- Nov 04, 2016
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dcashman authored
Bug: 32290392 Test: Builds. Change-Id: I46e8af202b41131cfc9bb280f04a214859c9b0de
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- Nov 03, 2016
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Ruchi Kandoi authored
Bug: 31180823 Test: reduced sepolicy errors Change-Id: Ibfba2efa903adec340e37abec2afb3b94a262678 Signed-off-by:
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
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Ruchi Kandoi authored
Bug: 31177288 Test: reduced sepolicy errors Change-Id: I29556276ee14c341ac8f472875e6b69f903851ff Signed-off-by:
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
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- Nov 01, 2016
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Steven Moreland authored
Bug: 32022100 Test: end to end Change-Id: I5dd9b64c98a5c549fdaf9e47d5a92fa6963370c7
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Dianne Hackborn authored
Test: N/A Change-Id: Ib3c85118bf752152f5ca75ec13371073fc2873cc
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Jorge Lucangeli Obes authored
This is required for https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/295748 so that init can drop the capability bounding set for services. Bug: 32438163 Test: With 295748 and a test service using ambient capabilities. Change-Id: I57788517cfe2ef0e7a2f1dfab94d0cb967ede065
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Felipe Leme authored
- Allow dumpstate to create the dumpservice service. - Allow System Server and Shell to find that service. - Don't allow anyone else to create that service. - Don't allow anyone else to find that service. BUG: 31636879 Test: manual verification Change-Id: I642fe873560a2b123e6bafde645467d45a5f5711
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- Oct 31, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Nick Kralevich authored
The kernel domain exists solely on boot, and is used by kernel threads. Because of the way the system starts, there is never an entrypoint for that domain, not even a file on rootfs. So tighten up the neverallow restriction. Remove an obsolete comment. The *.rc files no longer have a setcon statement, and the transition from the kernel domain to init occurs because init re-execs itself. The statement no longer applies. Test: bullhead policy compiles. Change-Id: Ibe75f3d25804453507dbb05c7a07bba1d37a1c7b
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- Oct 29, 2016
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Nick Kralevich authored
system_server is currently allowed write (but not open) access to various app file descriptor types, to allow it to perform write operations on file descriptors passed to it from Android processes. However, system_server was not allowed to handle file descriptors open only for append operations. Write operations are a superset of that allowed by appendable operations, so it makes no sense to deny system_server the use of appendable file descriptors. Allow it for app data types, as well as a few other types (for robustness). Addresses the following denial generated when adb bugreport is run: type=1400 audit(0.0:12): avc: denied { append } for path="/data/user_de/0/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-MASTER-2016-10-29-08-13-50-dumpstate_log-6214.txt" dev="dm-2" ino=384984 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 32246161 Test: policy compiles Test: No more append denials when running adb shell am bug-report --progress Change-Id: Ia4e81cb0b3c3580fa9130952eedaed9cab3e8487
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Nick Kralevich authored
Addresses the following audit messages: [ 7.984957] type=1400 audit(33873666.610:40): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=1 comm="init" name="system@framework@boot-ext.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106324 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file [ 65.528068] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:96): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.530425] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:97): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.530487] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.530800] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.530842] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531138] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531176] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup" ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531465] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup" ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.531502] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.531789] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open } for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file [ 65.531827] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir [ 65.713056] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted { search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 32246161 Test: policy compiles Test: dumpstate no longer generates the audit messages above. Change-Id: Id5afe2ebeb24f8a7407aac1a0a09806b1521b0e4
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- Oct 28, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
* changes: wifi_hal: Rename to 'hal_wifi' wpa: Add permissions for hwbinder
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Nick Kralevich authored
Fixes the following SELinux messages when running adb bugreport: avc: granted { read } for name="libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { getattr } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read execute } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: granted { read } for name="system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { read open } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2" ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir [ 169.349480] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:129): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350030] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350361] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350399] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.350963] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351002] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351330] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351366] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351861] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.351910] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353105] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353186] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353594] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read } for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.353636] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.354230] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.354437] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file [ 169.395359] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file Test: policy compiles Test: adb bugreport runs without auditallow messages above. Bug: 32246161 Change-Id: Ie0ab2ed3c6babc1f93d3b8ae47c92dd905ebc93a
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Roshan Pius authored
Renaming the wifi HIDL implementation to 'hal_wifi' from 'wifi_hal_legacy' to conform with HIDL style guide. Denials: 01-01 21:55:23.896 2865 2865 I android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: wifi_hal_legacy is starting up... 01-01 21:55:23.898 2865 2865 W android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: /odm/lib64/hw/ does not exit. 01-01 21:55:23.899 2865 2865 F android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service: service.cpp:59] Check failed: service->registerAsService("wifi") == android::NO_ERROR (service->registerAsService("wifi")=-2147483646, android::NO_ERROR=0) Failed to register wifi HAL 01-01 21:55:23.899 2865 2865 F libc : Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 in tid 2865 (android.hardwar) 01-01 21:55:23.901 377 377 W : debuggerd: handling request: pid=2865 uid=2000 gid=2000 tid=2865 01-01 21:55:23.907 2867 2867 E : debuggerd: Unable to connect to activity manager (connect failed: Connection refused) 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: 'Android/aosp_angler/angler:7.0/NYC/rpius10031052:userdebug/test-keys' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Revision: '0' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm64' 01-01 21:55:23.908 2867 2867 F DEBUG : pid: 2865, tid: 2865, name: android.hardwar >>> /system/bin/hw/android.hardware.wifi@1.0-service <<< 01-01 21:55:23.909 2867 2867 F DEBUG : signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr -------- 01-01 21:55:23.910 2867 2867 F DEBUG : Abort message: 'service.cpp:59] Check failed: service->registerAsService("wifi") == android::NO_ERROR (service->registerAsService("wifi")=-2147483646, android::NO_ERROR=0) Failed to register wifi HAL' Bug: 31821133 Test: Compiled and ensured that the selinux denials are no longer present in logs. Change-Id: I5bbbcad307e9bb9e59fff87e2926751b3aecc813
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- Oct 27, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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William Roberts authored
Filesystem capabilities should only be set by the build tools or by recovery during an update. Place a neverallow ensuring this property. Change-Id: I136c5cc16dff0c0faa3799d0ab5e29b43454a610 Signed-off-by:
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
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- Oct 26, 2016
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Roshan Pius authored
Modify permissions for wpa_supplicant to use hwbinder (for HIDL), instead of binder. Denials: 01-15 14:31:58.573 541 541 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:10): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 01-15 14:31:58.573 541 541 W wpa_supplicant: type=1400 audit(0.0:11): avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:wpa:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0 BUG: 31365276 Test: Compiled and ensured that the selinux denials are no longer present in logs. Change-Id: Ifa4630edea6ec5a916b3940f9a03ef9dc6fc9af2
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Test: builds Bug: 32243668 Change-Id: I1ad4b53003462e932cf80b6972db1520dc66d735
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Bug: 32123421 Test: build Hikey Change-Id: Iaf02626f3f3a94104c0f9d746c3cf5f20751a27d
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- Oct 25, 2016
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Connor O'Brien authored
Bug: 31864052 Test: Logging confirms service runs on boot Merged-In: I41e9e5c45d2d42886cdf7ff6d364e9e6e3df1ff4 Change-Id: I41e9e5c45d2d42886cdf7ff6d364e9e6e3df1ff4 Signed-off-by:
Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
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Treehugger Robot authored
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- Oct 24, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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- Oct 21, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Mikhail Naganov authored
Change-Id: Iaa9907ed516c947175a59bf49938c0ee03b4f6d1
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Remove and neverallow isolated_app access to external storage and USB accessories. Test: aosp_angler-userdebug builds Bug: 21643067 Change-Id: Ie912706a954a38610f2afd742b1ab4b8cd4b1f36
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Felipe Leme authored
BUG: 31001899 Test: manual Change-Id: I8d462b40d931310eab26bafa09645ac88f13fc97
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Craig Donner authored
Test: built and ran on device. Bug: 31442830 Change-Id: Idd7870b4dd70eed8cd4dc55e292be39ff703edd2
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- Oct 20, 2016
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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Treehugger Robot authored
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- Oct 19, 2016
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Jeff Vander Stoep authored
Test: builds Change-Id: Idd1d90a89a9ecbb2738d6b483af0e8479e87aa15
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William Roberts authored
If in invalid policy file is loaded check_seapp outputs: Error: Could not lod policy file to db: Success! The "Success" value is from errno, which is not manipulated by libsepol. Also, load should have an a in it! Hardcode the error message to: Error: Could not load policy file to db: invalid input file! Test: That when providing an invalid sepolicy binary, that the output message is correct. Change-Id: Iaf1f85eeb217d484997ee1367d91d461c1195bf4 Signed-off-by:
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
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Prashant Malani authored
Renaming vibrator sepolicy to remove the version number. Also moving the related binder_call() to maintain alphabetical order. Bug: 32123421 Change-Id: I2bfa835085519ed10f61ddf74e7e668dd12bda04 Test: booted, and checked vibrate on keypress on bullhead
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- Oct 18, 2016
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Prashant Malani authored
Helps fix vibrator HAL open issue avc: denied { write } for pid=907 comm="system_server" name="enable" dev="sysfs" ino=20423 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 32209928 Bug: 32225232 Test: m, booted, tested keypad to make sure vibrator works Change-Id: I4977c42b7fac0c9503be04b6520487f2d6cbc903
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