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  1. Oct 14, 2015
    • William Roberts's avatar
      neverallow: domain:file execute and entrypoint · f25304ee
      William Roberts authored
      
      Occasionally, files get labeled with the domain type rather
      than the executable file type. This can work if the author
      uses domain_auto_trans() versus init_daemon_domain(). This
      will cause a lot of issues and is typically not what the
      author intended.
      
      Another case where exec on domain type might occur, is if
      someone attempts to execute a /proc/pid file, this also
      does not make sense.
      
      To prevent this, we add a neverallow.
      
      Change-Id: I39aff58c8f5a2f17bafcd2be33ed387199963b5f
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWilliam Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
      f25304ee
  2. Oct 13, 2015
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Remove ptrace from app.te · de11f501
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Remove ptrace from app.te, and only add it to the app domains
      which explicitly require it.
      
      Change-Id: I327aabd154ae07ce90e3529dee2b324ca125dd16
      de11f501
  3. Oct 10, 2015
  4. Oct 07, 2015
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      delete procrank SELinux domain. · 9e6effa1
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Simplify SELinux policy by deleting the procrank SELinux domain.
      procrank only exists on userdebug/eng builds, and anyone wanting
      to run procrank can just su to root.
      
      Bug: 18342188
      Change-Id: I71adc86a137c21f170d983e320ab55be79457c16
      9e6effa1
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Do not allow untrusted_app to open tun_device · de53051a
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Third party vpn apps must receive open tun fd from the framework
      for device traffic.
      
      neverallow untrusted_app open perm and auditallow bluetooth
      access to see if the neverallow rule can be expanded to include
      all of appdomain.
      
      Bug: 24677682
      Change-Id: I68685587228a1044fe1e0f96d4dc08c2adbebe78
      de53051a
    • David Zeuthen's avatar
      Move update_engine policy to AOSP. · a10f789d
      David Zeuthen authored
      The update_engine daemon from Brillo is expected to be used also in
      Android so move its selinux policy to AOSP.
      
      Put update_engine in the whitelist (currently only has the recovery
      there) allowing it to bypass the notallow for writing to partititions
      labeled as system_block_device.
      
      Also introduce the misc_block_device dev_type as update_engine in some
      configurations may need to read/write the misc partition. Start
      migrating uncrypt to use this instead of overly broad
      block_device:blk_file access.
      
      Bug: 23186405
      Test: Manually tested with Brillo build.
      
      Change-Id: Icf8cdb4133d4bbdf14bacc6c0fa7418810ac307a
      a10f789d
  5. Oct 06, 2015
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      remove "allow vold block_device:blk_file create_file_perms;" · 7e86e19d
      Nick Kralevich authored
      vold hasn't use the generic "block_device" label since
      commit 273d7ea4 (Sept 2014), and
      the auditallow statement in vold hasn't triggered since that time.
      
      Remove the rule which allows vold access to the generic block_device
      label, and remove the vold exception.
      
      Thanks to jorgelo for reminding me about this.
      
      Change-Id: Idd6cdc20f5be9a40c5c8f6d43bbf902a475ba1c9
      7e86e19d
  6. Oct 03, 2015
  7. Oct 01, 2015
  8. Sep 29, 2015
  9. Sep 28, 2015
  10. Sep 22, 2015
  11. Sep 19, 2015
  12. Sep 18, 2015
  13. Sep 16, 2015
  14. Sep 15, 2015
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