07 00:59:26.901 178 178 E SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=user scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server_service:s0 tclass=service_manager 10-07 00:59:26.903 178 178 E SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=package scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Change-Id: I4cc2f31809a2615ba781e2ecfe2ca7d6f5226b73
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- Dec 20, 2014
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William Roberts authored
It's beneficial to be able to overide this in a device makefile if you need to get the domains into an unconfined state to keep the logs from filling up on kernel entries without having to add rules into device specific policy. Change-Id: I7778be01256ac601f247e4d6e12573d0d23d12a1
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Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following denials: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=148 comm="mkswap" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:toolbox:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=148 comm="mkswap" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:toolbox:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 Change-Id: I88c88493cd5f523b5b26a8028b421b3565aa5751
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- Dec 18, 2014
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Elliott Hughes authored
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Elliott Hughes authored
When toolbox completely disappears, we can worry about whether we want to rename this context. Change-Id: I359b6b2b21bb9452352e700f6ac37c137200ac77
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- Dec 15, 2014
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dcashman authored
All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting. Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
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- Dec 12, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Pawit Pornkitprasan authored
Required for Settings to show name/icon of apps on sd card (permission copied from untrusted_app) Also removed duplicate permission (from domain) in untrusted_app Change-Id: Ib2b3bee4dfb54ad5e45b392fd9bfd65add4a00bf
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- Dec 11, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Addresses denials such as: type=1400 : avc: denied { lock } for comm="PushCheckSendS" path="socket:[1834573]" dev="sockfs" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=tcp_socket Change-Id: Idbf6120cca9df634e2f8a876fd1cd836551e5ad7 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Dec 10, 2014
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Brian Carlstrom authored
Bug: 18485243 Change-Id: Ic17baa0767ee1f1a27a3338558b86482ca92765e
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- Dec 09, 2014
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- Dec 05, 2014
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dcashman authored
Change-Id: Ie7c2bf623dcfe246fa5e60b0775b6bb38869d8cb
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- Dec 02, 2014
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Daniel Cashman authored
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Stephen Smalley authored
Only allow it to read/write/stat already open app data files received via Binder or local socket IPC. Change-Id: Ie66f240e109410a17aa93d9d5dea4c2b87d47009 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Dec 01, 2014
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William Roberts authored
host C: sepolicy-analyze <= external/sepolicy/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c external/sepolicy/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c: In function 'usage': external/sepolicy/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c:30:5: error: 'for' loop initial declarations are only allowed in C99 mode external/sepolicy/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c:30:5: note: use option -std=c99 or -std=gnu99 to compile your code make: *** [out/host/linux-x86/obj/EXECUTABLES/sepolicy-analyze_intermediates/sepolicy-analyze.o] Error 1 Change-Id: I9222e447b032d051c251c9718e2b8d5ffb9e9c35
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- Nov 26, 2014
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- Nov 18, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Some devices leave "ro.build.fingerprint" undefined at build time, since they need to build it from the components at runtime. See https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/5568772e8161205b86905d815783505fd3d461d8 for details. Allow system_server to set ro.build.fingerprint Addresses the following denial/error: avc: denied { set } for property=build.fingerprint scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:default_prop:s0 tclass=property_service init: sys_prop: permission denied uid:1000 name:ro.build.fingerprint Bug: 18188956 Change-Id: I98b25773904a7be3e3d2926daa82c1d08f9bcc29
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- Nov 13, 2014
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William Roberts authored
This seems to not really being used, especially considering that the init.rc does not have a oneshot service for it, and its not using the build_policy() and other things to even make it configurable. Change-Id: I964f94b30103917ed39cf5d003564de456b169a5
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- Nov 12, 2014
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- Nov 10, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Stephen Smalley authored
init.rc files can potentially chown/chmod any character device, so allow it for everything except for kmem (prohibited by neverallow). While we could whitelist each of the device types, doing so would also require device-specific changes for the device-specific types and may be difficult to maintain. Resolves (permissive) denials such as: avc: denied { read } for pid=1 comm="init" name="ttySAC0" dev="tmpfs" ino=4208 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hci_attach_dev:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 avc: denied { open } for pid=1 comm="init" name="ttySAC0" dev="tmpfs" ino=4208 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hci_attach_dev:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for pid=1 comm="init" name="ttySAC0" dev="tmpfs" ino=4208 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:hci_attach_dev:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 avc: denied { read } for pid=1 comm="init" name="smd7" dev="tmpfs" ino=6181 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { open } for pid=1 comm="init" name="smd7" dev="tmpfs" ino=6181 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wcnss_wlan" dev="tmpfs" ino=7475 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wlan_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { open } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wcnss_wlan" dev="tmpfs" ino=7475 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wlan_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { setattr } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wcnss_wlan" dev="tmpfs" ino=7475 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wlan_device:s0 tclass=chr_file Change-Id: If8d14e9e434fab645d43db12cc1bdbfd3fc5d354 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Nov 08, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Otherwise denials like the following occur: avc: denied { write } for path="/data/local/tmp/foo" dev="dm-0" ino=325769 scontext=u:r:runas:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { read } for path="/data/local/tmp/foo" dev="dm-0" ino=325769 scontext=u:r:runas:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file Steps to reproduce: $ run-as com.google.android.talk id > /data/local/tmp/id.out $ run-as com.google.android.talk cat < /data/local/tmp/id.out Change-Id: I68a7b804336a3d5776dcc31622f1279380282030
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- Nov 07, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
tilapia's OTA code for updating the radio image needs to create files on rootfs and create a character device in /dev. Add an exception for recovery the the various neverallow rules blocking this behavior. (cherrypick, with modifications, from 0055ea90) Bug: 18281224 Change-Id: I5c57afe0a10b4598fea17f9c5c833bd39551907e
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id I52fd5fbe30a7f52f1143f176915ce55fb6a33f87 was only intended for lollipop, not for master. This reverts commit 2aa727e3. Change-Id: If2101939eb50cd6bbcde118b91c003d1f30d811c Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Nov 06, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'f7e98fe2': recovery.te: add /data neverallow rules
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit '35a4ed80': Add wpa neverallow rule
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Nick Kralevich authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
wpa should never trust any data coming from the sdcard. Add a compile time assertion to make sure no rules are ever added allowing this access. Change-Id: I5f50a8242aa30f6cc0cfd89d82b2b153625105f6
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- Nov 05, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Recovery should never be accessing files from /data. In particular, /data may be encrypted, and the files within /data will be inaccessible to recovery, because recovery doesn't know the decryption key. Enforce write/execute restrictions on recovery. We can't tighten it up further because domain.te contains some /data read-only access rules, which shouldn't apply to recovery but do. Create neverallow_macros, used for storing permission macros useful for neverallow rules. Standardize recovery.te and property_data_file on the new macros. Change-Id: I02346ab924fe2fdb2edc7659cb68c4f8dffa1e88
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- Nov 04, 2014
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Robert Greenwalt authored
* commit '3bcdec8a': Allow radio access to netd_pid file.
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- Nov 03, 2014
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Robert Greenwalt authored
They need to see when it changes so they know when netd bounces. (cherrypicked from commit 71e9a7c4) bug:18069270 Change-Id: I954cf43ff02f1d352015f128ef88b659e6d0f95a
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- Oct 31, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
* commit 'ca62a8b7': allow coredump functionality
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Nick Kralevich authored
(cherrypick of commit d7e004eb) Change-Id: I7993698ac96f21db0039681275280dbd43ff61ba
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dcashman authored
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dcashman authored
Also, divide each sepolicy-analyze function into its own component for simplified command-line parsing and potentially eventual modularization. Bug: 18005561 Change-Id: I45fa07d776cf1bec7d60dba0c03ee05142b86c19
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- Oct 30, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
* commit 'c457572b': Allow init to restorecon /data directories on upgrades.
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Stephen Smalley authored
Resolves (permissive) denials on upgrades from 4.4. Change-Id: Ia9eed4938a7235c23bb65de7ad65e6e7c325dfd7 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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