Allow CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
Allow reading /dev/input/*

(cherrypicked from commit 2133c2a1)

Change-Id: I869a4921e024702300aa9ecba9cdf84ae2b6edac

All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary.  Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a

A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
when handling AOSP contributions.

Resolve those conflicts.

This is essentially a revert of bf696327
for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.

Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c

Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.

Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d)

Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964

Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.

Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d

Change-Id: I99f93e4dd5dc1f43291c46f6ed07e51097613689
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="214" dev="proc" ino=1568 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=dir
avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=752 comm="ActivityManager" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=1878 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=187 comm="Binder_2" scontext=u:r:inputflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder

Change-Id: I099d7dacf7116efa73163245597c3de629d358c1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and
never make progress on confining it.  Of course we cannot truly
test until it is released into AOSP, but this prepares the way
and potentially allows for internal testing and collection of denials.

Change-Id: I800ab23baee1c84b7c4cf7399b17611a62ca6804
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add a placeholder domain for inputflinger.
Mark it initially unconfined and enforcing.

Change-Id: I433fd9e1954486136cb8abb084b4e19bb7fc2f19