Remove references to /data/security and the corresponding
type securitly_file.

Bug: 26544104
Change-Id: Iac00c293daa6b781a24c2bd4c12168dfb1cceac6

This macro does not give us anything to it.

Change-Id: Ie0b56716cc0144f0a59849647cad31e06a25acf1

Instead of allowing global read access to all properties,
only allow read access to the properties which are part of
core SELinux policy. Device-specific policies are no longer
readable by default and need to be granted in device-specific
policy.

Grant read-access to any property where the person has write
access. In most cases, anyone who wants to write a property
needs read access to that property.

Change-Id: I2bd24583067b79f31b3bb0940b4c07fc33d09918

Properties are now broken up from a single /dev/__properties__ file into
multiple files, one per property label.  This commit provides the
mechanism to control read access to each of these files and therefore
sets of properties.

This allows full access for all domains to each of these new property
files to match the current permissions of /dev/__properties__.  Future
commits will restrict the access.

Bug: 21852512

Change-Id: Ie9e43968acc7ac3b88e354a0bdfac75b8a710094

Remove system server's permission to dynamically update SELinux
policy on the device.

1) This functionality has never been used, so we have no idea if
it works or not.

2) If system_server is compromised, this functionality allows a
complete bypass of the SELinux policy on the device. In particular,
an attacker can force a regression of the following patch
  * https://android-review.googlesource.com/138510
see also https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=181826

3) Dynamic policy update can be used to bypass neverallow protections
enforced in CTS, by pushing a policy to the device after certification.
Such an updated policy could bring the device out of compliance or
deliberately introduce security weaknesses.

Bug: 22885422
Bug: 8949824
Change-Id: I3c64d64359060561102e1587531836b69cfeef00

On user and userdebug builds, system_server only loads executable
content from /data/dalvik_cache and /system. JITing for system_server
is only supported on eng builds. Remove the rules for user and
userdebug builds.

Going forward, the plan of record is that system_server will never
use JIT functionality, instead using dex2oat or interpreted mode.

Inspired by https://android-review.googlesource.com/98944

Change-Id: I54515acaae4792085869b89f0d21b87c66137510

Allow vold, healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd access to /dev/kmsg.
These processes log to the kernel dmesg ring buffer, so they need
write access to that file.

Addresses the following denials:

    avc: denied { write } for pid=134 comm="watchdogd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:watchdogd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
    avc: denied { write } for pid=166 comm="healthd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
    avc: denied { write } for pid=180 comm="vold" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

These denials were triggered by the change in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/151209 . Prior to that change,
any code which called klog_init would (unnecessarily) create the
device node themselves, rather than using the already existing device
node.

Drop special /dev/__null__ handling from watchdogd. As of
https://android-review.googlesource.com/148288 , watchdogd no longer
creates it's own /dev/null device, so it's unnecessary for us
to allow for it.

Drop mknod from healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd. healthd and slideshow
only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__, which is now obsolete.
watchdogd only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__ and /dev/__null__,
which again is now obsolete.

(cherry picked from e2651972)

Bug: 21242418
Change-Id: If01c8001084575e7441253f0fa8b4179ae33f534

service_manager_local_audit_domain was used to fine tune the service_manager
auditallow rules when introducing the service_manager SELinux rules.  This is no
longer needed.

(cherry-pick of commit: eab26faa)

Bug: 21656807
Change-Id: Ia042a887e7bf9eb2a2b08b8d831e68dfe6395f75

service_manager_local_audit_domain was used to fine tune the service_manager
auditallow rules when introducing the service_manager SELinux rules.  This is no
longer needed.

Bug: 21656807
Change-Id: Ia042a887e7bf9eb2a2b08b8d831e68dfe6395f75

Allow vold, healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd access to /dev/kmsg.
These processes log to the kernel dmesg ring buffer, so they need
write access to that file.

Addresses the following denials:

    avc: denied { write } for pid=134 comm="watchdogd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:watchdogd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
    avc: denied { write } for pid=166 comm="healthd" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
    avc: denied { write } for pid=180 comm="vold" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=9248 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

These denials were triggered by the change in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/151209 . Prior to that change,
any code which called klog_init would (unnecessarily) create the
device node themselves, rather than using the already existing device
node.

Drop special /dev/__null__ handling from watchdogd. As of
https://android-review.googlesource.com/148288 , watchdogd no longer
creates it's own /dev/null device, so it's unnecessary for us
to allow for it.

Drop mknod from healthd, slideshow, and watchdogd. healthd and slideshow
only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__, which is now obsolete.
watchdogd only needed mknod to create /dev/__kmsg__ and /dev/__null__,
which again is now obsolete.

Bug: 21242418
Change-Id: If01c8001084575e7441253f0fa8b4179ae33f534

Encourage the use of set_prop macro by making existing
unix_socket_connect(domain, property, init) calls
warn at compile time. When encountering one of these macros,
m4 will emit a deprecated message as follows:

m4: external/sepolicy/adbd.te: 97: deprecated: unix_socket_connect(adbd, property, init) Please use set_prop(adbd, <property name>) instead.

Change-Id: I997fed75d2683933e08db8b9efeecea71523c7c3
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>

A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service

The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.

To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)

This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.

No difference in sediff is expected.

(cherrypicked from commit 625a3526)

Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>

A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service

The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.

To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)

This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.

No difference in sediff is expected.

Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>

- allow access for /data/system/packages.xml.
- deprecate access to /dev/logd_debug (can use /dev/kmsg for debugging)
- allow access to /dev/socket/logd for 'logd --reinit'

Bug: 19681572
Change-Id: Iac57fff1aabc3b061ad2cc27969017797f8bef54

Encountered when certinstaller tries to talk to keystore:
ComponentInfo{com.android.certinstaller/com.android.certinstaller.CertInstaller}: java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'int android.security.IKeystoreService.test()' on a null object reference

Address the following denial:
avc:  denied  { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 19347232
Change-Id: I35b46da3c78b384cf04216be937c6b5bfa86452d

No longer used.  :-)

Change-Id: I687cc36404e8ad8b899b6e76b1de7ee8c5392e07

Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.

Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef

Used to record the Android log messages, then on reboot
provide a means to triage user-space actitivies leading
up to a panic. A companion to the pstore console logs.

Change-Id: I9b94ee3d5e94e0c4590ba8453b4ac1ebdfc7603f

In order to support the new goldfish service domains in
a change with the same Change-Id for the build project, we need
the following changes in external/sepolicy:
- /system/bin/logcat needs its own type so that it can be used as an
entrypoint for the goldfish-logcat service.  A neverallow rule prevents
us from allowing entrypoint to any type not in exec_type.
- The config. and dalvik. property namespaces need to be labeled
with something other than default_prop so that the qemu-props
service can set them.  A neverallow rule prevents us from allowing
qemu-props to set default_prop.

We allow rx_file_perms to logcat_exec for any domain that
was previously allowed read_logd() as many programs will read
the logs by running logcat.  We do not do this for all domains
as it would violate a neverallow rule on the kernel domain executing
any file without transitioning to another domain, and as we ultimately
want to apply the same restriction to the init domain (and possibly others).

Change-Id: Idce1fb5ed9680af84788ae69a5ace684c6663974
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Merge conflict resolution patch 11a29f29
inadvertently dropped a comment line. Pick it back up.

Change-Id: I0f7a7cdbdacafb86610595ee616e84a06da50a17

A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
when handling AOSP contributions.

Resolve those conflicts.

This is essentially a revert of bf696327
for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.

Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c

Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.

Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e

Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.

Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d)

Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964

Add keystore_key class and an action for each action supported
by keystore. Add policies that replicate the access control that
already exists in keystore. Add auditallow rules for actions
not known to be used frequently. Add macro for those domains
wishing to access keystore.

Change-Id: Iddd8672b9e9b72b45ee208e6eda608cc9dc61edc

As reported by sepolicy-analyze -D -P /path/to/sepolicy.
No semantic difference reported by sediff between the policy
before and after this change.

Deduplication of selinuxfs read access resolved by taking the
common rules to domain.te (and thereby getting rid of the
selinux_getenforce macro altogether).

Change-Id: I4de2f86fe2efe11a167e8a7d25dd799cefe482e5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

write_logd() is allowed for domain, which means that all domains
are permitted read/write access to /dev. That's overly permissive
and causes substantial differences between user and userdebug/eng
devices.

Remove domain device:dir rw_dir_perms access. It's not needed.

Allow all domains to write/append to logd_debug. logd is responsible
for creating this file if need be. Remove logd_debug file create
permissions. This also eliminates the need for the type_transition
rules.

Bug: 15419803

(cherry picked from commit 2bcea0a3)

Change-Id: If430615a3f3118124be331da518afc41f27aab5f

write_logd() is allowed for domain, which means that all domains
are permitted read/write access to /dev. That's overly permissive
and causes substantial differences between user and userdebug/eng
devices.

Remove domain device:dir rw_dir_perms access. It's not needed.

Allow all domains to write/append to logd_debug. logd is responsible
for creating this file if need be. Remove logd_debug file create
permissions. This also eliminates the need for the type_transition
rules.

Bug: 15419803
Change-Id: I7dc3c4df8d413c649c24ae7bc15546d64226ce3b

Create a separate recovery policy and only include the
recovery domain allow rules in it.

Change-Id: I444107f9821eabf4164ba07a44d03bd71e719989
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Introduce wakelock_use(). This macro declares that a domain uses
wakelocks.

Wakelocks require both read-write access to files in /sys/power, and
CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND. This macro helps ensure that both capabilities and
file access are granted at the same time.

Still TODO: fix device specific wakelock use.

Change-Id: Ib98ff374a73f89e403acd9f5e024988f59f08115

This was originally to limit the ability to relabel files to
particular types given the ability of all domains to relabelfrom
unlabeled files.  Since the latter was removed by
Ied84f8b4b1a0896c1b9f7d783b7463ce09d4807b, this no longer serves
any purpose.

Change-Id: Ic41e94437188183f15ed8b3732c6cd5918da3397
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change folds the shared_app, media_app, and release_app
domains into untrusted_app, reducing the set of app domains down
to just distinct domains for the fixed UID apps (e.g. system_app, bluetooth,
nfc, radio), a single domain for apps signed by the platform key
(platform_app), and a single domain for all other apps (untrusted_app).
Thus, SELinux only distinguishes when already distinguished by a predefined
Android ID (AID) or by the platform certificate (which get the signature-only
Android permissions and thus may require special OS-level accesses).

It is still possible to introduce specific app domains for specific
apps by adding signer and package stanzas to mac_permissions.xml,
but this can be done on an as-needed basis for specialized apps that
require particular OS-level permissions outside the usual set.

As there is now only a single platform app domains, get rid of the
platformappdomain attribute and platform_app_domain() macro.  We used
to add mlstrustedsubject to those domains but drop this since we are not
using MLS in AOSP presently; we can revisit which domains need it if/when
we use MLS.

Since we are dropping the shared, media, and release seinfo entries from
seapp_contexts, drop them from mac_permissions.xml as well.  However,
we leave the keys.conf entries in case someone wants to add a signer
entry in the future for specific apps signed by those keys to
mac_permissions.xml.

Change-Id: I877192cca07360c4a3c0ef475f016cc273e1d968
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=2758 comm="mediaserver" name="mediaserver" dev="mmcblk0p22" ino=169 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=2758 comm="mediaserver" path="/system/bin/mediaserver" dev="mmcblk0p22" ino=169 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Ifee9e6fa87ae933639ce0b1d69a2feee460cf31f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

- Add write_logd, read_logd and control_logd macros added along
  with contexts for user space logd.
- Specify above on domain wide, or service-by-service basis
- Add logd rules.
- deprecate access_logcat as unused.
- 'allow <domain> zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;' rule added to
  deal with fd inheritance. ToDo: investigate means to allow
  references to close, and reopen in context of application
  or call setsockcreatecon() to label them in child context.

Change-Id: I35dbb9d5122c5ed9b8c8f128abf24a871d6b26d8

Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.

Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.

This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.

Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.

Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858

Create a new m4 macro called userdebug_or_eng. Arguments
passed to this macro are only emitted if we're performing
a userdebug or eng build.

Merge shell.te and shell_user.te and eliminate duplicate
lines. Same for su.te and su_user.te

Change-Id: I8fbabca65ec392aeafd5b90cef57b5066033fad0

tmpfs_domain() macro defines a per-domain type and
allows access for tmpfs-backed files, including ashmem
regions.  execute-related permissions crept into it,
thereby allowing write + execute to ashmem regions for
most domains.  Move the execute permission out of tmpfs_domain()
to app_domain() and specific domains as required.
Drop execmod for now we are not seeing it.

Similarly, execute permission for /dev/ashmem crept into
binder_use() as it was common to many binder using domains.
Move it out of binder_use() to app_domain() and specific domains
as required.

Change-Id: I66f1dcd02932123eea5d0d8aaaa14d1b32f715bb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Also make su and shell permissive in non-user builds to allow
use of setenforce without violating the neverallow rule.

Change-Id: Ie76ee04e90d5a76dfaa5f56e9e3eb7e283328a3f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Allow tmpfs_domains the ability to write to ashmem allocated
regions. At least one Google internal app does this, and switching
untrusted_app into enforcing causes the following denial:

<5>[  291.791423] type=1400 audit(1385587240.320:79): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=3774 comm="XXXXXXXXXXXX" path=2F6465762F6173686D656D202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=16937 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:untrusted_app_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file

path=/dev/ashmem (deleted)

Bug: 11891764

(cherry picked from commit 47685535)

Change-Id: I1b8fcb82b7d21291707f18364486beb2fa9eb332