Duplicate of "allow domain su:fd use;"

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I81d86a8b325d619d3ecc9450a011d6646605cab9

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

Iot would like to allow bootanim to load libraries from /oem but in order for
device-specfic sepolicies to grant exec this global restriction needs to
be relaxed.

Bug: 37992717
Test: Tested with Iot sepolicies in effect and bootanim can exec.
Change-Id: I6462bf510562eb3fb06304e50b68fba05d37b285

This is needed to retain app's previous access to
/sys/devices/system/cpu. When these files were previously
labeled in file_contexts, symlinks were labeled as
sysfs_devices_system_cpu. When labeling was moved to genfs_contexts
symlinks all have the default sysfs label.

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="main"
path="/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq" dev="sysfs" ino=41897
scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Change-Id: Idaa565390bca13d3819e147fcea4214956c0f589
Bug: 64270911
Test: build aosp_marlin

This patch tries to provide similar functionality as the previous
change made here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/platform/system/sepolicy/+/432339/



Only, making sure we add the same map permissions for the vendor
directory.

Change-Id: Ia965df2881cdee8bb5d81278a1eb740def582871
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>

Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap")
added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation).  The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying).  The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.

This change defines map permission for the Android policy.  It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets.  This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33);
on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.

This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for
file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these
macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system
and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed,
although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the
global macros are not used.

Test: Policy builds

Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Due to the massively increased number of attributes in SELinux policy
as part of the treble changes, we have had to remove attributes from
policy for performance reasons.  Unfortunately, some attributes are
required to be in policy to ensure that our neverallow rules are being
properly enforced.  Usually this is not a problem, since neverallow rules
indicate that an attribute should be kept, but this is not currently the
case when the attribute is part of a negation in a group.

This is particularly problematic with treble since some attributes may
exist for HALs that have no implementation, and thus no types.  In
particular, this has caused an issue with the neverallows added in our
macros.  Add an extraneous neverallow rule to each of those auto-generated
neverallow rules to make sure that they are not removed from policy, until
the policy compiler is fixed to avoid this.  Also add corresponding rules
for other types which have been removed due to no corresponding rules.

Bug: 62591065
Bug: 62658302
Test: Attributes present in policy and CTS passes.  sepolicy-analyze also
works on platform-only policy.
Change-Id: Ic3fc034cdbd04a94167f8240cf562297e8d7c762

This is sometimes used for communication with the bootloader.

Bug: 62052545
Test: Build
Change-Id: I3ae37793407719e55ab0830129aa569c9018f7da

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)

(cherry picked from commit 11bfcc1e)

Change-Id: Icc60d227331c8eee70a9389ff1e7e78772f37e6f

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

Merged-In: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f
Change-Id: Ib4b73fc130f4993c44d96c8d68f61b6d9bb2c7d5

Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.

Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).

Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea

Adding the default label/mapping is important because:
1.  Lookups of services without an selinux label should generate
    a denial.
2.  In permissive mode, lookups of a service without a label should be
    be allowed, without the default label service manager disallows
    access.
3.  We can neverallow use of the default label.

Bug: 37762790
Test: Build and flash policy onto Marlin with unlabeled vendor services.
    Add/find of unlabeled vendor services generate a denial.

Change-Id: I66531deedc3f9b79616f5d0681c87ed66aca5b80
(cherry picked from commit 639a2b84)

The fuse_device neverallow rules are too aggressive and are inhibiting
certain vendor customizations. Relax the /dev/fuse neverallow rules so
that they better reflect the security invariants we want to uphold.

Bug: 37496487
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie73b0ba7c76446afc2a7a23ebed1275c977d932d

This adds neverallow rules which enforce the prohibition on
communication between framework and vendor components over VendorBinder.
This prohibition is similar in spirit to the one for Binder
communications.

Most changes consist of adding neverallow rules, which do not affect
runtime behavior. The only change which does affect runtime behavior
is the change which takes away the right of servicemanager domain to
transfer Binder tokens to hwservicemanager and vndservicemanager. This
grant was there by accident (because it was overly broad) and is not
expected to be needed: servicemanager, hwservicemanager, and
vndservicemanager are not supposed to be communicating with each
other.

P. S. The new neverallow rules in app_neverallows.te are covered by
the new rules in domain.te. The rules were nevertheless added to
app_neverallows.te for consistency with other *Binder rules there.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 37663632
Change-Id: I7c2ae23924bf0f2fed3f1e3a8d4d603129286329

App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to
arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the
attack surface. The reason is twofold:
1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
   currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it
   did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of
   apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for
   authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that
   a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to
   perform operations offered by the service.
2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with
   higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core
   components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way
   down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the
   Android security model.

HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor
components) are considered safer because of point #2 above.

Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are
considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs
by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its
client already as, because these services run in the process of the
client.

This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services
in neverallow rules.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d

This adds fine-grained policy about who can register and find which
HwBinder services in hwservicemanager.

Test: Play movie in Netflix and Google Play Movies
Test: Play video in YouTube app and YouTube web page
Test: In Google Camera app, take photo (HDR+ and conventional),
      record video (slow motion and normal), and check that photos
      look fine and videos play back with sound.
Test: Cast screen to a Google Cast device
Test: Get location fix in Google Maps
Test: Make and receive a phone call, check that sound works both ways
      and that disconnecting the call frome either end works fine.
Test: Run RsHelloCompute RenderScript demo app
Test: Run fast subset of media CTS tests:
      make and install CtsMediaTestCases.apk
      adb shell am instrument -e size small \
          -w 'android.media.cts/android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner'
Test: Play music using Google Play music
Test: Adjust screen brightness via the slider in Quick Settings
Test: adb bugreport
Test: Enroll in fingerprint screen unlock, unlock screen using
      fingerprint
Test: Apply OTA update:
      Make some visible change, e.g., rename Settings app.
      make otatools && \
      make dist
      Ensure device has network connectivity
      ota_call.py -s <serial here> --file out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
      Confirm the change is now live on the device
Bug: 34454312
(cherry picked from commit 632bc494)
Merged-In: Iecf74000e6c68f01299667486f3c767912c076d3
Change-Id: I7a9a487beaf6f30c52ce08e04d415624da49dd31

installd needs to check whether idmap is outdated or not compared to
vendor overlay file.

Test: building succeeded and tested on sailfish.
Bug: 37179531
Change-Id: I934c1ae39e3f806bca1e3d68cf8190addeebb499

Bug: 37542947
Test: Compiled and ran on device to ensure no access errors while in VR
Change-Id: Ia685676d82f1f10f2bd371a13879d00fe63a9ea6

Remove neverallow exemption allowing other processes to run in
the bluetooth app's selinux domain.

The bluetooth domain is intended to host the zygote spawned
bluetooth app. It is not intended to host other bluetooth related
processes. Please define new domains for these processes.

Test: build Marlin
Change-Id: I1fd3dd0fe85f73457d77b63a65b4307821cbd41c

vndservicemanager is a copy of servicemanager, and so has the exact
same properties.  This should be reflected in the sharing of an object
manager in SELinux policy, rather than creating a second one, which is
effectively an attempt at namespacing based on object rather than type
labels.  hwservicemanager, however, provides different and additional
functionality that may be reflected in changed permissions, though they
currently map to the existing servicemanager permissions.  Keep the new
hwservice_manager object manager but remove the vndservice_manager one.

Bug: 34454312
Bug: 36052864
Test: policy builds and device boots.
Change-Id: I9e0c2757be4026101e32ba780f1fa67130cfa14e

Temporary attribute (checked against in CTS) to point out vendor
processes that run /system executables. These are currently only down to
2-3 of them that are related to telephony on sailfish

Bug: 36463595
Test: Build succeeds for sailfish
Test: ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
          android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForVendorExecutingCore \
          --skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
          --abi arm64-v8a

Change-Id: I9eb40ad259aefba73869d6a1b40186d33fa475dd
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish, make wifi call, internet over data and wifi

Change-Id: I81259b6412d7197725afe2fe4976aa0a03b8df6e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 34980020

(cherry picked from commit 3cc6a959)

Change-Id: I64c7275551e8e27d68072e8ec38c07b539989da0

Change-Id: Ic9a9026df6f36d65fa02cc7b264bc901a14546f9
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Adds a rule to audit vendor domains from executing programs from /system
with the exception of domains whitelisted in the rule.

Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish
Test: Run SELinuxHostTests with the tests that checks for new violators
      (without the API check) to ensure it fails for sailfish. The API
      check will allow the test to skip the check.

Change-Id: Id19f32141bceba4db4bd939394ff3ee0b3c4b437
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish and make sure all vendor services that are shell scripts
      work. (Checke exited status)

Change-Id: I3d1d564114a914dec8179fb93a9e94493c2808da
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This unbreaks user builds broken by recently landed changes to secilc
which is now aggressively removing attributes which aren't used in
allow rules, even when they are used in other places, such as being
referenced from *_contexts files.

User builds are broken by vndservice_manager_type not being found when
checkfc is run for *vndservice_contexts targets.

Test: On a clean user build: mmma system/sepolicy
Bug: 37319524
Bug: 36508258
Change-Id: I4a1727a74122ecd9020c3831462d56a65ee6d304

So it won't get compiled out of sepolicy.

Test: marlin build
Change-Id: I3a089fe83df69a76bebf64f874556967bc49ee78

hwservicemanager can check hwservice_contexts files
both from the framework and vendor partitions.

Initially, have a wildcard '*' in hwservice_contexts
that maps to a label that can be added/found from
domain. This needs to be removed when the proper policy
is in place.

Also, grant su/shell access to hwservicemanager list
operations, so tools like 'lshal' continue to work.

Bug: 34454312
Test: Marlin boots
Change-Id: I3a02d97a82458692b528d85c1b8e78b6f82ea1bc

Follow-up to commit 1b5f81a2.

Bug: 36681210
Bug: 37158297
Test: lunch sailfish-userdebug && m
Test: Manually run OTA
Change-Id: Ifb4808c9255842a51a660c07ffd924cef52024c5

The kernel  modules under /vendor partition has been relabeled to vendor_file.
This CL allows for the modprobe to load modules labeled vendor_file.

Kernel modules are loaded in init.rc with following commands:
    exec u:r:modprobe:s0 -- /system/bin/modprobe -d /vendor/lib/modules MODULE

Bug: 35653245
Test: tested on sailfish
Change-Id: I2132ca4de01c5c60476dad8496e98266de5a1bb7

Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- no warnings
Bug: 3716915
Change-Id: I76886c2d09a70cbe6dc707dd0599217407bb63f7

Renderscript drivers are loaded from /vendor/lib64 by following the
/system/vendor symlink. This change fixes a couple of things.
- Allows all domains access to follow the symlink
- Restores app domain permissions for /vendor for non-treble devices
- Allow app domains to peek into /vendor/lib64, but NOT grant 'execute'
  permissions for everything. Since RS drivers can be loaded into any
  process, their vendor implementation and dependencies have been
  marked as 'same process HALs' already.

Bug: 37169158
Test: Tested on sailfish (Treble) & Angler (non-treble)
      ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases \
      --skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
      --abi arm64-v8a
      Result: Tests Passed: 743 Tests Failed: 0

Change-Id: I36f5523381428629126fc196f615063fc7a50b8e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The concept of VNDK-stable set is gone because they no longer need to be
stable across several Android releases. Instead, they are just small set
of system libraries (other than Low-Level NDK) that can be used by
same-process HALs. They need to be stable only during an Android release
as other VNDK libraries. However, since they are eligible for double
loading, we still need to distinguish those libs from other VNDK
libraries. So we give them a name vndk-sp, which means VNDK designed for
same-process HALs.

Bug: 37139956
Test: booting successful with vndk-sp libs in /vendor/lib(64)?/vndk-sp
Change-Id: I892c4514deb3c6c8006e3659bed1ad3363420732

Vndk-stable libs are system libs that are used by same process HALs.
Since same process HALs can be loaded to any process, so are vndk-stable
libs.

Bug: 37138502
Test: none, because the directory is currently empty and thus this is
no-op. sailfish builds and boots.

Change-Id: I67a2c8c2e4c3517aa30b4a97dc80dc2800e47b5a

All accesses to /vendor/app within platform include permissions to read
symlinks in the location. This rule is redundant now.

Bug: 36806861
Test: Boot sailfish and find no denials for 'vendor_app_file'

Change-Id: Ic17a67521cff6717d83b78bb4ad8e21e772f6d4f
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

/vendor/framework is now designated location for vendor's platform
libraries. The directory is thus only made available for 'dex2oat'
coredomain.

Bug: 36680116
Test: Boot sailfish & angler and launch gApps, dialer w/ no denials for
      'vendor_framework_file'

Change-Id: I24c2ec30f836330005a972ae20d839bef9dcb8aa
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.

The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Effectively removes TODOs and finalizes the initial solution to allow
all domains access to 'vendor_file'.

Bug: 36681074
Test: Build and boot sailfish (no policy changes in the CL)

Change-Id: I50c05e20175c5273b34901809d967dd3e48bdb0e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>