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  1. Jan 16, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Drop legacy device types. · d9b8ef43
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      powervr_device is obsoleted by the more general gpu_device.
      akm_device and accelerometer_device are obsoleted by the more
      general sensors_device.
      
      We could also drop the file_contexts entries altogether and
      take them to device-specific policy (in this case, they all
      came from crespo, so that is obsolete for master).
      
      Change-Id: I63cef43b0d66bc99b80b64655416cc050f443e7d
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      d9b8ef43
  2. Jan 14, 2014
  3. Jan 13, 2014
  4. Jan 11, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      allow adbd setpcap · 40ce0bb8
      Nick Kralevich authored
      adbd uses setpcap to drop capabilities from the bounding
      set on user builds. See system/core commit
      080427e4e2b1b72718b660e16b6cf38b3a3c4e3f
      
      Change-Id: I6aec8d321b8210ea50a56aeee9bc94738514beab
      40ce0bb8
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Support forcing permissive domains to unconfined. · 623975fa
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Permissive domains are only intended for development.
      When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
      permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
      
      Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
      development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
      are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
      frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
      to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
      unconfined+enforcing.
      
      This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
      minimal level of protection.
      
      Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
      
      Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
      623975fa
  5. Jan 10, 2014
  6. Jan 09, 2014
  7. Jan 08, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Allow keystore to talk to the tee · b23d2876
      Nick Kralevich authored
      On manta, the keystore CTS tests are failing, because
      keystore isn't allowed to talk to the tee. Allow it.
      
      I've only seen this bug on manta, but it seems appropriate
      for all domains.
      
      Fixes the following denial:
      
      <5>[  286.249563] type=1400 audit(1389210059.924:6): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=126 comm="keystore" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
      
      Bug: 12450710
      Change-Id: I07133d9abeaf967392118ba478a5a391cf0c5fa5
      b23d2876
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      address denials when playing protected content. · e45603d3
      Nick Kralevich authored
      When playing protected content on manta, surfaceflinger would crash.
      
        STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
        1. Launch Play Movies & TV
        2. Play any movie and observe
      
        OBSERVED RESULTS:
        Device reboot while playing movies
      
        EXPECTED RESULTS:
        No device reboot
      
      Even though this only reproduces on manta, this seems appropriate
      for a general policy.
      
      Addresses the following denials:
      
      <5>[   36.066819] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:9): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" name="tlcd_sock" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=627097 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file
      <5>[   36.066985] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:10): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" path="/data/app/tlcd_sock" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
      <5>[   41.379708] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:15): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
      <5>[   41.380051] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:16): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      <5>[   41.380209] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:17): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      <5>[   41.380779] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:18): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path="/dev/mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      Change-Id: I20286ec2a6cf0d190a84ad74e88e94468bab9fdb
      Bug: 12434847
      e45603d3
    • rpcraig's avatar
      Apply a label to /data/mediadrm files. · d362cdf8
      rpcraig authored
      
      /data/mediadrm is appearing on devices but is
      receiving the system_data_file type. Use the
      media_data_file label to help classify these files.
      This new label will help with the following denials.
      with exisiting allow rules for mediaserver are already
      in place.
      
      type=1400 msg=audit(1389139139.551:308): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="ay64.dat" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136819 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      type=1400 msg=audit(1389139140.783:309): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="IDM1013" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136818 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      type=1400 msg=audit(1389139140.783:310): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=179 comm="mediaserver" name="IDM1013" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=136818 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Change-Id: I84ac78517fdbb0264cf07379120a62675505fc95
      Signed-off-by: default avatarrpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
      d362cdf8
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      84a81d1e
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