Denials seen on hammerhead but seem
appropriate for general policy.

<5>[ 8.339347] type=1400 audit(3731546.390:17): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=314 comm="rild" path="socket:[7996]" dev="sockfs" ino=7996 scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket
<5>[ 8.339065] type=1400 audit(3731546.390:16): avc: denied { create } for pid=314 comm="rild" scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket
<5>[ 11.232121] type=1400 audit(3731549.289:22): avc: denied { read } for pid=620 comm="rild" scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket

Change-Id: Ieaca5360afbb44d5da21c7c24bdd5e7c5758f0a2

Change-Id: I6df9981b2af0150c6379a0ebdbe0a8597c994f4a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245

Change-Id: Ie0ee266e9e6facb2ab2abd652f68765239a41af1

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1

Change-Id: Iafe68ac1b742e40c1a23a2f6cfd6373ea89cc07b

Change-Id: Ia7457e3fd4f1100bbee821f412e80ba17fede5ec

Change-Id: I448a5553937a98775178b94f289ccb45ae862876
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I448a5553937a98775178b94f289ccb45ae862876
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Assortment of policy changes include:
 * Bluetooth domain to talk to init and procfs.
 * New device node domains.
 * Allow zygote to talk to its executable.
 * Update system domain access to new device node domains.
 * Create a post-process sepolicy with dontaudits removed.
 * Allow rild to use the tty device.

Change-Id: Ibb96b590d0035b8f6d1606cd5e4393c174d10ffb
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Two new types are introduced:
sdcard_internal
sdcard_external

The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute
sdcard_type is introduced.

The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for
controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external
sdcards.

Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5

perms.

Tested on a maguro variant.

Only label properties with the ril. prefix with rild_prop.
Allow rild and system (and radio) to set radio_prop.
Only rild can set rild_prop presently.

New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.