Add patchoat selinux rules.

Bug: 15358152

Change-Id: Ibe92d8b55a24bbf718b0416a21b76e5df7a2de26

The list of processes comes from frameworks/native/cmds/dumpstate/utils.c.
dumpstate calls dump_backtrace_to_file() for each such process, which
asks debuggerd to dump the backtrace.

Resolves denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=debuggerd
 avc:  denied  { dump_backtrace } for  scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tclass=debuggerd

Change-Id: Idbfb0fef0aac138073b7217b7dbad826a1193098
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Fix two neverallow rules that yield Invalid SELinux context
warnings from the CTS SELinuxTest.

For transitions from app domains, we only need to check
{ domain -appdomain } (i.e. domains other than app domains),
not ~appdomain (i.e. all types other than app domains).  Otherwise
SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and
non-domain types for testing since the target class is process,
and such contexts are invalid.

For keeping file_type and fs_type exclusive, we only need to
check associate permission, not all filesystem permissions, as
only associate takes a file type as the source context.  Otherwise
SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and
non-domain types for testing filesystem permissions other than
associate, since the source of such checks is normally a process
context.

Change-Id: I6c2f63f4786d75294a6938613ba14b64212fc802
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Bug: 16563899
Bug: 14251916
Change-Id: Id3172b73f10186ba361caf6b7333e5d2a0648475

Do not auditallow dumpstate as it is the only instance
of listing services seen so far.

Change-Id: I1c142cf5a3a745ea64b22f3a14b8395b24f2e1d0

As described in the system/core commit with the same Change-Id,
there's a race condition between installd and sdcard when it
comes to accessing /data/media. Resolve the race by checking
/data/.layout_version to make sure the filesystem has been upgraded.

Maybe indirectly fixes the following SELinux denial:

  sdcard  : type=1400 audit(0.0:3): avc: denied { write } for name="media" dev="mmcblk0p17" ino=102753 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

(cherrypicked from commit 792d8650)

Bug: 16329437
Change-Id: I5e164f08009c1036469f8734ec07cbae9c5e262b

Define a new class, permissions, and rules for the debuggerd
SELinux MAC checks.

Used by Ib317564e54e07cc21f259e75124b762ad17c6e16 for debuggerd.

Change-Id: I8e120d319512ff207ed22ed87cde4e0432a13dda
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.

Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e

Change-Id: Iad32cfb4d5b69176fc551b8339d84956415a4fe7

Change-Id: I427c0f4828d45f2c43206c09cb37e3eb30455dee

Addresses the denial in charger mode:
[   17.993733] type=1400 audit(1405412231.119:4): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=123 comm="charger" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=10287 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:pstorefs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Change-Id: I95e65753a99aa61ef86b8eebb7083b3d450e6b7b

Augment the already existing neverallow on loading executable content
from file types other than /system with one on loading executable content
from filesystem types other than the rootfs.  Include exceptions for
appdomain and recovery as required by current policy.

Change-Id: I73d70ab04719a67f71e48ac795025f2ccd5da385
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Further refined auditallow statements associated with
service_manager and added dumpstate to the
service_manager_local_audit_domain.

Change-Id: I2ecc42c8660de6a91f3b4e56268344fbd069ccc0

Add adbd as a service_manager_local_audit_domain and negate
surfaceflinger_service in its auditallow. Negate keystore_service
and radio_service in the system_app auditallow.

Change-Id: I05ea2a3e853b692f151182202f1b30786b44f1fb

Add com.android.net.IProxyService as a system_server_service
to service_contexts.

Bug: 16369427
Change-Id: I29ac87babe393f2fe3ce91c2d5eba9673d5a1be3

https://android-review.googlesource.com/94851 added an LD_PRELOAD
line to init.environ.rc.in. This has the effect of loading
libsigchain.so into every process' memory space, regardless of
whether it wants it or not.

For lmkd, it doesn't need libsigchain, so it doesn't make any sense
to load it and keep it locked in memory.

Disable noatsecure for lmkd. This sets AT_SECURE=1, which instructs the
linker to not honor security sensitive environment variables such
as LD_PRELOAD. This prevents libsigchain.so from being loaded into
lmkd's memory.

Change-Id: I6378ba28ff3a1077747fe87c080e1f9f7ca8132e

dex2oat fails when upgrading unlabeled asec containers.

Steps to reproduce:

1) Install a forward locked app on Android 4.1
  adb install -l foo.apk
2) Upgrade to tip-of-tree

Addresses the following denial:

  <4>[  379.886665] type=1400 audit(1405549869.210:4): avc: denied { read } for pid=2389 comm="dex2oat" path="/mnt/asec/jackpal.androidterm-1/pkg.apk" dev=dm-0 ino=12 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: I58dc6ebe61a5b5840434077a55f1afbeed602137

Change-Id: I66a88b5dafc295e6daa9f4c0225aa593c97fe187

addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(1.871:3): avc:  denied  { ipc_lock } for  pid=1406 comm="lmkd" capability=14  scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability

Bug: 16236289
Change-Id: Id9923c16c6db026dd5d28996126f503c5c1d7c87

Define the service context for "webviewupdate", a new service that will
run in the system server.

Bug: 13005501
Change-Id: I841437c59b362fda88d130be2f2871aef87d9231

system_server auditallow statements were causing logspam and
there is not a good way to negate services from specific devices
so as a fix we are removing all system_server auditallows. These
logs may not be useful anyway because I suspsect that system_server
will probe for most all services anyway.

Change-Id: I27a05761c14def3a86b0749cdb895190bdcf9d71

dex2oat can't access file descriptors associated with asec_apk_files.
This breaks installing forward locked apps, and generates the following
denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { read } for path="/mnt/asec/com.example.android.simplejni-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-0" ino=12 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file

Steps to reproduce:

  $ adb install -r -l SimpleJNI.apk

Expected:

  app installs

Actual:

  app fails to install.

Change-Id: I5a468508014e9963460d13d78e1c4867187322b3
Bug: 16328233

Change untrusted_app to not auditallow radio_service find requests
to cut down on log spam.

Change-Id: I65d4a60ea1c7e81425937d5f1908e764fdec417f

Addresses the following selinux denials:
type=1400 audit(1405383429.107:22): avc: denied { remove_name } for pid=137 comm="lmkd" name="uid_10060" dev="cgroup" ino=18368 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
type=1400 audit(1405383794.109:6): avc: denied { sys_nice } for pid=1619 comm="lmkd" capability=23 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0

Change-Id: I7b6e5a396bf345c4768defd7b39af2435631a35b

1) Remove explicit allow statements. Since su is in permmissive,
there's no need to ever specify allow statements for su.

2) Remove unconfined_domain(su). Su is already permissive, so there's
no need to join the unconfined domain, and it just makes getting
rid of unconfined more difficult.

3) Put su into app_domain(). This addresses, in a roundabout sorta
way, the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc: denied { setsched } for scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=process permissive=0

which comes up while testing media processes as root. We already put
the shell user into this domain, so adding su to this domain ensures
other processes can communicate consistently with su spawned processes.

Bug: 16261280
Bug: 16298582
Change-Id: I30b6d3cc186bda737a23c25f4fa2a577c2afd4d7

Addresses the following denial:

  W/system_server( 2697): type=1400 audit(0.0:9): avc: denied { execute } for name="dex2oat" dev="mmcblk0p31" ino=118 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dex2oat_exec:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Change-Id: I168842b3e281efcb0632049632ed3817c2025e4d

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964

Address denials in devices that use /oem

Change-Id: I80b76bb58bab9b6c54d6550eb801664d82a4d403

Currently, dex2oat runs in the installd sandbox, and has
all the SELinux capabilities that installd does. That's too
excessive.

dex2oat handles untrusted user data, so we want to put it in
it's own tighter sandbox.

Bug: 15358102
Change-Id: I08083b84b9769e24d6dad6dbd12401987cb006be

Prune down unconfined so it doesn't allow process access
to all other domains. Use domain_trans() for transitions to
seclabeled domains.

Change-Id: I8e88a49e588b6b911e1f7172279455838a06091d

Support opening the ffs-based interface for adbd in recovery.  (Copied
from adbd.te.)

Bug: 16183878
Change-Id: Ib80e5b910d9ad4252cb80e7ce2f85e478cd94816