modprobe domain was allowed to launch vendor toolbox even if its a
coredomain. That violates the treble separation. Fix that by creating a
separate 'vendor_modprobe' domain that init is allowed to transition to
through vendor_toolbox.

Bug: 37008075
Test: Build and boot sailfish

Change-Id: Ic3331797691bb5d1fdc05a674aa4aa313e1f86b2
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e366a0e)

With project Treble, we're relying heavily on attributes for
permission inheritance and enforcement of separation between
platform and vendor components.

We neead tests that verify those attributes are correctly applied.
This change adds the framework for those tests including a wrapper
around libsepol for loading and querying policy, and a python module
for running tests on policy and file_contexts.

Included with the testing framework is a test asserting that the
coredomain attribute is only applied to core processes. This
verification is done using the following rules:
1. Domain's entrypoint is on /system - coredomain
2. Domain's entrypoint is on /vendor - not coredomain
3. Domain belongs to a whitelist of known coredomains - coredomain

In a subsequent commit these tests will be applied at build time.
However, I first need to fix existing Treble violations exposed by
this test. These tests will also be applied during CTS.

Test: LD_PRELOAD=$ANDROID_HOST_OUT/lib64/libsepolwrap.so python \
    treble.py -p $OUT/vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy \
    -f $OUT/vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_file_contexts \
    -f $OUT/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts
Bug: 37008075
Change-Id: I7825f5c2909a5801deaccf2bef2bfd227adb0ae9
(cherry picked from commit 0366afdf)

Bug: http://b/62297059
Test: mma
Merged-In: Ibcd93e5554a9c2dd75fbfb42294fbc9b96ebc8cc
Change-Id: Ibcd93e5554a9c2dd75fbfb42294fbc9b96ebc8cc
(cherry picked from commit 17885f14)

Modprobe requires this permission or the following denial will
prevent loading of signed kernel modules:

audit: type=1400 audit(27331649.656:4): avc:  denied  { search } for
pid=448 comm="modprobe" scontext=u:r:modprobe:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0
tclass=key permissive=0

Bug: 62256697
Test: Verified signed module loading on sailfish.
Change-Id: Idde41d1ab58e760398190d6686665a252f1823bb

This is sometimes used for communication with the bootloader.

Bug: 62052545
Test: Build
Change-Id: I3ae37793407719e55ab0830129aa569c9018f7da

Bug: 38232801
Test: Build

Change-Id: Iccc16430e7502bb317f95bb2a5e2f021d8239a00

Bug: 38233550
Test: Build
Change-Id: I7c2105d5f215a60a611110640afff25fc3403559

Bug: 62102558
Test: see b/62102558
Change-Id: If80d1270bcf6835e6d1a78e2176c3e139cebd174

* changes:
  Restrict BOARD_PLAT_[PUBLIC|PRIVATE]_SEPOLICY_DIRS to one dir.
  Add BOARD_PLAT_[PUBLIC|PRIVATE]_SEPOLICY_DIRS

These directories were added to allow for partner extensions to the
android framework without needing to add changes to the AOSP global
sepolicy.  There should only ever be one owner of the framework and
corresponding updates, so enforce this restriction to prevent
accidental accrual of policy in the system image.

Bug: 36467375
Test: Add public and private files to policy and verify that they are
added to the appropriate policy files.  Also test that specifying
multiple directories for public or private results in an error.

Change-Id: I397ca4e7d6c8233d1aefb2a23e7b44315052678f
Merged-In: I397ca4e7d6c8233d1aefb2a23e7b44315052678f
(cherry picked from commit 1633da06)

Add new build variables for partner customization (additions) to platform sepolicy.
This allows partners to add their own policy without having to touch the AOSP sepolicy
directories and potentially disrupting compatibility with an AOSP system image.

Bug: 36467375
Test: Add public and private files to sailfish policy and verify that they are
added to the appropriate policy files, but that the policy is otherwise identical.
Also add private/mapping/*.cil files in both locations and change the BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS
to trigger use of prebuilt mapping files and verify that they are appropriately
combined and built in policy.

Change-Id: I38efe2248520804a123603bb050bba75563fe45c
Merged-In: I38efe2248520804a123603bb050bba75563fe45c
(cherry picked from commit f893700c)

vendor implementations need to be able to run modprobe as part of
init.rc scripts.  They cannot do so because of the strict neverallow
currently in place that disallows all coredomains (including init)
to execute vendor toybox.

Fix this by adding init to the exception list for the neverallow so
vendors can then run modprobe from .rc scripts and also add the rule to
allow init to transition to modprobe domain using vendor_toolbox.

Bug: b/38212864
Test: Boot sailfish

Change-Id: Ib839246954e9002859f3ba986094f206bfead137
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Fix the following denial:
    avc: denied { append } for pid=1093 comm="mediaextractor" path="pipe:[68438]" dev="pipefs" ino=68438 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=1 ppid=1 pcomm="init" pgid=1 pgcomm="init"

Bug: http://b/38444258
Test: none
Change-Id: I58162e3a28b744a58396e77d6b0e2becb5633d6a
(cherry picked from commit 5efadd91)

Needed to allow lower power Play Music of downloaded files.

    05-24 10:12:49.331 24025 24025 W generic : type=1400
          audit(0.0:1259): avc: denied { read } for
          path="/data/data/com.google.android.music/files/music/925.mp3"
          dev="sda35" ino=2179256 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0
          tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file
          permissive=0

Test: Play Music
Bug: 62059834

Change-Id: I97bdb1d175dba8f7a8ec6cd9084323cfcd3660bd

Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks for the Tether Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.

Bug: 38417260
Test: New functionality. So we don't have any tests.
Change-Id: I2c95b290523c55c081afa1bca091f368559c9125
(cherry picked from commit 722249b3)

system_server: replace sys_resource with sys_ptrace am: 3d8dde0e am: dddbd2f3 am: 5ee08053 am: 6b3ef921
am: ed21f855

Change-Id: Iba0094323da99989b1abf4e7002facce9af20e39

am: 6b3ef921

Change-Id: Iefc3436c532f5f291345e3d01a1cbe175d69e619

am: 5ee08053

Change-Id: I530872c3d9a8ddf5a03353b27e75ea1043cd2ab2

am: dddbd2f3

Change-Id: I517d7bbd415e28d2ba7719f17c1ddcc7c28f20a0

am: 3d8dde0e

Change-Id: I19cb50ee62d217f025bb7fcf535257dac3b3610e

Commit https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/f0ce0eee added
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE as a capability check which would allow access to
sensitive /proc/PID files. However, in an SELinux based world, allowing
this access causes CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to duplicate what CAP_SYS_PTRACE
(without :process ptrace) already provides.

Use CAP_SYS_PTRACE instead of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

Test: Device boots, functionality remains identical, no sys_resource
denials from system_server.
Bug: 34951864
Bug: 38496951
Change-Id: I04d745b436ad75ee1ebecf0a61c6891858022e34
(cherry picked from commit 44866954)

Test: Boot sailfish with shared system image
Bug: 36814984
Change-Id: I2937c20c3b6ca7bf4edab66a74742c48e76c7687

Right now, the hwcomposer hidl hal is unable to figure out where
to get the hidl mapper implementation.

It is expected that all graphics composer objects will need this
permission. The interfaces are written to work together with the
"IMapper" being the same-process ("sphal") component and the
"IComposer" interface being the binderized compoenent.

10-09 00:24:38.900   457   457 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for
interface=android.hardware.graphics.mapper::IMapper pid=495
scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_composer_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:s0 tclass=hwservice_manager

Test: boot marlin, denial no longer present.
Bug: 38415912
Change-Id: I1b274be10e115fa7b53fb81e85be8827da05997e

Underlying data services setup no longer needs this

Bug: 35757613
Bug: 36085168
Test: GPS, XTRA & avc denial checks
Change-Id: I679ee70f65f34d5a7d1fc1f1fe92af6a92ec92c5

Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks from Wifi Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.
Combined cherry pick from d56aa1982d15acfc2408271138dac43f1e5dc987
and 66e27bf5

Bug: 32842314
Test: Unit tests, Mannual test to ensure Wifi can be brought up and
connected to an AP, ensure that Offload HAL service is running and that
that wificond can get the service handle by calling hwservicemanager.

Change-Id: I0fc51a4152f1891c8d88967e75d45ded115e766e

This hidl service provides information about vsync and hotplug
to vendor services which is required by at least some camera
hal implementations.

Test: VtsFwkDisplayServiceV1_0TargetTest
Test: no denials
Bug: 38311538
Change-Id: I64f0321e2832facf987057f0d48940e269d8e2d9

Currently, some jni libs in /vendor/lib are allowed to be executed
in java process by labelling them as same_process_hal_file. This is
wrong because those jni libs are not in fact same process HALs.

After b/37481404, those jni libs for vendor apks are embedded inside the
apk just like downloaded apks.

In order to make this possible, appdomain is allowed to execute
vendor_app_file. Note that allowing this is not a Treble violation because
vendor_app_file is Java and JNI code only. Native libraries in
/vendor/lib are still prevented from being loaded in apps except for
those are labeled as same_process_hal_file AND are loaded via the
'sphal' namespace.

Bug: 37481404
Test: Phone application does not crash.
Change-Id: Ifaece2f05d0b20e28c4b1c0847f5ea0bb28ade02